161 A. 471 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1932
Argued May 3, 1932.
Nellie Brown died October 21, 1929 in a hospital in Philadelphia. James Brown, a foster son, not adopted or akin, applied for letters of administration, which were granted, and he duly qualified. On October 25, 1929 Mary Barry presented a petition to the register of Allegheny County, alleging kinship to the above decedent, and praying for letters of administration, which were granted. The lower court stated in its opinion in the present case, that the register of Allegheny *238
County had no knowledge of the prior letters granted in Philadelphia County. On November 29, 1929, James Brown, above named, asked for a revocation of the letters granted in Allegheny County alleging his prior appointment in Philadelphia. Mary Barry answered claiming that the true residence of the decedent was in Allegheny County and that the letters granted in Philadelphia County were void. The register of Allegheny County rescinded his former action and revoked the appointment. He was within his power in so doing: Phillip's Estate,
The lower court decided that the granting of letters by the register of Allegheny County, subsequent to the granting of letters in the same estate by the register of Philadelphia, was illegal. In support of its conclusion it relied on the cases of Sebik's Estate,
In the Sebik estate a statement is made supported by reference to many cases that the probate of a will by the register cannot be attacked collaterally, but all question arising at the probate must be determined by the orphans' court on appeal. In Zeigler v. Storey, supra, the same position was taken. We quote, "The great weight of authority is now in favor of holding an appointment of an administrator valid against collateral attack on the ground merely that the decedent was not a resident of the county, if the fact of such residence is expressly or impliedly found as a condition precedent to making the appointment." See McNichol's Estate,
The present case is clearly ruled by the authorities to which reference is made above.
The cases relied upon by counsel of the appellant have no application to the present. There is no doubt abundant authority for the position he takes that a decree of the orphans court authorizing the sale of the lands of decedent can be attacked collaterally in a suit by or against a person claiming title under such decree: Smith et al. v. Wildman,
The decree of the orphans' court is affirmed; the appellant to pay the costs. *240