David Esteppe v. Baltimore City Police Department
No. 47, September Term 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
August 25, 2021
Opinion by McDonald, J.
Cirсuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 24-C-13-001297. Argument: April 8, 2021
Local Government Tort Claims Act – Tortious Act or Omission of Local Government Employee - Scope of Employment. Under the Local Government Tort Claims Act,
Local Government Tort Claims Act – Scope of Employment – Summary Judgment. A circuit court may not grant summary judgment against a police department and hold, as a matter of law, that a police officer‘s tortious conduct fell within the scope of the officer‘s employment when the record before the court contains evidence that the conduct was motivated by personal reasons and there is no factual support in the record that the officer acted, even in part, in furtherance of the interests of the police department.
Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.
This appeal concerns the effort of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent David Esteppe,2 who won a judgment for damages in his tort action against a Baltimore City police detective, to collect that judgment from Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Baltimore City Police Department (“the Police Department“) and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City (“the City“). This case has proceeded in three acts during the past decade.
In Act I, in 2012 a Baltimore City police detective, Adam Lewellen, committed perjury to obtain a search warrant for Mr. Esteppe‘s home, and instigated a prosecution of Mr. Esteppe, in an effort to please Mr. Esteppe‘s еstranged girlfriend, who was an old friend of Mr. Lewellen. When the internal affairs unit of the Police Department learned of Mr. Lewellen‘s deception, Mr. Lewellen attempted to obstruct its investigation. Eventually, the prosecution of Mr. Esteppe was dropped,
In Act II, Mr. Esteppe sued Mr. Lewellen in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the torts of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligence, violation of rights secured by the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and civil conspiracy. During the bench trial of that action in 2014, Mr. Esteppe emphasized the absence of a legitimate law enforcement purpose for his prosecution and Mr. Lewellen‘s personal motive for pursuing it. At the conclusion of the trial, the Circuit Court found Mr. Lewellen liable for negligence, violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and civil conspiracy; the court granted Mr. Lewellen‘s motion for judgment on Mr. Esteppe‘s other claims. The сourt awarded damages in favor of Mr. Esteppe in the amount of $167,007.67. Esteppe v. Lewellen, 2014 WL 7636156 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2014). The Circuit Court did not make any finding, one way or the other, as to whether Mr. Lewellen was acting within the scope of employment for purposes of the LGTCA.3
Mr. Lewellen appealed. The Circuit Court‘s decision was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in 2015, again without
In Act III, Mr. Esteppe, believing that the LGTCA made the Pоlice Department liable for the damages award against Mr. Lewellen, asked the Baltimore City Solicitor whether the City would pay the damages award pursuant to a memorandum of understanding (“MOU“) that the City had with the Police Department.4 Mr. Esteppe was advised that the Police Department believed that it was not responsible for the judgment because Mr. Lewellen had not been acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the wrongdoing. In July 2016, Mr. Esteppe filed, in the otherwise concluded proceeding against Mr. Lewellen in the Circuit Court, a “Motion for Declaratory Relief to Enforce Judgment” against the City and the Police Department, neither of which was a party in that action at that time.5 In that motion, he sought to collect from the City and the Policе Department, pursuant to the LGTCA, the damages he had been awarded against Mr. Lewellen.
Mr. Esteppe‘s motion was assigned to a different judge of the Circuit Court, who held a non-evidentiary hearing on the motion in September 2016. At the hearing, Mr. Esteppe‘s counsel argued that Mr. Lewellen had acted within the scope of his employment and emphasized the police aspects оf Mr. Lewellen‘s conduct: obtaining and executing a search warrant, seizing firearms, and making an arrest. However, counsel appeared to retreat from the prior reliance at the trial of the tort action on Mr. Lewellen‘s personal motive for his conduct, stating, for example, that “it‘s nothing but innuendo” that Mr. Lewellen took those actions for the sake of Mr. Esteppe‘s еstranged girlfriend. Mr. Esteppe‘s counsel argued that the judgment against Mr. Lewellen became the responsibility of the Police Department under the LGTCA and that the City was responsible for paying that judgment under the MOU.
In response, counsel for the Police Department summarized key evidence that Mr. Esteppe had relied on at the trial and argued that Mr. Lewellen‘s conduct was outside the sсope of his employment and “wasn‘t for any Baltimore Police Department purpose, it was for his own purpose and for his own friend‘s purpose.” Counsel for the City argued that a “motion for declaratory relief” was not an appropriate procedural vehicle for Mr. Esteppe to make his claim and, more substantively, that Mr. Esteppe was not a third-party beneficiary of the MOU between the City and the Police Department.6 The City also
In November 2018, the Circuit Court issued a memorandum and order in which it concluded that Mr. Lewellen‘s actions were within the scope of his employment and held that the Police Department was liable for the judgment against him. The Circuit Court opined that the City was not liable under the LGTCA because Mr. Lewellen was not a City employee. However, the court noted that the City might be obligated to fund the Police Department‘s liability as a contractual matter under its MOU with the Police Department.
