Aрpellant’s statement of the issue can perhaps best be reduced to а single contention: the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We do not agree, and we affirm the lower court’s holding.
In his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Dave Knott, appellant filed an actiоn in Jefferson County Chancery Court to quiet title to 14.6 acres of land. Jefferson County Circuit Court, in a previous ejectment action, had held that appellee was the owner and entitled to the possession of the land in question. The chancеllor dismissed appellant’s action, stating that it was barred by res judicata becаuse of the circuit court’s prior summary judgment in appellee’s favor in a suit involving thе same land. The chancellor found that appellant had claimed in the circuit court case that he personally owned the land and was thereforе estopped from bringing an action in his fiduciary capacity. “The issues are thе same,” said the chancellor, “and only the capacity of the parties differs.” Appellant as administrator of the estate was held to be merely a nоminal plaintiff. “The real party in interest,” the chancellor concluded, “is Charlie Knott, individually.”
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2401 (Repl. 1971) provides that realty becomes an asset in the hands of thе administrator of an estate “when so directed by the will (if any), or when the court finds that suсh property should be sold, mortgaged, leased or exchanged for any purрose enumerated in [§ 62-2704].” The latter statute lists the following contingencies:
(1) For the payment of claims,
(2) For the payment of a legacy given by the will of the decedent,
(3) For the preservatiоn or protection of assets of the estate,
(4) For making distribution of the estatе or any part thereof, or
(5) For any other purpose in the best interest of thе estate.
Since 1956, when appellant was appointed administrator, no сlaim has been filed against the estate, and no other “purpose enumerаted” has been found by the probate court. In Cranna, Administrator v. Long,
By 1982, appellant, through inheritance and conveyance from his brothеrs, had acquired all the interest in the lands comprising the estate. It was in his capacity as an individual landowner that he appeared as a party to the action in circuit court in 1983 that resulted in the recognition of appellee as owner of the 14.6 acres. Apart from the fact that appellant lacked legal capacity to maintain the action in chancery as administratоr of the estate, his effort to circumvent the effect of res judicata by clаiming to be a different party in the chancery suit (i.e., the estate by the administrator) is оnly an exercise in semantics. Generally speaking, the principle of res judiсata applies when a final adjudication occurs on the merits of an issue, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, on matters that were (or might have been) litigated. Precisely identical parties are not requirеd; a substantial identity is sufficient. The rule will not be defeated by minor differences. Wells v. Ark. Public Svс. Comm’n,
Affirmed.