61 Mass. App. Ct. 638 | Mass. App. Ct. | 2004
The defendants appeal from a summary judgment of the Superior Court, declaring that they hold no rights in a way crossing the plaintiffs’ property, as shown on a 1971 plan of subdivision. The way was never constructed on the ground in
Facts. The undisputed facts may be summarized as follows, with reference to the sketch plan attached to this opinion as an appendix for assistance in understanding the configuration and spatial relationships of the various parcels.
The DeMellos own property, on which their residence is located, consisting of four contiguous lots in Mattapoisett. They acquired the property under two separate deeds. The first deed, from Alfred E. Faria and Elizabeth F. Faria and dated October 17, 1963, conveyed the largest lot, with its frontage on the northerly side of Acushnet Road (an improved and regularly traveled public way). The second deed, from Alfred E. Faria (Elizabeth having died), was dated January 20, 1972, and conveyed the three smaller lots. The lots conveyed under the 1972 deed had no frontage on Acushnet Road, but were contiguous to the northern boundary of the lot conveyed under the 1963 deed.
The 1972 deed described the land conveyed thereunder as “ [beginning at a point... in the westerly sideline of a proposed way known as Stevens Street as shown on a plan hereinafter described.” That plan is a 1971 plan, endorsed as “approval not required” under the subdivision control law, see G. L. c. 41, § 81P, that reconfigured and divided into three lots the lot formerly shown as lot 52 on a subdivision plan of land approved by the Mattapoisett planning board in 1964, and duly recorded with the registry of deeds.
“Subject to the condition that the grantee is aware that ‘Stevens Street’ is a proposed way and is not in existence and the grantor undertakes noobligation [sic] or makes no representations or warranty that said street will be constructed or that he will begin construction on said street, or that any utilities will be installed in said street, grantor reserves title to said way subject to the grantee’s right to use said way in common with others for ingress and egress to the granted premises. And grantor reserves the right to grant easements in common over said way to others or to grant easements to any utility company or to the Town for municipal services over, under or across said way.”
In 1986, Faria conveyed to James B. Lanagan, III, approximately 5.2 acres of land, consisting (according to the deed) of “Steven Street, part of Joseph Street and Lots 23, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 50, and 53” on the subdivision plan approved by the Mattapoisett planning board in 1964. Though, as noted, the 1986 deed referred to Steven Street by reference to the 1964 plan, it did not state that the conveyance was subject to any rights of way held by other parties in Steven Street. By comparison, the 1986 deed expressly stated that it was subject to two easements held by New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Company.
In May of 1991, Lanagan’s development trust gained approval of a subdivision plan which, of relevance to the parties’ dispute, shortened the way formerly shown as Steven Street to a
Discussion. The motion judge considered whether the De-Mellos held an easement either by express grant or by estoppel. On the question of express grant, the judge concluded that the easement granted to the DeMellos under the 1972 deed was subject to a condition subsequent, unlimited in time and uncertain of satisfaction, and was therefore void under the rule against perpetuities.
a. Express grant. “The basic principle governing the
The language of limitation the motion judge construed as imposing a condition on the creation of the DeMellos’ rights in the way appears instead merely to disclaim any obligation on the part of the grantor to construct the way. Nothing in the deed purports to limit any use the grantees might make of the way, or states that their rights of ingress and egress (to which the grantor’s reservation of the fee was expressly subject)
The effect of the unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the easement grant is exacerbated by the application of the rule against perpetuities to void it. The principles governing interpretation of a deed are similar to those governing contract interpretation. In the case of the latter, “[a]n interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all of the provisions of a contract is to be preferred to one which leaves a part useless or inexplicable.” Jacobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 417
b. Estoppel. “[W]hen a grantor conveys land bounded on a street or way, he and those claiming under him are estopped to deny the existence of such street or way, and the right thus acquired by the grantee (an easement of way) is not only coextensive with the land conveyed, but embraces the entire length of the way, as it is then laid out or clearly indicated and prescribed.” Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 677-678 (1965), quoting from Casella v. Sneierson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 (1949). Similarly, “where land situated on a street is conveyed according to a recorded plan on which the street is shown, the grantor and those claiming under him are estopped to deny the existence of the street for the entire distance as shown on the plan.” Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 755 (1945) (citations omitted). “This rule is applicable even if the way is not yet in existence, so long as it is contemplated and sufficiently designated.” Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., supra at 678. “The rights also apply even if the way under
In concluding that the DeMellos do not hold rights in Steven Street under an easement by estoppel, the motion judge observed that the 1986 deed from Faria to Lanagan did not describe the land conveyed thereunder as bounded by Steven Street, and that the 1963 deed from the Farias to the DeMellos did not refer to Steven Street at all. However, the easement at issue arose for the benefit of the land conveyed under the 1972 deed, so the language of the 1963 deed, concerning other land, is irrelevant; moreover, the subdivision plan which laid out Steven Street was not submitted to the Mattapoisett planning board for approval until 1964. As to the effect of the 1986 deed from Faria to Lanagan, Faria and his grantees (including Lanagan and the plaintiffs as his successors in interest) were estopped to deny the existence of the way from and after the 1972 deed. In any event, at least part of the reason the 1986 deed did not describe the land as bounded by the way is that the land conveyed thereunder included the fee of the way; the 1986 deed did refer to Steven Street by name and by reference to the subdivision plan delineating its precise layout.
