Estate of Stephens
THE COURT*
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Aguilar brought the instant petition to obtain title to the subject property. Stevens‘s granddaughter, Elizabeth Rose Tyler, objected to Aguilar‘s petition. The probate court held a contested hearing in the matter. The court ruled in favor of Aguilar. The court found that Aguilar had contracted with Stephens to buy her property and had complied with the contract‘s terms. Accordingly, the court ordered that title to the property be transferred to Aguilar.
Tyler appealed. She argues (1) that the probate court erroneously excluded her expert witness‘s opinion testimony as to the value of the property, and (2) that the court did not properly apply the statute of frauds in considering the question of the existence of the contract. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter concerns a claim to a parcel of property—with a trailer home on it—in Goshen (the property or the Goshen property). Aguilar lived on a neighboring or adjacent property. The Goshen property had long been owned by Stephens. Stephens moved to Oregon in October 2016, to live with her sister Donna Dennis. Stephens died in November 2022 at the age of 84 years.
In August 2023, Aguilar filed a petition for transfer of property under
On September 29, 2023, Tyler filed an objection to Aguilar‘s petition; Tyler is a granddaughter of Stephens. Tyler asserted that Stephens remained “legal owner” of the Goshen property at the time of her death. Among other contentions, Tyler posited that, to the extent Stephens entered into an agreement with Aguilar, she was cognitively impaired at the time and did not have the mental capacity to enter into a contract. Tyler also asserted that Aguilar had not made full payment under the contract. Tyler asked the probate court to deny Aguilar‘s petition.
On February 10, 2025, the probate court held a contested hearing on Aguilar‘s petition. On March 7, 2025, the court issued a written ruling granting the petition.
On May 20, 2025, the probate court entered a “judgment determining claim to property.” (Capitalization omitted.) The judgment provided that the Goshen property “shall not be considered an asset in the Estate of Norma J. Stephens.” The judgment further provided that title to the Goshen property “is hereby ordered to be held by MACARIO AGUILAR.”
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Testimony of Macario Aguilar at the Contested Hearing
Aguilar testified on his own behalf at the contested hearing on his petition. He testified that he was Stephens‘s neighbor. In May 2016, he asked Stephens if he could lease part of her property. Stephens told him she planned to move to Oregon and offered to sell her property to him. Aguilar and Stephens discussed the terms of the sale.
Aguilar testified: “Well, the house needed a lot of work. Needed a lot of work. The property, it‘s pretty much just the lot because the house needs a lot of work. But [Stephens was] all, ‘I have a lien that needs to be paid beforehand. And if you pay the
After Aguilar gave Stephens the funds to discharge the lien, and he was ready to make the first $10,000 payment for the Goshen property, Stephens memorialized their agreement in writing. The contract stated that Aguilar would make an initial $10,000 payment towards the purchase of the Goshen property, followed by a second $10,000 payment at a later point. Aguilar was asked: “And was this [agreement] written after you had already paid off the lien on the mobile home to her?” He answered: “Yes.” Aguilar said the contract was written when he delivered the first $10,000 installment payment towards the purchase of the property to Stephens.
The signed, written agreement was admitted into evidence. It states: “Price [$]20,000. Received [$]10,000 from [Aguilar] for [the Goshen property] … for sale as is[,] leaving a [b]alance of [$]10,000 to be paid by [January] 15[,] 2017[.] Will get the Deed to the property when paid in full.”2 The agreement further noted, with respect to the balance that Aguilar “promise[d] to pay [Stephens] [$]10,000 by [January]15th[,] 2017.”
The agreement was drafted by Stephens, and both parties signed it at the same time. They signed it in the presence of Stephens‘s sister, Donna Dennis. Aguilar could
Two versions of the agreement were admitted into evidence. The text of the two versions is substantively identical; however, one version is written on a larger piece of paper and the other on a smaller one.3 Aguilar explained that Stephens first drafted the agreement on “[t]he little sheet[,]” but deemed it “too small.” She then got the “bigger” sheet and rewrote it in a larger format. Both versions were written on the same occasion.
