OPINION
Opinion by
This аppeal involves the appointment of Marcus P. Rogers as receiver in a dispute over the estate of Lee Roy “Cowboy” Hos-kins Sr. (Cowboy). Cowboy’s will was probated in 1985. Thirty years later, many of Cowboy’s family members are still involved in litigation to determine the fate of Cowboy’s estate assets. In the present suit, appellees Rogers, Lee Roy Hoskins Jr., Lee Roy Hoskins III, Lee Aim Hos-kins Kulka, Andrea Clare Jurica, Leonard K. Hoskins, Daniel Kenton Hoskins, and William Rex Hoskins all moved for the probate court to name Rogers ás receiver for two trusts created by Cowboy’s will.
Appellants Clifton Hoskins and Hoskins, Inc.—whom we refer to collectively as “Cliff’
I. BackgRound
Cowboy died testate in 1985. According to his will, Cowboy created two trusts—the Marital Deduction Trust and the Residuary Trust. The will identified Cowboy’s
It is undisputed that the family has been embroiled in litigation for decades. The lawsuits involve allegations that. Hazel transferred several pieces of property from Cowboy’s estate to Clifton, in violations of the trusts. In one such dispute, Leonard sued Clifton and Hazel. The dispute proceeded to arbitration, at the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Texas.
Hazel, however, remained in the arbitration. The arbitrator appointed Rogers as receiver of the assets of the trusts pursuant to the Texas Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 114.008(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The arbitrator ordered Rogers to take “possession of all Trust Property and administer the Trust[s] pursuant to [their] terms,” determine “whether Hazel Hoskins is capable of continuing as the Trustee,” make “such other recommendations as he may deem appropriate,” and deliver “a report to the Arbitrator no later than June 30, 2013.” Rogers filed his written report on June 28, 2013. On November 12, 2013, the arbitration was abated pending the outcome of the Hoskins v. Hoskins appeal. See
On October 9, 2013, Rex Hoskins, who is Leonard’s son and Cowboy’s grandson, initiated the present litigation in Live Oak County Probate Court. Rex took the position that under the terms of Cowboy’s will, all of the estate was to go into the Residuary Trust for the benefit of Hazel for life, with discretionary distributions to go to the support of Cowboy’s children and grandchildren. Upon Hazel’s death, the remainder was to go to Cowboy’s descendants, per stirpes. However,. according. to Rex, Hazel had instead transferred several valuable trust assets directly, to herself or Clifton, to the exclusion of the other family-member beneficiaries of the trusts. Rex further alleged that Hazel had also never provided an accounting to the trust beneficiaries, as the terms of the will and the trusts required her to do. Rex sought to remove Hazel as executor of Cowboy’s estate and as trustee of the trusts. Hazel filed pleas in opposition to Rex’s petition, but the probate court denied Hazel’s pleas in May 2014. Hazel resigned as independent executor and as trustee of each trust shortly thereafter.
Rogers had also joined the probate court suit in November 20, 2013. In his petition, Rogers identified himself as the receiver of the two trusts “by Order signed on April 16, 2013, by Thomas J. Smith, arbitrator.” He requested confirmation' of the arbitra
Rather' than confirming Rogers’s appointment or independently appointing him, the probate court appointed Dyann MeCully dependent administrator of Cowboy’s estate on August 18, 2014. In October 2014, MeCully filed a declaratory judgment action naming Rogers, Hazel, the successor trustees, and Cowboy’s children, grandchildren, and their associated entities as respondents. MeCully asked the probate court to declare whether the estate, the trusts, or any of the beneficiaries of the estate or trusts had any claims аgainst one another and, if so, to identify those claims. Subsequently, the Live Oak County District Court appointed Joe Carter to serve as trustee of the Marital Deduction Trust and George Morrill III as Trustee of the Residuary Trust.
Likewise, rather than ordering Rogers to perform an accounting, on August 1, 2014, the probate court ordered Hazel to file a complete accounting of the estate and each trust from April 1985 to the date of the accounting. The accounting for the trusts was to be “delivered to Marcus Rogers, Receiver,” along with all other parties. Hazel filed an accounting for the Marital Deduction Trust only, and Rogers objected to this accounting as being deficient in several ways—chiefly, that it was devoid of detail on individual assets and trust transactions, and also that it contained many unsworn declarations which coincided with Cliff and Hazel’s stance in this litigation.
In April 2015, three of Cowboy’s grandchildren—Lee Roy Hoskins III, Andrea Clare Jurica, and Lee Ann Hoskins Kul-ka—filed a motion to appoint Rodgers as reсeiver over the assets of both trusts. The motion set out that Rogers had previously been appointed by the arbitrator and that the probate court had already made comments and entered orders which impliedly “recognized the standing and role of the Receiver.” The motion urged the court to formally appoint Rogers and grant him the authority to pursue this litigation on behalf of the trusts and their beneficiaries, using funds drawn from the estate.