The case for estoppel is perhaps even more pronounced in the present case than in the usual circumstances, since Faria relied on Steven Street to provide the frontage required for endorsement of the 1971 plan as “approval not required.” Though the 1971 plan noted that lot 52C was to be combined with the adjacent DeMello property (and could thereby rely on its frontage), and lot 52B was to be combined with the Faria lot situated to its west (which also had frontage), lot 49 (with which lot 52A was to be combined) had no frontage on any way other than Steven Street. Accordingly, the plan dividing lot 52A from the larger lot 52 was eligible for endorsement as “approval not required” only by reliance on the frontage furnished to the combined lots 49 and 52A by Steven Street, “a way shown on a plan theretofore approved and endorsed in accordance with the subdivision control law.” G. L. c. 41, § 81L, twelfth par., cl. (b). The very plan delineating the boundaries of the land Faria conveyed to the DeMellos under the 1972 deed relied on Steven Street to meet the legal requirements applic
As illustrated by such cases as Murphy, supra, and Canton Highlands, supra, it is of no consequence that Steven Street was not built or staked out on the ground at the time of the 1972 deed. Wellwood v. Havrah Mishna Anshi Sphard Cemetery Corp., 254 Mass. 350 (1926), and Walter Kassuba Realty Corp. v. Akeson, 359 Mass. 725 (1971), cited by the motion judge as resting on that distinction, involved rights claimed in unimproved ways shown on a recorded plan as extending beyond the plaintiffs’ land and leading to no other improved or traveled way. See Wellwood, supra at 355; Kassuba, supra at 728. By comparison, the way in the present case leads directly from the land conveyed under the 1972 deed to the nearest public way, and is the only means to reach the public way from such land without traversing the DeMellos’ other land, on which they previously had developed their house and yard. Moreover, insofar as the DeMellos’ rights depend on a determination of the intent of the parties, the circumstances bearing on intent are strikingly similar to those considered in Scagel v. Jones, 355 Mass. 208, 210 (1969) (way arose by implication over strip abutting granted premises, even though not designated as way on plan referred to in deed).
Conclusion. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed. A new judgment shall enter, declaring that the DeMellos have an easement for ingress and egress over the way shown as Steven Street on the 1971 plan, including so much of the improved way now called Brook Trout Lane as is within the limits of Steven Street.
So ordered.
The plan depicts the way as “Steven Street,” rather than “Stevens Street” as described in the deed. The parties place no significance on the difference, nor do we.
A division of land into multiple lots does not require approval under the subdivision control law if each resulting lot has sufficient frontage along a suitable way. See G. L. c. 41, §§ 81L, 81P. The purpose of § 81P “was to alleviate the ‘difficulty . . . encountered by registers of deeds in deciding
The deed included certain other property, not relevant for our purposes.
Like the 1986 deed to Lanagan, both the 1991 deed in lieu of foreclosure and the 1992 deed to the plaintiffs stated that the property was subject to two easements to New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Company and, though referring by name and by reference to the plan creating Faria’s Field Road, did not expressly state that the property was subject to rights of any other party in Faria’s Field Road or the former Steven Street.
Under the view expressed by the motion judge, the easement would not arise unless and until the grantor constructed the way.
Though, as illustrated below, the requirements for an easement by estoppel are quite clearly satisfied by the facts of this case, we discuss the somewhat
Had Faria not expressly reserved the fee in the way, portions of it would have passed to the DeMellos under G. L. c. 183, § 58.
Even if the easement grant were subject to a condition subsequent, it is unclear why we should not consider the condition satisfied by the later construction of the renamed, and shortened, Faria’s Field Road, at least as to the portion of the way actually constructed. Nothing in the terms of the condition suggests that it would not be satisfied by construction of the way under a different name, by a person other than Faria, or for only a portion of its proposed length — at least for so much of the way as actually constructed. The statutory modifications to the common law rule against perpetuities adopted under St. 1954, c. 641, and St. 1989, c. 668, “had the effect of validating executory interests of the type described, which would otherwise be held void under the rule against perpetuities, but limited them to thirty years’ duration.” Oak’s Oil Serv., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 597-598 (1983) (discussing provisions of former G. L. c. 184A, § 3, now contained in G. L. c. 184A, § 7). Accordingly, the fact that it was possible at the time of the grant that its condition might never be satisfied does not invalidate the grant ab initia, and the interest conditionally granted would vest if the condition were satisfied within thirty years.
