26 N.W.2d 659 | Wis. | 1947
Petition of Charles A. Bender, as administrator of the estate of Ernestine Matzke, deceased, for settlement of his final account. From a judgment assigning the estate to the heirs of the deceased, excluding Gertrude Ruch, an adopted child of a deceased daughter of the instant decedent, entered July 9, 1946, Gertrude Ruch appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Ernestine Matzke died intestate October 23, 1945. She left surviving her as her only kin Charles Bender, a son, and George Schwenk, a son of a deceased daughter. Gertrude Ruch is an adopted daughter of another deceased daughter of Mrs. Matzke. Our general statute of descent, sec.
On hearing of the petition of the administrator of Mrs. Matzke's estate for settlement of his account the county court entered judgment assigning the land and the residue of the personal property of Mrs. Matzke to her son and grandson above mentioned. Gertrude Ruch claimed an equal share with these lineal descendants under sec. 322.07, Stats., as an adopted daughter of a deceased daughter of Mrs. Matzke, and appeals from the judgment.
On May 7, 1945, before the death of Mrs. Matzke the legislature passed ch. 117, Laws of 1945, amending sec. 322.07, Stats. 1943, to read as shown in the margin.1 The only *206 change in the statute is in the first sentence. That change is readily perceived by inspection of the parallel columns set out in the opposite margin.
The opinion in Estate of Sauer (1934),
"The first sentence of sec. 322.07 in our opinion deals with the right of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parents." (p. 291.)
This being so, it does not at all affect the right of an adopted child to inherit from a parent of his adoptive parent when his adoptive parent is deceased. The only amendment made to the section by the 1945 act is contained in the first sentence. Therefore the amendment does not affect the right of the instant adopted child to inherit from the mother of his adoptive parent. The Sauer opinion goes on to say:
"The second sentence gives to adoptive parents, their heirs and next of kin, the right to inherit from an adopted child, . . . and also gives to the natural parents of an adopted child the right to inherit from him under certain circumstances. The third sentence provides that the natural parents shall, by virtue of the order of adoption, be deprived of such legal rights as they may have respecting such child and its property. The fourth sentence frees the adopted child from the legal obligation to maintain and obey his natural parents. The proviso contained in the fourth sentence relates to a situation where a natural parent is married to a parent by adoption. The statute explicitly and unmistakably covers, (1) the right of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parents, (2) the right of adoptive parents to inherit from their adopted child, (3) the right of natural parents, under certain circumstances, to inherit from an adopted child notwithstanding his adoption, but it does not explicitly or unmistakably give or deny to the adopted child the right to inherit from its natural parents" (p. 291.)
From the above quotation and from the statute itself as it now stands, it plainly appears that none of the last three sentences of the statute has any effect whatever on the right of the instant adopted child to inherit from the decedent Mrs. Matzke. The only change effected by the 1945 amendment is that it gives an adopted child the right to inherit from his adoptive parent such property as that parent held under a will or deed expressly limited to the "heirs of the body of such parents," *208
which under statements in the Sauer Case, supra, and Estateof Bradley,
Appellant's counsel suggests that the purpose of the 1945 act is plainly indicated by a note of Assemblyman Young, who introduced the bill, requesting the legislative reference library to draft a bill to change the law so that an adopted child would inherit from an aunt or uncle of his deceased adoptive parent. But legislative acts must be construed from their own language, uninfluenced by what the persons introducing or preparing the bill actually intended to accomplish by it. Moorman Mfg. Co.v. Industrial Comm.
By the Court. — The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
Stats. 1943, sec. 322.07: Stats. 1945, sec. 322.07:
Effect of adoption. An adopted Effect of adoption. An adopted person shall be deemed, for the person shall be deemed, for the purposes of inheritance and purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal succession and for all other legal consequences and incidents of the consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and natural relation of parents and children, the same to all intents children, the same to all intents and purposes as if the child had and purposes as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock of been born in lawful wedlock of such parents by adoption, excepting such parents by adoption, and such that such child shall not child shall be capable of taking be capable of taking property property expressly limited to expressly limited to the heirs the heirs of the body of such of the body of such parents. parents the same to all intents and purposes as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock of such parents by adoption.
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