191 Pa. 600 | Pa. | 1899
Opinion by
The contract of the decedent for the sale of the Girard House property, the specific performance of which was decreed by the orphans’ court, contains peculiar provisions which have an important bearing on the questions presented by this appeal. The property was subject to liens amounting to some $600,000, and
This contract, if carried into effect, would have enabled Mr. Moore to dispose of an unmarketable property, and to have obtained a higher price for it, because of the provisions for its improvement. It imposed upon Mr. McDevitt an obligation to borrow of third parties $1,200,000 and to erect a building at a cost of $800,000. It was in effect a building agreement, differing from the usual building agreement by which the owner agrees to sell and to make advances only in the provision that the advances were to be obtained from third parties. It required the doing of many things not a part of a simple contract for the sale of land, and the doing of them to the satisfaction of third parties. The approval of the plans of building, and many matters of detail which could be disposed of only as they arose in their order, were necessarily left for future negotiations. Presumably the parties acted with this knowledge and knew, not only that time would be required, but that modifications and changes would have to be made in order to carry out the ' contract.
By writing, the time was twice extended, and on June 19, 1897, seven days before the end of the last extension, Mr. Moore ■wrote suggesting and agreeing to a modification of the contract whereby he would be required to lend Mr. McDevitt two $100,000 mortgages, to enable him to obtain enough money to complete the building. A month or more after the expiration of the time he advised Mr. McDevitt to break off his negotiation with a' company which had agreed to loan him $1,000,000 and to apply
The argument that the testimony shows nothing more than a mere indulgence upon the part of Mr. Moore is not without force; but when in connection with the testimony the purpose and character of the agreement are considered we cannot say that there is error in the conclusion reached by the orphans’ court that the limitation as to time had been waived and that in December, 1897, both parties considered the agreement as binding.
The decree is affirmed and the petitioner is allowed sixty days from the date of the filing of this opinion to perfect and carry out his agreement.