268 P. 426 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1928
The appellants have appealed from an order of the probate court directing them to pay into court moneys found to belong to the estate of Troy, deceased, of which respondent Hanks is the executrix. The moneys are proceeds of the sale of real property belonging to the estate which came into the possession of the appellants in their capacity as attorneys for the executrix. They make no claim of title but insist that they are excused from complying with the order because of certain attachments which have been levied in actions pending against the executrix personally. Of the sums ordered to be paid $8,000 is on deposit in a local bank to the joint account of Palmer and Dorn, while the remaining $779.58 is held by Dorn alone. Palmer has endeavored *354 to meet the terms of the order and does not join in the appeal.
[1] The order was made pursuant to a citation and hearing under section
[2] It is argued that the court was without power to set aside the decree of distribution to the prejudice of the attaching creditors of the distributee. The point does not arise. No appeal was taken from the order setting aside the decree of distribution. There are many cases under which such a decree may be set aside, and when this is done it is not subject to collateral attack. The fact that attaching creditors may have had the right to object to the vacation of the decree is not a matter which the appellants can raise here, as they are not representatives of those creditors.
[3] It is argued that the accounting involved the determination of title claimed by third parties — a matter over which the probate court had no jurisdiction. The decree of distribution having been set aside before any of these moneys were distributed to the legatee, there was no dispute of title between the creditors and the legatee. The moneys were clearly the property of the estate for which the attorneys were bound to account to the estate.
[4] Finally it is argued that the order requiring the payment of the moneys into court is a nullity because section
Order affirmed.
Koford, P.J., and Sturtevant, J., concurred.