When Stephens returned to Goshen in January 2017, she and Aguilar went to Tulare County Escrow. Aguilar testified: “We went to the—I forget what it‘s called—where you do the paperwork. It closed down. Tulare—Tulare County Escrow.… They closed down afterwards. We went there, met up, signed all the paperwork … at the escrow [company]. We didn‘t finish the paperwork that day because since it‘s a mobile home, I was told that it needs to be [registered at] a separate department .… And that‘s what we didn‘t finish. She signed, I signed, and I just had to come back for the other paperwork and then I didn‘t come back.” Aguilar testified that he made the second payment of $10,000 to Stephens at the escrow company‘s office. He took possession of the property at that time.4
Aguilar explained why he did not timely finish the outstanding paperwork for the mobile home: “Cold came around and we got busy with work. Had a situation at home. My brother got cancer. I had to go to Mexico. When I came back, I got to work. Cold came around, and that‘s why I didn‘t finish the paperwork.” Aguilar noted that Stephens
Aguilar testified that he remained in touch with Stephens until September 2017. He was asked, “Did you recognize any cognitive decline in Norma Stephens between, say, May … 2016 and September … 2017?” He responded: “Nothing. Normal.” He stated he did not have any concerns regarding her ability or capacity to enter into an agreement.
Aguilar testified that he had paid property taxes on the Goshen property starting in 2023, and all property taxes were “up to date.” He explained: “I was having a hard time with the issue [of the property purchase]—with my brother having cancer, and Covid came around, and I was under the impression that all my taxes came, since all the—the two properties were together, I thought they would come together.5 I wasn‘t really paying attention. My wife doesn‘t speak English. She thought we were paying [for] both of the properties, until we found out it [sic] wasn‘t. The paperwork didn‘t get completed, so that‘s when we started moving to put it in my name.”
With regard to the sale price for the Goshen property proposed by Stephens, Aguilar testified that the mobile home needed a lot of work and that the purchase price was commensurate with the prices of “three lots down the road.” He testified that Stephens had factored in the prices of those nearby lots.
Counsel for both parties deposed Stephens‘s sister, Donna Dennis, on April 18, 2024, during the course of the discovery process in this matter. The deposition was admitted into evidence at the contested hearing, by stipulation of the parties.
Dennis has lived outside Klamath Falls in Oregon since 2001. At the end of October 2016, Stephens moved to Oregon to live with Dennis. Prior to moving to Oregon, Stephens lived in Goshen for 45 years, at the Goshen property. Dennis and Stephens were “very close,” and Dennis would regularly visit Stephens in Goshen. They would also speak on the phone once a week, when Stephens lived in Goshen.
Dennis testified: “[Stephens] told me a long time ago … that she wanted [Aguilar] to have her house, to buy her house, because he had bought my other sister‘s house next door to her.6 And he was a truck driver, and he needed the land for all of his trucks.”7 Dennis stated that she had not noticed any cognitive decline in Stephens before Stephens moved to Oregon.
Dennis recalled that Stephens sold her property to Aguilar in September 2016. Dennis was asked: “And how do you know that?” Dennis replied: “Because I was down there with her, and she told [Aguilar] that she had a lien on her property for [$]15,000 plus some change and if he would pay the lien off then she would sell it to him for $20,000. So he agreed.” Dennis was shown the written agreement signed by Aguilar and Stephens. Dennis confirmed the agreement was written in Stephens‘s handwriting and the signature on it was Stephens‘s signature. Dennis also noted that she and her husband were both present at Stephens‘s house when Stephens drafted the agreement. Dennis
Dennis was asked, “And to your knowledge did [Aguilar] pay the $10,000 to [Stephens] by January 15[,] of 2017 as agreed?” Dennis answered: “Yes. I was there when he paid both [installments]. He owed her $20,000, and I was there both times.”
Dennis was asked, “To your knowledge [Stephens] never transferred the deed?” Dennis responded: “I think that‘s what the problem [was]. Yeah, she signed a lot of papers, and we thought then that the property would be in his name. But evidently it wasn‘t in his name, it was [still] in [Stephens‘s] name.” Dennis added: “We ran into different places and signed a lot of papers, her and [Aguilar] did. And I went with them. But the normal papers I guess was nothing that had to do with the deed.”
Dennis was further asked: “How do you know there was no deed?” She answered: “It‘s just that [Aguilar] asked me, because he took a long time finding me, [after the problem came to light], and when he did find me he asked if I had gotten anything in the mail about a deed or anything. I said, no, I haven‘t received anything. He said, well, he hadn‘t received anything either.”
In addition, Dennis was asked, “[D]o you know how the price of $20,000 came about?” Dennis replied: “Well, [Aguilar] was asking [Stephens] how much she wanted for it, and she says, well, I have a lien against it. That‘s when she said if he would pay off the lien that she would let him have it for $20,000. Because she knew the property wasn‘t worth that much anyway. The trailer was getting really bad. It was in really bad shape.” Dennis added: “The only thing that [Aguilar] was interested in was the [land].” Dennis said that Stephens was pleased with the transaction.
