129 So. 117 | La. | 1930
This is a suit to annul a tax assessment of a partly constructed building, or, in the alternative, to reduce the assessment from $36,000 to $13,500. The construction was commenced in October, 1928, and was one-fourth completed on the 1st of January, 1929. The contract price of the building, a three-story brick apartment house, was $90,000. In the assessment of the plaintiff's property for the year 1929, the lots on which the building was being constructed were assessed at $4,610, a frame building on the lots was assessed at $1,000, and the partly constructed apartment house was assessed at $36,000. Plaintiff did not complain of the assessment of the lots, or of the assessment of the frame building, but contended that the partly constructed building was not an improvement or an enhancement of the value of the lots, and was therefore not subject to taxation as long as it was not completed.
The defendants, tax commission, assessor, and tax collector, filed an exception of no cause or right of action and a plea of prescription of thirty days. The plea of prescription was founded upon the second section of Act No. 97 of 1924, p. 152, providing that a suit contesting the correctness or legality of an assessment cannot prevail unless brought within thirty days after the date of filing of the assessment rolls in the office of the clerk of court. The exception of no cause or right of action and the plea of prescription were *651 submitted together for decision on the admission that the suit was filed on the thirty-second day after the date of filing of the assessment rolls in the office of the clerk of court.
The district judge maintained the plea of prescription, dismissed the suit, and condemned the plaintiff to pay the statutory penalty of 10 per cent. attorney's fee, on the amount of taxes in contest. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal; and the court, on its own motion, and on the authority of City of New Orleans v. Arthurs, 36 La. Ann. 98; State v. Voorhies, Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 41 La. Ann. 540, 6 So. 821, V. A. Meyer Co. v. Pleasant, Tax Collector, 41 La. Ann. 645, 6 So. 258, and State v. Rosenstream, Weiss Co., 52 La. Ann. 2126, 28 So. 294, transferred the case to this court (127 So. 12), on the ground that the plaintiff's contention that the incomplete building was not subject to taxation raised a question of legality of the tax, and not merely a question of legality of the assessment.
It is conceded by appellant's counsel — and could not well be denied — that the alternative demand for a reduction of the assessment of the incomplete building from $36,000 to $13,500, if the incomplete building was subject to taxation, was barred by the limitation in the second section of Act No. 97 of 1924. There is no reason why the incomplete building should not have been assessed for taxes as a part of the real estate. The admission in the plaintiff's petition that the building was one-fourth completed and would be worth $90,000 when completed, with the alternative demand for a reduction of the assessment to $13,500, if it should be held valid, was an admission that the incomplete building was property of some value. The second section of Act No. 109 of 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 233, levying taxes for the annual revenue of the state, declares that the term "property," as therein *652 used, shall include every form, character and kind of property, real, personal and mixed, tangible and intangible, "and every other thing of value, in possession, on hand, or under the control, at any time during the calendar year for which taxes are levied, within the State of Louisiana, of any person, firm, partnership, association of persons, or corporation," etc. Act No. 170 of 1898, p. 386, which, as amended, is the current revenue law, declares (in section 91, subsec. 1) that the term "real estate" shall be held to mean and include, not only land, city, town and village lots, but all things thereunto pertaining, and all structures and other things so annexed and attached thereto as to pass to the vendee by a conveyance of the land or lot. Under that definition the partly constructed apartment house of the appellant was properly assessed as a part of the real estate.
Appellant cites three decisions to support the proposition that a building in course of construction is not subject to taxation as a part of the real estate, viz. Bunkie Brick Works v. Police Jury,
The judgment dismissing this suit and condemning the plaintiff to pay the attorney's fee is affirmed. *654