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Estate of Shapiro v. United States
634 F.3d 1055
9th Cir.
2011
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Docket

*1 SHAPIRO; Bernard ESTATE OF Pitchford;

Clyde Steven R. E.

Scow, Plaintiffs-Appellants, America,

UNITED STATES

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-17491. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit. Dec.

Argued and Submitted 22, 2011.

Filed Feb. *2 individuals, (argued), cohabitating between re- Youngquist John M. San Fran- we cisco, CA, Feurzeig Feurzeig, verse. Donald L. CA, LLP, Chavin, Francisco,

Mark & San appellant.

for the Background I. and Jonathan S. (argued) Barthel Carol Shapiro and and Chenchark met Cohen, Department States of Jus- began shortly dating thereafter. Chenc- Division, DC, tice, Washington, for the Tax They hark moved in Shapiro with appellee. together lived twenty-two next

years, they During but never married. Chenchark relationship, provided homemaking Shapiro, including services to cooking, cleaning, and managing household such as the employees, gardener *, E. Before: ROBERT COWEN A. Shapiro paid and housekeeper. for Chenc- TASHIMA, WALLACE and BARRY G. hark’s living expenses provided and SILVERMAN, Judges. Circuit weekly with a spending allowance. Chenc- hark contributed no financial to the assets SILVERMAN; Opinion by Judge household. Partial and Partial Concurrence Dissent In learning that was Shapiro after Judge TASHIMA. woman,

involved with another OPINION court, sued Shapiro in Nevada state claim- contract, ing implied breach of and express SILVERMAN, Judge: Circuit quantum fiduciary duty, breach of Bernard Shapiro and Cora Jane Chenc- meruit. According com- Chenchark’s twenty-two hark lived together years, plaint, Shapiro agreed pool she and had they but never married. Over those twen- their and to equally resources share ty-two cooked, cleaned, years, Chenchark each others’ assets. and managed their household. When up, broke palimony against Shapiro she filed a suit on February died him in state court. While the suit was while Chenchark’s action pending. was still pending, Shapiro’s he died. In the context of this estate filed an estate tax return $10,602,238 tax Shapiro’s May paid refund lawsuit filed es- 2001 and in estate tate, tax district court held that Chenc- and generation-skipping transfer tax. not, hark’s homemaking services did as a The Estate against continued defend law, claim, matter of provide September sufficient consider- and in Chenchark’s ation a cohabitation jury contract verdict in returned favor of Chenchark, Estate, Shapiro between specifically finding Shapiro and that therefore, an deduction for not Chenchark did enter into ex- value of claim properly press ap- Chenehark’s was contract. implied disallowed. pealed, appeal Because district court’s pending while was holding premised upon claim, was parties misconstruc- settled Chenchark’s tion of regarding along Nevada law contracts lawsuit in she another which * Cowen, designation. The E. Honorable Robert Senior Cir- Circuit, Judge sitting by cuit for the Third will, approximately against Chenchark’s claim did contested § 2053, qualify as a deduction under million. $1 according the district court. settling time after In some June *3 judicially further held that the Estate was claim, an the Estate filed Chenchark’s Shapiro estopped arguing from that among seeking, tax return amended estate agree- employment entered an to deduct million adjustments, $8 other sorts, ment of homemak- with Chenchark’s of the taxable estate under from the value ing services because as 2053(a)(3) for § Chenchark’s 26 U.S.C. position had opposite Estate taken the return, amended claim. Based on the defending against lawsuit. Chenchark’s approximately a refund of Estate claimed The IRS disallowed de- million. $3.5 claim, II. Discussion only

duction for Chenchark’s $361,483 as result of unrelated refunded A. Standard of Review adjustments. “We the district review court’s brought

In the Estate suit August novo, grant summary judgment de seeking ap- court refund of federal whether, viewing determine the evidence proximately According million. to the $2 light in the to the most favorable non- expert an valued complaint, Estate’s party, moving genuine there are issues just at over million Chenchark’s claim $5 fact material and whether the lower court Shapiro’s as of date of death. The correctly applied the relevant substantive complaint in- Estate later amended law.” Fed. v. Trade Comm’n Network relief, seeking clude an additional claim (9th Inc., 1127, 1138 Depot, 617 F.3d Servs. in property for the decrease value refund Cir.2010). by pendens due to notices of lis recorded Shapiro’s properties during on We the district court’s ap review pendency lawsuit. In its judicial plication estoppel for abuse of sought the Estate complaint, amended Fitch discretion. Abercrombie & Co. v. $4,863,480. total refund Creek, (9th Inc., Moose 486 F.3d The and the United filed Estate States .2007). Cir summary judgment. cross-motions court ruled in district favor of B. Consideration “[wjithin States, that, holding facts, determining

