{¶ 3} When Mr. Malz died in late 1994, the property containing the pump house became part of his estate. The property containing the apartments was purchased in foreclosure by Cosmo Olivieri in 1995. Mr. Olivieri believed that the pump house was on his property and continued to use it for the benefit of the apartment buildings. In order to keep the pumps operational, Mr. Olivieri maintained electric service to the pump house in his name. When a dispute arose with Mr. Malz's estate about ownership of the pump house property, Mr. Olivieri sued the estate, alleging that he held an implied easement on the pump house property for benefit of the apartment buildings. His lawsuit was unsuccessful, and Mr. Olivieri appealed to this Court. In 2001, while the appeal was pending, Mr. Olivieri disconnected the apartments from the pump house and ended electrical *3 service to the building. He moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal as moot and served a copy of his motion, which explained that he had disconnected his buildings from the pumps, on Ms. Malz.
{¶ 4} Ms. Malz claimed that she could not enter the pump house in 2001 because it was padlocked. Two years later, she had the padlock removed. When she entered the building, she found damage to the pump house and its contents caused by accumulated water. The estate and the defendants agree that Mr. Olivieri stopped using the pump house in 2001 and that he discontinued electrical service to the building with Ms. Malz's knowledge. They also agree that the machinery in the pump house was in good working order at that time. The estate, however, has claimed that the defendants are responsible for the damage to the pump house and its contents.
{¶ 7} The estate argued that Mr. Olivieri blocked Ms. Malz's access to the pump house by padlocking the door and that she was unable to enter to inspect or maintain the equipment inside. It pointed to the affidavit of Ms. Malz, in which she stated that Mr. Olivieri padlocked the door and would not remove the padlock when asked. Despite this statement, however, there is no evidence in the record tending to prove that the damage could be attributed to Mr. Olivieri's actions. While Ms. Malz's affidavit does allege that Mr. Olivieri padlocked the door to the pump house, it appears that the affidavit refers to Mr. Olivieri's actions prior to disconnecting his buildings from the pumps in 2001. The affidavit also acknowledges that Mr. Olivieri ended his connection (although, again, without reference to a date) and that Ms. Malz did not break the padlock to enter until 2003. The estate failed to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Olivieri caused the damage. This Court, therefore, reaches the same conclusion as *5
the trial court regarding whether there are genuine issues of fact, but for a different reason. This Court does not discount Ms. Malz's affidavit as "self serving," but concludes instead that it does not point to genuine issues of material fact. See Stone v. Cazeau, 9th Dist. No. 07CA009164,
{¶ 8} In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court must construe the evidence in a way that is favorable to the nonmoving party.Horton v. Harwich Chem. Corp.,
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. *7
Costs taxed to appellant.
*1SLABY, P. J. CARR, J. CONCUR