Various other parties filed responses indicating support for Rogers’s appointment. Cowboy’s son Leonard argued that the appointment would control legal fees and expedite presentation of the case. Morrill, who is the trustee of the Residuary Trust, argued that because Hazel had left the trusts underfunded, he had no resources to pursue litigation; he supported the appointment as a means of controlling expenses and, in the alternative, moved to resign if no receiver or “ad litem” were appointed to pursue litigation in his plаce. Basic statements of support were also filed by Cowboy’s grandsons Rex and Daniel Hoskins as well as Carter, the trustee of the Marital Deduction Trust. On May 11,
On July 15, 2015, the probate court held a hearing on the receivership motion. It heard extensive arguments from counsel, but no evidence was offered or admitted. The probate court asked for additional post-hearing briefing, Cliff joined Hazel in that briefing, arguing against the appointment of Rogers as receiver.
On October 2, 2015, the probate court signed an order appointing Rogers as “receiver” for the trusts, to be compensated from the estate. According to the order, Rogers’s sole responsibility as “receiver” was to prepare a written report determining what estate assets, if any, should have been distributed to either trust, where each asset was located, who owned each asset, and the approximate fair market value of each asset. Following the receipt of the report, the dependent administrator McCulIy was directed to “file a Motion with the Court seeking authority to transfer the assets or claim for the assets to the [trusts].” Then each trustee was to “determine the viability .of pursuing litigation to recover assets that should have been distributed to his respective trust.” Finally, the order set out that “[additional authority for the Receiver to file litigation to recover assets on behalf of one or both of the Trustees will require further order of the Court.” Cliff filed this interlocutory appeal from the October 2015 order,
II. Jurisdiction on Appeal
As an initial matter, we consider appel-lees’ argument that this' Court is without jurisdiction. It is undisputed that the federally-appointed arbitrator had named Rogers as receiver of the two trusts. In light of this fact, appellees argue that in the present suit, the probate court’s “Order Appointing Receiver” is in fact a confirmation of the arbitrator’s prior order appointing Rogers. Appellees argue that the Texas Civil Prаctice and Remedies Code only provides for interlocutory review of an order which “appoints a receiver;” because the probate court confirmed Rogers’s role rather than appointing him, appellees argue, we are therefore without jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. In the alternative, appellees point out that even before the probate court issued the “Order Appointing Receiver” that is the subject of this appeal, the probate court sometimes referred to Marcus Rogers as -“receiver” in hearings and even in its orders. Appellees argue that these references have the legal effect of orders appointing or confirming Rogers’s status as receiver. Appellees reason that because Cliff did not appeal these “orders,” Cliffs present appeal is untimely, which also deprives this Court of jurisdiction.
A. Applicable Law
A party may bring an interlocutory appeal from an order appointing а receiver. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem. Code Ann, § 51.014(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); Diana Rivera & Assocs., PC v. Calvillo,
The same rules of interpretation apply in construing the meaning of a court order as in ascertaining the meaning of
An ambiguity in an order may be said to be “patent” or “latent.” See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Indus., Inc.,
B. Discussion
To address appellees’ first argument, we ask whether the probate court’s 2015 “Order Appointing Receiver” was in reality an order confirming Rogers as receiver, based on the arbitrator’s prior appointment. The order, which is the subject of this appeal, reads in pertinent part as follows:
On the 15th day of July, 2015, came on to be heard the Motion of Lee Roy Hoskins, Jr., Lee Roy Hoskins, III, Andrea Clare Jurica, and Lee Ann Hoskins Kulka for an Order Appointing Marcus Rogers as Receiver. Having considered the motion, the responses thereto, and the argument of counsel, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part as follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Marcus Rogers is appointed as Receiver for the Marital Deduction Trust and the Residuary Trust created under the will of Lee Roy Hos-kins, Sr. dаted July 20, 1982 (the ‘Will”),
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4. The Receiver shall prepare a written report, utilizing the information contained on the Inventory filed for the Estate of Lee Roy Hoskins Sr.; the 706 Return filed for such Estate; and the Final Accounting filed by Hazel Hoskins in this cause, to determine, per the terms'of the Will:
(a) To the extent the information is available, which assets, if any, should have been distributed, from the Estate to the Marital Deduction Trust and/or to the Residuary Trust; and
(b) To the extent the information is available, where each of the assets is currently located, the current ownership of such asset, and the approximate fair market value of each asset.
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6. Following receipt of the Receiver’s Report, the Dependent Administra-trix shall file a Motion with the Court*303 seeking authority to transfer the assets or claim for the assets to the Residuary Trust and/or Marital Deduction Trust (the “Motion”). Any party may file objections or responses to the Motion.
7. Any party may file written objections to the Receiver’s report within fourteen (14) days following service оf the Report. Such objections will be considered and ruled on by the Court at the hearing on the Administratrix’s Motion.
8. The Trustee of the Marital Deduction Trust and the Trustee of the Residuary Trust shall determine the viability of pursing litigation to recover assets that should have been distributed to his respective Trust.
9. Additional authority for the Receiver to file litigation to recover assets on behalf of one or both of the Trustees will require further order of the Court.
