ESTATE OF VINCENT E. COYLE VS. CRAIG SCOTT, PRESIDENTÂ SINGER KEARFOTT(SC-0415-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-4494-15T2
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | May 16, 2017|
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4494-15T2
ESTATE OF VINCENT E. COYLE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CRAIG SCOTT, President,
Singer Kearfott Corp.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided May 16, 2017
Before Judges Fasciale and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Passaic County, Docket No. SC-0415-
16.
Julie R. Witte, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kearfott Corporation (Kearfott) appeals from a May
11, 2016 judgment of $3042 awarded in small claims court following
a bench trial. We affirm.
Plaintiff is the Estate of Vincent Coyle (Estate). Coyle
worked for the Singer Company from 1955 to 1986. During his
employment, Coyle became entitled to a $3000 death benefit.
In 1988, Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corporation
(Kearfott Guidance) purchased certain assets of the Singer
Company. Kearfott Guidance later changed its name to Kearfott
Corporation.
In 1991, Kearfott sent a letter to Coyle informing him that
Kearfott would no longer offer the death benefit to Coyle. The
letter went on to explain that if Coyle had satisfied certain
requirements at the time of his retirement, he may have been
eligible for the $3000 death benefit. Coyle contacted Kearfott's
human resources department and, in 1992, Kearfott sent a letter
to Coyle stating that his death benefit would continue and was in
effect.
Thereafter, Coyle died and the Estate requested that Kearfott
pay the $3000 death benefit. Kearfott, however, refused to pay.
Thus, the Estate filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part of
the Law Division. The Estate was self-represented by Patricia
Seidel, who is Coyle's daughter and the executor of the Estate.
The complaint named Craig Scott as defendant and identified him
as president of "Singer Kearfott."
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It is undisputed that Kearfott received the complaint because
on the day of the trial, Kearfott appeared, represented by its
vice president of finance, Steven Grant, Esq., who is also a
lawyer. At trial, the court heard testimony from Seidel and
Grant. The court also considered various letters and documents
submitted by the parties.
Kearfott contended that when it purchased certain assets from
Singer, it did not assume Singer's liabilities or obligations.
Kearfott also argued that the obligations of Singer, including the
death benefit granted to Coyle, were discharged in Singer's 1989
bankruptcy proceedings.
Kearfott acknowledged, however, that it had agreed to honor
the death benefits for certain former Singer employees. In that
regard, Grant explained that in the 1990s, a number of former
Singer employees raised the issue of the death benefits with
Kearfott. Some of those former Singer employees were working for
Kearfott and other former Singer employees had relatives working
at Kearfott. Ultimately, Kearfott agreed to honor the death
benefits for the Singer employees who retired from Singer, but not
honor the benefits for employees who were terminated from Singer
or who left Singer with a severance payment.
After hearing the testimony and reviewing the documents, the
trial court found that (1) Coyle had retired from Singer; (2)
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Singer sent Coyle a letter in 1991 informing him that he would no
longer receive the death benefit; (3) Coyle communicated with
Kearfott; and (4) Kearfott ultimately agreed to continue to provide
Coyle with a $3000 death benefit. In making those findings, the
court relied on a January 13, 1992 letter sent to Coyle from
Kearfott, which stated: "Upon review, we wish to advise you that
your $3,000 life insurance benefit will continue and is in effect."
Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment awarding the
Estate $3000 plus $42 in costs. Kearfott now appeals from that
judgment.
On appeal, Kearfott makes three arguments: (1) the Estate
cannot collect benefits from an individual, Craig Scott, with whom
Coyle never had a relationship; (2) the correspondence sent by
Kearfott did not establish a contractual obligation, Kearfott made
a unilateral mistake in confirming the death benefits, and that
mistake does not create an enforceable contract; and (3) the
January 13, 1992 letter from Kearfott to Coyle was not a valid
enforceable contract because there was no consideration.
Plaintiff did not file a responding brief on this appeal. Having
reviewed the record, we reject the arguments put forth by Kearfott
and affirm.
Kearfott's first argument is a technical, procedural
argument. Kearfott argues that the named defendant, Craig Scott,
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had no relationship with Coyle. Kearfott never raised this
argument before the trial court. Accordingly, we need not consider
it. See State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 599 (2016) (noting, "issues not raised below will ordinarily not be considered on appeal" (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III,201 N.J. 328
, 339 (2010))). Nevertheless, even if we consider the argument,
it has no merit. The transcript of the trial makes it clear that
the parties and the court understood that the proper defendant was
Kearfott Corporation. Thus, if this argument had been raised, the
trial court could have allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint.
See R. 4:9-2 (allowing amendment of the pleadings by motion "as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence").
Accordingly, it is clear that the judgment is against Kearfott.
Kearfott's two other arguments rely on law concerning
contractual obligations. Thus, Kearfott contends that its 1992
correspondence to Coyle did not create an enforceable contract
because there was no consideration. Moreover, Kearfott argues
that the 1992 letter was based on a unilateral mistake in that
Kearfott thought that Coyle had retired, but it now contends that
Coyle received a severance package.
We need not engage in an analysis of contractual law to
enforce this judgment. The principle of promissory estoppel binds
Kearfott. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of
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Burlington, 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008) (stating that the elements
of promissory estoppel are "(1) a clear and definite promise; (2)
made with the expectation that the promisee will rely on it; (3)
reasonable reliance; and (4) definite and substantial detriment").
When Kearfott first informed Coyle that he would not receive
the benefit, Coyle had communications with Kearfott that showed
that Coyle thought he was entitled to receive the death benefit.
Kearfott then confirmed that he would receive the death benefit.
Coyle reasonably relied on Kearfott's 1992 letter, a clear and
definite promise to provide the death benefit. If that promise
were not enforced, Coyle would have relied on the promise to his
detriment. Kearfott is, therefore, estopped from now contending
that Coyle's estate is not entitled to the death benefit.
Affirmed.
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