uncontested no evidence exists that In the value of the taxable calculating contributed estate for anything purposes Chenchark ever oth- love, owed, support, er than amount of the tax management of estate code relationship. against household to the allows a deduction for “claims ... as provide These factors do not estate are allowable the laws of sufficient support jurisdiction which the contractual agreement.” being The district went on to is administered.” U.S.C. 2053(a). against conclude “because Chenchark did not In the case of claims make sufficient contributions to the estate on a that are founded provide agreement, consideration for the this deduction is limited “to Shapiro,” she extent received from there “was no the were contracted bona them, money and for [and] contract between fide consider- was, she in the in ation in worth.” sought Contract Action Id. 2053(c)(1)(A). fact, a gift Shapiro.” gift, from As a Here, Hay the district court concluded In Hay, 100 Nev. 678 P.2d as a matter of law Chenchark’s con (1984), the Nevada Supreme Court twenty-two tributions to the adopted holding Marvin’s and ruled that Estate — years cooking, cleaning, and other unmarried cohabitants sue to enforce homemaking services—did not constitute contracts concerning property rights. Id. consideration to sufficient allow the Estate at 674. Even an implied contract to share against her claim to deduct it. The dis property, in which agree- the terms of the ruling did not base its trict court on an conduct,” ment are “manifested rather 2053(c)(l)(A)’s §of application require words, than stated is enforceable. Id. *4 the underlying promise ment or The court right reaffirmed the of cohabi- agreement be contracted adequate “for an tants to contract in Western States Con- and full consideration in or mon struction, 840 P.2d at 1224. In Western worth”; instead, ey’s rejected the court Construction, States the court affirmed the the Estate’s deduction for Chenchark’s finding trial court’s that Lois Michoff and claim based on an reading incorrect Max Michoff impliedly agreed to hold then- Nevada state law regarding contracts be property though they married, as were tween cohabitating partners. The district based on evidence couple filed erroneously court concluded that Chenc joint returns, designated property as hark did not have a valid contract claim community property in Subchapter their S Construction, under Western States Inc. v. form, election signed and spousal consent Michoff, 931, 108 Nev. 840 P.2d 1220 form for a partnership. Id. at 1224-25. (1992), love, support, because her and homemaking not, services did as a matter Here, the district court compared the law, provide sufficient consideration to facts of Chenchark and relation- support a agreement. contractual ship to that of Lois and Max Michoff in decades, In recent widespread social ac Construction, Western States and conclud- ceptance of nonmarital cohabitation has ed that Chenchark “did not make sufficient triggered expansion of cohabitants’ le contributions to the provide Estate to con- gal rights. Marvin, In Marvin v. 18 sideration for support that she re- 660, 815, Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d 134 557 P.2d 106 ceived from Shapiro.” Because Chenchark (1976), a watershed concerning case such did not provide sufficient rights, the California Supreme Court held the court held that Chenchark did not have that courts express should enforce or im a valid contract claim. But the Nevada plied contracts between nonmarital part Supreme Court in Western States Con- except ners when such a contract insep struction did not consider the amount or arably upon provision based of sexual type of necessary Id., 815, services. CaLRptr. 134 557 P.2d a contractual agreement between cohabi- at 114. “[A]dults who voluntarily live to instead, just the court examined tants — gether engage and in sexual relations are Lois and Max’s conduct to determine nonetheless as competent as other whether their supported actions the con- persons to contract respecting their earn clusion that intended to share then- ings property rights.... [T]hey may property though as agree Nothing married. pool their earnings and to all hold property acquired Western States during supports Construction relationship community “love, accord with the district governing law court’s conclusion that sup- p Id., roperty[.]” 815, 134 Cal.Rptr. port, management 557 of [a] household” P.2d at 116. cannot, law, as a matter of constitute con-