Dennis was asked, “When you were present and heard discussion between [Stephens] and [Aguilar] about the price for her property, who proposed the sale price?” She responded: “Well, [Stephens] called the realtor out there, and [he] didn‘t go inside the house or anything, and he estimated about [$]40[,000] to [$]45,000.” Dennis said this
Dennis stated that sometime after Stephens moved to Oregon, she was placed in a conservatorship. Dennis noted that Stephens was fine for a while after she moved to Oregon. However, around 2018, she was “a little bit … forgetting stuff.” Dennis added: “I wouldn‘t call that dementia. But she was forgetting things a little bit, yeah.” Eventually, Stephens was moved from Dennis‘s house to a facility. Dennis explained: “She just didn‘t seem like she was getting along that well mentally by herself. I think she should have had more care.”
Dennis testified that all of Stephens‘s four children had passed away. She said Stephens‘s grandchildren “never came around at all until they found out money was involved, and now they‘re coming out of the woodwork.” Dennis said that Stephens had told her that her grandchildren did not visit her and did not like her.
Probate Court‘s Written Ruling
Following the contested hearing on Aguilar‘s petition, the probate court issued a detailed, written ruling granting the petition.
Among other findings, the probate court stated: “In this case, the court finds that the petitioner has [established] that he completed the purchase of the property. He testified he paid the agreed purchase price for the real property.” The court added: “Decedent‘s sister fully supports his version of events. She confirmed her sister wanted to sell the property to ‘[Aguilar].’ Dennis additionally testified that [Stephens] set the price, which price she was willing to agree to after Aguilar paid the mobile home lien.
The probate court continued: “Dennis‘s testimony was consistent with Aguilar‘s that the parties had ‘signed papers,’ but that the property was never transferred to Aguilar for unknown reasons. Dennis also confirmed that cognitive decline and undue influence did not impact the sale.”
The probate court further stated: “[T]he [c]ourt does not give great weight to the 2018 conservatorship” as “it tells the [c]ourt nothing about [Stephens‘s] mental state in 2016.” The court added: “Decedent hand-wrote two versions of the sales contract and neither exhibited any confusion as to their terms. The [c]ourt is more persuaded by the testimony of decedent‘s sister in that she was present when the transaction was negotiated and completed and no evidence was presented that would cast doubt on her credibility on the matters about which she testified.”
The probate court concluded: “The
DISCUSSION
I. Probate Court‘s Exclusion of Opinion Testimony of Tyler‘s Expert Witness
Tyler argues the probate court improperly struck the opinion testimony of her expert witness. We conclude Tyler has not shown reversible error.
A. Standard of Review
We “review a trial court‘s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 540, fn. 5.)
Tyler called Diane Witz as a witness in the contested hearing on Aguilar‘s petition. Witz is a “broker associate and manager of the [E]state [P]roperties office in Beverly Hills.” She has been with that office since 1995 and became manager in 1999. She works on “all aspects of real estate, as far as sales go.”
Witz explained she conducts market research to help clients who are selling properties decide on listing prices. She testified: “We pull public record data and multiple listing data or in commercial applications, CoStar, which is similar to Multiple Listing Service for commercial property. And from that information, we‘re able to discern what the valuation is for comparative market analysis purposes.”
Witz was asked to form an opinion about the fair market value of the Goshen property as of October 2016. She explained how she went about doing that. She testified: “Well, the first thing I do when I‘m working on a property that is outside of my immediate geographic area is contact a local agent who is familiar with the local territory and nuances, because I can pull public record information, but I can‘t get the feel for … the street, a local [perspective].” Witz followed this practice in this instance as well.
Witz contacted Jennifer Oliphant of the Anderson Realty Group. Witz said: “She is a native Visalian, and she‘s been in the business for [10] years.” Oliphant provided Witz with new information and “also supplemented some of the information that [Witz] already had.” Witz was asked, “And what information did she provide you?” Witz responded: “The fact that [focusing on] west Goshen is critical to ascertaining true comps. It‘s a very limited geographic area, but pulling information from a greater radius will not really deliver comparable information because the data sets are quite different.” Witz added: “Both of us separately searched the greater Visalia area, Tulare County, Goshen, and west Goshen, all separately and combined.”
