Estate of Neal v. WhiteEstate of Neal v. White
William D. Bell, Sr., for Defendant-Appellee.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the Estate of Daniel Neal, through its administrator Sherri Neal, (“the Estate“) appeals from a judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court, after a bench trial, in favor of defendant-appellee Lillie White. The Estate sought in part to recover from White, based on a quasi-contract theory for unjust enrichment, a sum of money for rent. This amount was equal to the reasonable value of the benefit White had received by residing at the Estate‘s property after Daniel‘s death without paying for the privilege. Because the trial court applied the law incorrectly when disposing of the Estate‘s quasi-contract claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Background Facts and Procedure
{¶2} The Estate is the owner of real property located at 6545 Hamilton Avenue in North College Hill. White cohabitated at the property with Daniel Neal (“Daniel“) for several years during Daniel‘s lifetime, and continued to reside at the property after Daniel‘s passing in January 2017. Sherri Neal (“Sherri“), the daughter of Daniel, was appointed as the administrator of his estate. White refused Sherri‘s request to either enter into a lease and pay rent or vacate the premises.
{¶3} The Estate then filed an eviction action in municipal court asserting three causes of action against White. A magistrate set a rent bond at zero dollars based on the lack of any existing rental agreement. The eviction cause was delayed while the municipal court attempted, unsuccessfully, to transfer the case to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas for consolidation with a separate action White had filed against the Estate.
{¶5} At trial, the Estate took the position that while the evidence did not support an award of damages against White based on an express or implied covenant to pay rent, it had established the right to remuneration in the amount of $9,140 based on a quasi-contract theory for unjust enrichment.
{¶6} White argued in part that she did not owe the Estate for her occupancy of the property under any theory because there was no evidence that a landlord-tenant relationship had ever been created. The trial court apparently adopted White‘s argument and entered judgment for White on the remaining claims, indicating in its entry that “there was no evidence a landlord[-]tenant relationship was ever created.”
Analysis
{¶7} In its sole assignment of error, the Estate argues that the trial court erred by granting judgment for White on the claim for rent based on the reasonable rental value of the property, because the court preconditioned the award on the existence of a lease agreement between the parties, which was contrary to law. We agree.
{¶9} Liability in quasi-contract originates out of an obligation arising by law upon a person in receipt of benefits that he or she is not justly entitled to retain. Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 526, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938), cited in Shore v. Helfrich, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-91-173, 1992 WL 131818, *3 (June 12, 1992). The elements of a quasi-contract are (1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) retention of a benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment of its value. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984), cited in Toney at *3. A quasi-contract claim does not depend upon traditional contract formation elements such as a meeting of the minds. Hummel at 525; Toney at *3.
{¶10} In this case, at trial White had emphasized that she had never entered into a lease agreement related to the premises and thus was never a part of a landlord-tenant relationship. The trial court found the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship fatal to the Estate‘s quasi-contract claim. When viewed in context, it is clear that the court applied traditional contract formation requirements to the quasi-contract claim, and denied the Estate a recovery on that basis. This was error.
{¶12} White presents three arguments in support of the trial court‘s judgment. First, she maintains that the Estate could not recover any monies from her absent evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship, an argument we have already rejected.
{¶13} Next, she argues that the judgment should be affirmed because the Estate did not file objections to the magistrate‘s order setting a rent bond at zero. White is correct that the Estate did not move to set aside the magistrate‘s bond order, but the bond hearing was limited to determining the amount of a bond based on a contracted-for rental value. We are unable to conclude that the Estate‘s failure to contest this interlocutory and ministerial order precludes it from now challenging the merits of its quasi-contract claim for unjust enrichment.
{¶14} White further argues that there was some evidence presented at trial demonstrating that she was not unjustly enriched, in the amount sought by the Estate or at all. Whether White was unjustly enriched and the value of that unjust enrichment, if any, should be determined by the trial court on remand after the court‘s reconsideration of the evidence presented at the August 15, 2018 trial.
{¶15} Because the Estate is correct that the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship was not fatal to its quasi-contract claim for unjust enrichment, and the trial court erred by denying its claim on that basis, we sustain the assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶16} We reverse the trial court‘s judgment for White on the quasi-contract claim for unjust enrichment. The Estate does not challenge the judgment for White on the
Judgment accordingly.
MOCK, P.J., and MYERS, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.