ESTATE OF ROBERT W. QUICK, DECEASED, ESTHER P. QUICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND ESTHER P. QUICK, PETITIONERS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
Docket No. 8588-97
United States Tax Court
Filed June 29, 1998
110 T.C. 440
Nims, Judge
*This opinion supplements our previously filed opinion in Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 172 (1998).
Gretchen A. Kindel, for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
NIMS, Judge: In a timely filed motion for reconsideration (motion) pursuant to
Except where otherwise noted, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All section
In our opinion, we held, among other things, that respondent‘s recharacterization of petitioners’ distributive share of partnership losses for 1989 and 1990 as passive for purposes of
In their motion, petitioners allege that our conclusion that the
Reconsideration under
Petitioners’ argument that the
Petitioners next contend that, even if the
Respondent argues that this Court correctly declined to order refunds for overpayments of tax in our opinion. We agree, but for the sake of clarity, we deem it necessary to discuss our rationale in greater detail than we did previously.
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress. See
SEC. 6512(b). OVERPAYMENT DETERMINED BY TAX COURT.—
(1) JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE.—Except as provided by paragraph (3) and by section 7463, if the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax for the same taxable year * * * in respect of which the Secretary determined the deficiency, or finds that there is a deficiency but that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount of such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the decision of the Tax Court has become final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer.
Respondent, by virtue of having challenged petitioners’ characterization of their distributive share of adjusted partnership losses for 1989 and 1990, has effectively transmuted what otherwise would have been unquestionably a partnership item, i.e., the amount of losses in petitioners’ hands, into an affected item requiring partner level factual determinations.
In response to petitioners’ argument, even if the adjustments to the amounts of their distributive share of partnership losses for 1989 and 1990 were somehow separable from respondent‘s challenge to the characterization of those losses
Lastly, petitioners’ argument that the Court failed to treat the
Respondent did not challenge petitioners’ characterization of their proportionate share of partnership losses for 1987 and 1988, and thus the affected items deficiency procedures were not required to be followed for those years. Rather, adjustments to the amounts of petitioners’ distributive share of partnership losses in those years were properly made by respondent pursuant to notices of computational adjustment upon the conclusion of the partnership level proceeding.
In sum, respondent cannot, as petitioners contend, arbitrarily “elect” to make the
We have considered each of the remaining arguments of the parties and, to the extent that they are not discussed herein, find them to be either not germane or unconvincing.
An appropriate order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration will be issued.