The Police Department appealed. The Court of Special Appeals stayed its consideration of the case pending this Court‘s opinion in another case in which the scope of employment of Baltimore City police officers for purposes of the LGTCA was at issue. See Baltimore City Police Department v. Potts, 468 Md. 265 (2020). Once the Potts decision was issued, the intermediate appellate court proceeded to decide the appeal in this case. In a well-reasoned decision, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Cirсuit Court ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Baltimore City Police Department v. Esteppe, 247 Md. App. 476 (2020).
In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals first addressed the Police Department‘s contention that Mr. Esteppe‘s “Motion for Declaratory Relief to Enforce Judgment” against a non-party – the Police Department – was procedurally irregular and that he should have pursued a separate actiоn against the Police Department. The court analogized the situation to an insurance coverage dispute involving a private insurer. It held that, when there is a genuine dispute as to whether the local government employee was acting with the scope of employment, a tort victim must pursue that claim directly against the local government. 247 Md. App. at 503-07. Such an enforcement аction may be instituted either in the underlying tort action or later in a separate enforcement action. Id. at 507-11. Mr. Esteppe had not taken either route, but the Police Department had appeared in response to his motion and defended against his claim on the merits. By doing so, the intermediate appellate court concluded, the Police Department had wаived any objection to the procedure followed by Mr. Esteppe and the Circuit Court. Id. at 511-13. The Police Department has not further appealed that issue, which therefore is not before us.
The Court of Special Appeals then addressed the merits of the Circuit Court‘s ruling that Mr. Lewellen had acted within the scope of his employment and that the Police Department was liablе for the judgment against him. The intermediate appellate court regarded Mr. Esteppe‘s motion for declaratory relief as, in substance, a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Mr. Lewellen had acted within the scope of his employment as a police officer. It therefore treated the Circuit Court‘s ruling on that motion as an award of summary judgment in Mr. Esteppe‘s favоr. 247 Md. App. at 497-98, 528 n.23. Before us, both parties accept that characterization of the Circuit Court‘s action.
The Court of Special Appeals then reviewed the record in light of the principal cases setting forth the standards for assessing scope of employment – Potts and the primary case on which the Potts court relied – Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247 (1991). Under Sawyer, to establish that a local government employee committed a tort within the scope of employment, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the acts were in furtherance
The intermediate appellate court held that, оn the basis of the undisputed facts in the record, Mr. Esteppe had failed to satisfy the first prong of the Sawyer/Potts test – i.e., that Mr. Lewellen‘s actions were motivated at least in part by a purpose to serve the interests of the Police Department. The court observed that the evidence in the record supported a conclusion that Mr. Lewellen was acting to further his own intеrests, not the Police Department‘s. 247 Md. App. at 524-25. The court also noted that, under Potts, the fact that Mr. Lewellen was exercising the powers of a police officer was not dispositive. Id. at 526. Because Mr. Esteppe had failed to establish, based on the undisputed facts in the record before the trial court, that Mr. Lewellen‘s actions were motivated at least in part to further the Police Department‘s interests, he was nоt entitled to summary judgment on the issue of scope of employment. Id. at 527-28.
The Court of Special Appeals, noting that the Police Department had not filed its own motion for summary judgment, or any other motion that could be construed as a motion for summary judgment, declined to address whether the record would support summary judgment in favor of the Police Department. The court also did not consider the Police Department‘s estoppel argument – that Mr. Esteppe was bound as a matter of law by statements made by his counsel during the tort trial. The court noted that the Police Department had asserted that argument only obliquely in the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court itself had not ruled on it. 247 Md. App. at 527-28 nn.22-23. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for what may be Act IV.
Mr. Esteppe filed a petition for a writ of certiorari concerning the scope of employment issue. The Police Department filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari in which it reiterated its estoppel argument. We granted both petitions.
When a circuit court grants a motion for summary judgment, as the Circuit Court effectively did here, it has concluded that, based on the undisputed material facts, the movаnt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 The appellate
Before us, the parties generally reprise the same arguments that they made to the Court of Special Appeals, with only slight variation.8 We have examined the record in this case and considered carefully the arguments made by Mr. Esteppe and the Police Department. We find the well-researched and well-reasoned opinion of the Court of Special Appeals to be unassailable in its analysis and conclusions. That court has correctly applied the law as it relates to the scope of employment for purposes of LGTCA liability in light of our recent decision in Potts.9 This is one of those instances in which there is little рrofit in restating what has already been well-said by the intermediate appellate court, other than to say that we adopt it as our own. See, e.g., Kponve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 448 Md. 311 (2016); TIG Ins. Co. v. Monongahela Power Co., 437 Md. 372 (2014); Sturdivant v. Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 436 Md. 584 (2014). Instead, we add “an endorsement that removes any doubt as to the standing of that decision as the law of Maryland.” Sturdivant, 436 Md. at 590.
In sum, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Mr. Esteppe was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We further agree that his lack of success on his motion did not necessarily mean that the Police Department – which has not filed a cross-motion of any sort – was so entitled and that remand to the
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER/CROSS-RESPONDENT.