1059 Homemaking pro- services such as those property to share promise sideration quantified can be by Chenchark vided Nevada law. point a value attached them. Our have Supreme Nevada Although the not of simply that these services are sufficiency has not addressed Court law, value as a matter of as zero homemaking services as consideration believed. apparently district property, to share California contract perform have held that cases say if a This is not to even sup services is homemaking determines that Chenchark’s factfinder See, e.g., a contract. Chiba port such “adequate full supported by claim was Greenwald, 156 67 Cal. Cal.App.4th consideration,” necessarily Estate is (2007) Marvin, 134 (citing Rptr.3d it seeks. entitled 5); n. P.2d at 113 Whor Cal.Rptr. Rather, is a the value of Chenchark’s claim Cal.App.3d Dillingham, 202 ton v. summary judg precludes factual issue that (1988). And Ari Cal.Rptr. (and the claim ment. value of which, law, like Nevada and Califor zona corresponding allowable estate tax deduc *5 nia, of unmarried co recognizes right tion) remains for the district court to de property, to share to contract habitants on remand. her claim termine Whether ade homemaking services constitute (as eventually it was worth million was $1 quate consideration for such a contract. for) or other is for settled some amount 923, Lee, 10, 712 P.2d v. Ariz. Carroll 148 decide. this the district court to Under (1986). if It makes no difference 926-27 claim val precedent, court’s must be “unlike exchanged services.” parties Shapiro’s ued as of the date of death. See Supreme the Nevada Id. at 926. Given C.I.R., F.2d Van Home v. 720 Estate of Hay adoption through Marvin Court’s (9th Cir.1983); 1114, v. Prapstra 1116 Construction, think we States (9th Western States, 680 F.2d 1254 United join would those likely it that Nevada is Cir.1982). reason, For this Chenchark’s holding courts in California and Arizona testimony from this case—as deposition homemaking can be services dissenting colleague our ir quoted by —is property-sharing consideration of her claim. relevant the valuation We agreement cohabitants. between not made statements were Chenchark’s court’s disagree with the district therefore than seven after years until more not, mat that Chenchark did as a holding All that known at Shapiro’s death. was law, provide ter sufficient consideration death was that the time law. a contract under Nevada plausible claim had asserted Nevada law. argues that Chenc- The United States it is claim is not deductible because hark’s Estoppel C. Judicial by “adequate and full con- supported not Es holding In that the money’s worth.” addition sideration any amount for disagree government’s tate could not deduct not with We do 2053(c)(1)(A), lack of a claim claim because of the point Chenchark’s court also held agreement, like the district on a founded claim, only judicial estoppel prohibited “to that deductible Chenchark’s homemak arguing fide that Chenehark’s contracted bona from [it the extent was] provided for the ing services adequate and full consideration and for Shapiro and alleged agreement between worth” —but the district money or equally others’ specific issue. share each never this court reached property. specifically summary district court in the mo- judgment The addressed held: tions. judicial application estoppel The grant We affirm the district court’s appropriate in this case. Estate is The summary judgment on the Estate’s posi- taking barred from inconsistent claim for a refund related the notices tions in accordance with the doctrine of this pendens. Us The Estate abandoned judicial It cannot over-claim estoppel. it in failing opposition claim to raise it. against the value of the suit the United States’ motion for complete it paid value is what for suit settle- summary judgment. See Shakur v. Schri ment, and no more. (9th ro, Cir.2008) (“We 514 F.3d positions defending The Estate’s previously plaintiff have held that a has against not in- Chenchark’s lawsuit were ‘abandoned claims them raising any positions consistent with it took before in opposition to [the defendant’s] motion

the district in this case. See Yanez summary judgment.’”) (quoting Jen States, (9th v. F.2d 326-27 Riverside, Cnty. kins 398 F.3d Cir.1993). consistently The Estate took (9th Cir.2005)). n. 4 position contract claim had in against it, fact been asserted a fact that no Expenses E. Administrative one denies. The within Estate was As claim Estate’s for a refund rights yet-to-be- deduct value of the related to the pendens, notices lis right determined claim without waiving *6 court district did not address the Estate’s validity in contest the of the claim state claim for a deduction of ex- administrative 20.2053-l(b)(3) Reg. § court. Treas. Cf. 2053(a)(l)(i). penses § the Also like (2000) (“An on item be entered the claim, pendens lis the Estate failed return for though deduction its exact raise this issue in opposition to the United known, amount is not then provided it is States’ motion summary judgment. certainty, ascertainable with reasonable the But in States noted its answer- and will paid.”).1 be ing brief that objection it has no a remand to allow the district court ad- D. Lis Notices of Pendens deductibility the dress of administrative In granting the United States’ motion expenses. we Therefore instruct dis- the for summary judgment, the district court trict court to address this issue on remand. did not the address Estate’s claim that it was entitled to a refund a of as result the III. Conclusion reduction in property by value the caused pendens by notices lis reasons, filed the foregoing For we RE- on a Shapiro’s properties. number of But the grant VERSE district court’s of sum- it entered judgment against Estate on mary judgment the on the Estate’s claim that claim, this along the rest the case. it is entitled to deduct the value of Chenc- On appeal, argues claim; the that dis- hark’s summary judg- AFFIRM trict court in granting summary erred on ment the claim for Estate’s a refund judgment on this claim arising because it was not out of the pendens notices lis regulation 1. The Shapi- in effect at regulations changed, the time in requir- that required ro’s death ing Estate value the estate to wait and see about the value death, contested, claim as date unliquidated of the even if there of a claim. See Treas. (d) (as 2009). were uncertainty § about the We Reg. amount. note 20.2053-1 amended in by supported be full consider- Shapiro’s properties on recorded money’s worth.2 ation Chenehark; and REMAND. gov- The estate tax issue this case is on its own costs party shall bear Each Although § 2053. by 26 U.S.C. erned