Witz was also asked: “Did you encounter any difficulties in coming up with a fair market value in this case?” Witz answered: “Yes, one of the challenges that we ran into
Witz focused on information about prior sales on the street on which the Goshen property is located. She settled on two prior properties on that street. One was Aguilar‘s own property, which he had purchased from Stephens‘s sister in 2006 for $90,000. The other property was a “brick and mortar” house, not a mobile home, and was “substantially larger“; this property had sold for $165,000 in 2014.
Witz was asked: “Based on what you did find, in all the work you did, including talking with the local agent, did you come up with a figure that you felt was the fair market value for the subject property in October 2016?” Witz replied: “My opinion is the property was worth, conservatively, $100,000.… Adjustments have been made for the fact that the structure was a different type of structure. And that‘s how I got to [$]100,000. And I conferred with the local agent on that valuation and she is in agreement with me.”
At that point, Aguilar‘s counsel objected on hearsay grounds and moved to strike the opinion; the probate court sustained the objection. The court stated: “I‘m going to strike the whole thing. I don‘t think she has any basis to make that testimony that‘s compatible with the Sanchez case,8 counsel. She‘s clearly relied on case-specific hearsay to form 100 percent of her opinion. And, I mean, I assume you would have listed the information if you had any connection to the local market: [s]he had been [here], she had listed properties here, sold property here, she had knowledge that wasn‘t related to hearsay that had helped her form that opinion.” (Italics added.)
C. Analysis
Here, even assuming the probate court erred in excluding Witz‘s opinion testimony, Tyler has not shown the error was prejudicial. “The burden is on the appellant in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial, i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 71, 82.) Prejudice is not presumed and must appear affirmatively upon an examination of the entire record. “[T]he appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106; see also Santina v. General Petroleum Corp. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 74, 76.)
The record indicates the probate court was not inclined to give much weight to Witz‘s opinion, regardless of its admissibility. First, at one point in Witz‘s testimony, the court had observed: “I‘ll let [Witz] express her opinion, but it‘s unlikely I‘m going to give it much, if any, weight based on her testimony as to how she acquired it.”
Next, the probate court noted in its written ruling: “The [c]ourt agrees that this was a civil bench trial, and the [c]ourt has more discretion to consider or disregard opinions it finds inaccurate. Ultimately, the court doesn‘t find the valuation testimony relevant. The court has not been presented with any evidence that indicates the decedent was incapable of setting a sales price for her property, that she was defrauded or subject to undue influence. The two witnesses who testified on this issue[, namely Aguilar and
Elsewhere in its written ruling, the probate court commented: “Decedent asked for the price she wanted and was fully aware of the property‘s defects.”
Tyler contends the “purpose of [Witz‘s] opinion was to establish that the sale price asserted by Aguilar was grossly below fair market value.” However, Tyler‘s argument as to prejudice arising from the exclusion of Witz‘s opinion is only one sentence long. On the issue of prejudice, Tyler merely states: “Striking Witz‘s testimony and thus preventing use of Witz‘s valuation in the case was highly prejudicial to Tyler.”
Tyler‘s argument as to prejudice is entirely undeveloped and unsupported. Accordingly, we conclude Tyler has not affirmatively shown that the exclusion of Witz‘s opinion testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice in this case.
II. Statute of Frauds
Tyler next contends the probate court did not properly apply the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds,
Tyler notes: “The statute of frauds (
We conclude Aguilar has the better argument on the point. Here, the lien was paid off before the written agreement was executed. Thus, when the agreement was executed, there was no danger of a dispute regarding paying off the lien in relation to execution of the contract. The written contract, executed after the lien was paid off, reasonably specified that the sale price for the Goshen property was $20,000, payable in two installments of $10,000 each, and that Aguilar would acquire title upon full payment thereof. In short, the written agreement appears to encompass all essential terms. (See Sterling v. Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 775 [the statute of frauds‘s writing requirement is intended to ” ‘prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of contracts never in fact made’ “].) Furthermore, Tyler has not provided citations to any legal authorities showing that, under the circumstances, the lien payoff was required to be included in the written agreement as an essential contractual term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Aguilar is entitled to his costs on appeal.
Notes
Aguilar responds: “This point is untenable. Sufficient evidence was produced to substantiate that [Aguilar] performed all conditions and obligations in conformity with the parties’ agreement. By virtue of the written agreement, title of the [p]roperty should have vested to [Aguilar].”
Aguilar again has the better argument.