ESTATE OF STEVIC ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATION OF OHIO, INC., d.b.a. FMC DIALYSIS SERVICES OF RICHLAND COUNTY, APPELLANT, ET AL.
No. 2008-0392
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted December 17, 2008—Decided April 8, 2009.
121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-Ohio-1525
CUPP, J.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Damion M. Clifford, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
CUPP, J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant-defendant contends that it may claim the benefit of the one-year “medical claim” statute of limitations contained in
{¶ 2} Because
I
{¶ 3} In October 2003, Donald Stevic went to the Richland County Kidney Dialysis Center for dialysis treatment. Appellant, Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. FMC Dialysis Services of Richland County (“Bio-Medical“), owns and operates the Richland County Kidney Dialysis Center. According to the complaint, employees of the center either physically dropped Stevic or allowed him to fall from a mechanical lift device that was used to move him from a wheelchair and into position for dialysis. As a result of the fall, Stevic suffered a fractured hip, abrasions, and other injuries. In February 2004, Stevic died.
{¶ 4} Almost two years later, in October 2005, appellee Betty Stevic, as widow and executor of appellee the estate of Donald Stevic, filed a complaint for personal injuries and other tort damages against appellant, Bio-Medical.
{¶ 5} Bio-Medical filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Bio-Medical asserted that notwithstanding Stevic‘s styling of the claims as claims for personal injury, the claims nevertheless arose in the course of medical treatment, were essentially medical claims falling within the
{¶ 6} Upon review, a divided appellate court concluded that it was not clear from the face of Stevic‘s complaint whether or not claims based on Mr. Stevic‘s injuries constituted
{¶ 7} Thereafter, Bio-Medical appealed to this court, and we accepted review under our discretionary jurisdiction. Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 118 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2008-Ohio-2595, 887 N.E.2d 1202.
{¶ 8} Although an action for bodily injury must generally be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues,
{¶ 9} As pertinent to this appeal, “medical claim” has the following specific, defined statutory meaning:
{¶ 10} “(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, advanced practice nurse, physical therapist, physician assistant, emergency medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-intermediate, or emergency medical technician-paramedic, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. ‘Medical claim’ includes the following:
{¶ 11} “(a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person;
{¶ 12} “(b) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and to which either of the following applies:
{¶ 13} “(i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical care.
{¶ 14} “(ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision, retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or treatment.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 15} Further, the statute also lists and defines the medical providers included within the
{¶ 16} Both parties in this appeal assert that the definition of “medical claim” set forth in
{¶ 17} Bio-Medical argues that the
{¶ 18} Bio-Medical may be correct that Stevic‘s claim arises out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person. However, Bio-Medical ignores the portion of the statute that also requires that the claim be asserted against one or more of the specific medical professionals or facilities listed in
{¶ 19} Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the legislature‘s enactment, we hold that for the purposes of the
{¶ 20} Moreover, as the appellate court correctly concluded, because Stevic‘s complaint did not clearly indicate whether any of her claims were asserted against medical providers enumerated in
IV
{¶ 21} For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.
Benham & Ream Co., L.P.A., Jeffery S. Ream, and Frank L. Benham, for appellees.
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Jane F. Warner, and Susan M. Audey, for appellant.