appeal. majority is correct 26 U.S.C. PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED 2053(a) ‘claims a deduction for “allows PART, AND REMANDED. IN are ... as allowable against estate jurisdiction ... under the laws TASHIMA, Judge, concurring Circuit ” administered,’ being the estate is which part dissenting part: 1057, valid claim is Maj. Op. at state law majority’s disposition agree I with the deduction, necessary condition ex- administrative pendens and the Us necessarily not a sufficient one. Sec- but in Parts I concur penses issues. therefore requires also be deduct- tion 2053 majority opinion. See and II.E II.D ible, claims on “founded however, disagree, I at 1060-61. Maj. Op. agreement[ ] be limited the extent majority’s analysis disposition with the contracted for an were appeal, in this primary of the issue claim for feder- of the valuation Chenehark 2053(c)(1)(A).3 26 U.S.C. worth[.]” I re- purposes. al therefore merely requirement This satisfied Part II.B of spectfully dissent from “legally binding a claim because Maj. Op. at 1057- majority opinion.1 See against [an] enforceable estate” Comm’r, state law. 304 U.S. Taft (1938); 891, L.Ed. see 58 S.Ct. majority reverses district Stapf, upon a United States v. 375 U.S. holding premised “was also because (A (1963) 248, 11 regarding 84 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 195 of Nevada law misconstruction against claim an estate cohabiting individu- deduction contracts between case, solely on the Maj. Op. predicated how- not be at 1056. This “should als....” *7 legally that a ever, finding of con- or claim is does not turn on issues state law, law, governing tax and the the state laws but on federal enforceable under tract wills.”). validity of We of ma- the contracts genuine has raised no issue Estate “the gone it the have so far as to state that fact as to whether has met terial according pro- legal of the relevant estate tax existence requirement ” i.e., vision, underlying purposes local law is that the claim to immaterial See, v. grounds. e.g., Crowe 1. I the court’s on alternate Because would affirm district 406, (9th claim under County Diego, the Chenehark 432 disallowance San 608 F.3d 2053, unnecessary § it to Cir.2010). U.S.C. I find 26 issue, judicial in estoppel discussed reach the Maj. Op. Part II.C. See at 1059-60. 2053, § claim be deductible under the 3. To "con- supporting must also be the deduction supposed 2. district court’s misconstruc- The U.S.C. tracted bona fide.” 26 In the of Nevada law is also immaterial. tion case, 2053(c)(1)(A). § from the In this aside context, summary judgment de our review is question of whether Chenchark’s consider- "may and we affirm the district court's novo supported would ation have contract any ground [grant summary judgment on of] (to nothing say Nevada Law of a by Jet supported the record.” Hawn v. Exec. 2053), by § clear that it is no means Inc., (9th Cir. Mgmt., F.3d 1155 615 it. a contract there was fact to 2010). assuming the Accordingly, even however, need, issue no reach this There is mistaken its construction district was law, the discussed herein. we are to affirm reasons of Nevada contract free 1062 Comm’r, tax. v. 148 who are the natural objects

the estate Giannini sons one’s Cir.1945) (9th bounty.” (emphasis Id. F.2d added).4 Thus, as we have held in previously the 2053: context deductions under requirement statute’s that deduc- promises agreements exceptional on or be Under circumstances it tions based by a claim by be that someone who supported full consideration might otherwise inherit the from dece- protect worth is based on a need to the limitation, dent should be deductible under section tax. this estate Without there simply 2053. If claim is sub- “prevent be nothing would testators terfuge legacy, for a nondeductible from estates depleting their transform- if is supported ‘adequate claim objects natural of their ing bequests ’ the consideration bounty Leopold into deductible claims.” v. if a non-zero which augmented is sum States, (9th 510 F.2d Cir. estate, decedent’s then it would seem 1975). any Accordingly, contract between be deduction should allowed. decedent someone who would be a particular or not a claim Whether object bounty natural of his deductible, then, depend will on the facts with suspicion, requiring exception- viewed in each case. al circumstances to be treated as some- added) thing “simply than an agreement (emphasis other at (ellipsis Id. 623-24 testamentary disposition per- original) make a (quoting Hartshorne v. ty relationships It is neither unusual nor unreasonable within their domestic because diverge tax federal law to from state contract recognize a failure estate of the tax to regard, law this because two bodies of claims; property deduction for their fair col- very protecting law are concerned with differ- hampered by lection of the tax estate is not Although pro- ent state interests. law often recognition that unmarried individuals protections vides for unmarried individuals legal protection need of the economic ar- contract, partners through from their it does rangements made within their domestic rela- protect so in order reliance interests of tionships. expected long-standing individuals who their Further, rightly wrongly, policy as a relationships prop- would last and held their Congress choice of bestows See, erty with in accordance this reliance. special couples status on married that it does e.g., Michoff, W. States Constr. Nev. See, ("[T]his couples. e.g., not bestow on unmarried (1992) 840 P.2d 2032A(e)(2) ("The protect expecta- court must 26 U.S.C. the reasonable term 'member respect means, tions of unmarried cohabitants family’ with respect of the concerning property to transactions individual, their only (A) an ancestor such indi- — *8 tax, contrast, rights.”). by The estate de- is vidual, (B) individual, (C) spouse the of such a See, signed prevent e.g., tax avoidance. individual, lineal descendant of such of such States, 1012, N.Y. Bank v. United 526 F.2d of spouse, parent individual’s or of a of such (3d Cir.1975) (denying a 1018 deduction un- individual, (D) spouse any or the of lineal § der 2053 that be enforceable under (C).”); subparagraph descendant described in require- state law because it not did meet the 2043(b) (providing § relinquishments that of law, of even ments federal where was there rights marital are not consideration "in mon- suspect no reason to that the intent of a money’s ey except purposes or of worth” per- transaction “was establish a situation 2516, requirements § § 2053 where which taxes, mitting the evasion of estate [because] governs agreements, written certain divorce type to sanction a in a this case met); 2056(a) ("[T]he § are value of the tax- avoidance”). encourage could tax estate ... be able shall determined deduct- specifically, More is not it unreasonable to ing gross from the value of the estate an have different the rules in different contexts equal any amount to the value of interest in presented by the facts this case. Co- property passes habiting partners passed which or protec- not has from the would lose their inequitable proper- surviving spouse....”). tion from an allocation of decedent to his

1063 Hartshorne), (In money money’s to a value in or 402 reducible re Estate Comm’r worth, affection, promise (2d Cir.1968)).5 love and as 2n. 594-95 F.2d etc., wholly marriage, disregarded, is be Chenchark, roman Shapiro’s long-term as trans property and the entire value of the Shapiro’s object of is a natural partner, tic the gift.”); ferred constitutes amount the in his will.6 provided for bounty, who was (“Nor 301.6323(h)-l(a)(3) § 26 C.F.R. that her claim was testified affection, promise of or marriage, love and “if any Shapiro’s on based not a other consideration reducible to him would be tak thing happened [she] money money in or value consideration Accordingly, the test set care of.” en worth.”); money’s also Harris see applies here. Leopold forth 107-08, Comm’r, U.S. 71 340 S.Ct. from the text As clear (“The (1950) 181, 95 L.Ed. 111 federal 2053(c)(1)(A) § and our decision Leo- tax gift estate tax and the federal ... are not circum- pold, exceptional whether or materia, pari pur construed in since the here, presented are otherwise stances complement pose gift is to adequate supported by be claim must still by preventing tax-free depletion estate tax is “a non-zero and full consideration that during of the his life transferor’s es- augmented which the decedent’s sum gift time. Both the tax and the estate tax at The Estate has 510 F.2d 624. tate.” ‘an adequate exclude transfers made for genuine no evidence raise adduced money money’s full consideration fact as Chenc- of material to whether ” issue (citation omitted)). worth.’ and footnotes aug- full consideration provided hark The Tax also has observed that love Court estate. Shapiro’s mented adequate do and affection not constitute matter, “money or See, As an initial purposes. e.g., consideration for tax appears Comm’r, (CCH) number of times worth” 79 Cavett v. T.C.M. (2000) (“If regulations, Revenue Code and Internal 2000 at *7 WL by regulation as from generally7 sprang and is defined to decedent love and services See, e.g., affection, 26 tan excluding and affection. the services themselves are love (“A expression of love affee- § not tamount to 25.2512-8 C.F.R. however, Shapiro, although Leo- a letter to specific In the context considered 5. legitimate no agreements, opinion had pold, that the Tax Re- Scow's of divorce assets, 98-369, 425(a), she has § ”[s]ince L claim to Act of Pub. 98 form (1984), [Shapiro] twenty years, appears supplanted lived it would have Stat. arrange- amending gesture §§ some inquiry by & be nice to make 26 U.S.C. relinquishment put account trust to of marital ment to in an 2053 to allow the supporting pay support during lifetime.” rights qualify as consideration See if certain criteria are met. deductions 2053(e); 2043(b)(2) §§ & see also 26 occasion, U.S.C. express, 7. On the limitation is however, sug- authority, No See, U.S.C. e.g., but exclusion remains clear. weight gests that this has diminished 20.2043-l(a) ("To constitute a bona C.F.R. beyond principles Leopold established fide for an consider- sale *9 agreements. worth, of written divorce limited context money money's or the transfer ation in faith, good and the must have been made in provision price full Admittedly, Shapiro’s must have been an and 6. Chenc- equivalent money the reducible to a value. If will was not without limitation. hark his $50,000 only price than a Shapiro provided bequest a was less such of value the proviso the excess of the fair market of will that Chenchark in his with price residing property ... over the received gift lapse they if were not would ascertaining value is included together time of death. As defen- decedent at the his estate.”). gross of his and R. Scow noted in dant co-executor Steven tion, which cannot be reduced to or that Chenchark supportive “was of [Shapi- worth.”). money’s any Accordingly, love emotionally, supportive and of him in ro] provided Shapiro by and affection the business matters ... which he some- not, cannot, Chenchark must and be treat- discussed her. times with Their associa- purposes ed as consideration for of intimate, personal tion was associa- support even if it would contract lives, where they tion shared their hopes state law. “Nevada law con- regarding gave and dreams. physi- [Chenchark] no individuals,” cohabiting tracts between except cal asset herself the relation- ” Maj. Op. simply at irrelevant Further, ship Shapiro .... averred be- determining adequacy of consideration fore his death that Chenchark never “ha[d] 2053. anything acquisition contributed maintenance of any properties,” [his]

While some of the authori- above-cited Scow, and Steven R. of the one co-execu- appear suggest ties where the Estate, tors of the testified that there was provided motivation for services was love agreement Shapiro no between affection, Chenc- the entire value of the ser- pool hark to their assets. vices are for tax purposes discounted even monetary value, had there is no if Thus, the Estate genu- has raised a reason to decide that issue in this case. ine issue material fact to support its assuming Even that anything Chenchark contention that Chenchark’s claim against provided Shapiro out of love affec- Estate, assuming arguendo that it was tion support would full its fide,9 contracted bona was supported value, dollar presented the Estate has no money’s worth for the genuine evidence that here would create purpose federal tax law. I Accordingly, issue of material fact that Chenchark en- affirm would the district court on this is- hanced the value of the Estate in sue. Although worth. there is evidence that Chenchark supervised Shapiro’s household reasons, For I foregoing dissent staff, maid, including gardener, and a majority’s from the reversal of the district man, pool cooked, cleaned, and that she grant summary court’s judgment to the provided support Shapi- emotional government on the Chenchark claim. ro,8 presented no that evidence these services have a cash value what

that cash value would be.

Further, the Estate did not controvert

the government’s statement summary motion for judgment that

“[djuring the entire time Chenchark lived Shapiro, she ... never contributed

any money or other assets material

value to relationship.” Perhaps more

importantly, the Estate itself represented gave monetary nothing

value to relationship. It represented note, however, I stated supra. 9. See footnote *10 deposition that "I didn't in the work home. I had a maid.”

Case Details

Case Name: Estate of Shapiro v. United States
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 22, 2011
Citation: 634 F.3d 1055
Docket Number: 08-17491
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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