On the face of the order, no patent ambiguity is apparent. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins.,
Likewise, we do not find any latent ambiguity in the application of this order to its subject matter. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins.,
By contrast, the probate court did not order Rogers to perform any of those tasks, and it in fact stated that Rogers would need to seek further order of the court before he would receive the probate court’s imprimatur to perform those tasks. The probate court instead asked Rogers to generate a report on a very different topic: determining what estate assets, if any, should have been distributed to either trust, where each asset was located, who owned each asset, and the approximate
The Fifth Circuit has rejected an analogous argument under, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See In re Deepwater Horizon,
The district court’s two orders neither mentioned the FAA nor- purported to vacate, modify, or correct the Claims Administrator’s awards of compensation. Nor did the district court consider any of the enumerated grounds for declining to confirm an arbitral award under 9 U.S.C. § 10 or § 11. Nor did the district court indicate more generally that the motions filed by Whitehead and Rocon were denied with prejudice.
Id: Here, similar to Deepwater, the probate court’s order made no mention of the TAA or the principles which the TAA imposes onto a confirmation proceeding. See id.; see also Nafta Traders,
Thus, based on the plain meaning and distinct operation of the probate court’s order, and the absence of any hallmarks of a confirmation, we cannot conclude that the probate court’s “Order Appointing Receiver” was simply a confirmation in disguise.
Appellees next argue that even before the probate court entered the “Order Appointing Receiver,” the court had included language in its earlier orders and made remarks during hearings which impliedly confirmed Rogers’s authority as receiver. Appellees assert that Cliffs failure to timely appeal these confirmation “orders” deprives this Court of jurisdiction. We disagree. First, based on their plain
We conclude that these ordеrs and remarks did not have the effect of confirming or appointing Rogers as receiver. Cliff was not required to appeal these unrelated orders and remarks, and we are thus not lacking jurisdiction due to any untimeliness. See Verburgt,
III. EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT POR APPOINTMENT op Receiver
By his first two issues on appeal, Cliff contends that appellees offered no evidence which would justify a receivership under the applicable law. Cliff asserts that the probate court therefore abused its discretion by appointing a receiver.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The appointment of a receiver lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the appointment of a reсeiver under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Estate of Herring,
' Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent reversible grounds, but are relevant components in assessing whether the trial court erred. Coburn v. Moreland,
The burden to show the existence of circumstances justifying the appointment of a receiver rests on the party seeking the appointment. Spiritas,
Subject to the control and limitation of the court, a receiver generally has the following duties and powers: (1) take charge and keep possession of the property; (2) receive rents; (3) collect and compromise demands; (4) make transfers; and (5) perform other acts in regard to the property as authorized by the court. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.031 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); Diana Rivera,
B. Discussion
Cliff .contends that the probate court abused its discretion because there was no evidence to supрort its order appointing a receiver. Cliff premises this contention on a review of only the record from the receivership hearing on July 15, 2015. All parties acknowledge that the July 15 hearing was a non-evidentiary proceeding.
In response, appellees direct our attention to a hearing held July 3, 2014 and the allegedly deficient accounting Hazel produced in the months that followed. Appel-lees assert that the record of the 2014 hearing and the accounting both offer evidence showing a breach of trust.
At the 2014 hearing, the, court received testimony from Rogers and documentary evidence concerning the trust. Rogers testified that following his appointment by the arbitrator, he made inquiries with Clifton and Hazel in order to take possession of the trusts’ property, as the arbitrator had ordered. He testified that in response, Hazel and Clifton denied having any relevant documents, denied that the estate had any net assets exceeding its debt in 1985, de
Rogers also testified that Hazel had breached the trust by 'transferring valuable trust property either to herself or to Clifton, to the exclusion of other beneficiaries. Rogers responded to questioning from Hazel, wherein Hazel asserted that under the terms of the will, she had the right to engage in self-dealing as the estate administrator and the trustee of both trusts. However, we note that between the time of the 2014 and 2015 hearings, the San Antonio Court of Appeals issued its opinion regarding a separate Hoskins litigation, holding that Hazel was prohibited from distributing trust income or principal to herself. See Hoskins v. Hoskins, No. 04-13-00859-CV,
It is undisputed that after the conclusion of the 2014 hearing, the probate court ordered Hazel to file a complete accounting for the estate and each trust from April 1985 to the date of the accounting. Hazel submitted an accounting for the Marital Deduction Trust, but she did not submit an accounting for the Residuary Trust. A review of the record reveals that Rogers responded by objecting to several alleged deficiencies in Hazel’s accounting, including: the accounting failed to itemize any of the debts which it listed as paid; it provided no balance statements; it provided no information on the source or nature of any funds in the estate; it provided an incomplete list of estate transactions, and it provided no details for the transactions which were listed; the accounting was not supported by any documentary evidence except for the totals listed on the 1985 tax return; it showed that half of the stock of Hoskins, Inc. was in the Marital Deduction Trust in 2002 but had been removed from the trust between 2002 and 2014, and the accounting did not provide any explanation for the disappearance; the accounting contained many unsworn, partisan declarations that aligned with Hazel and .Cliffs stance in this litigation, rather than providing a neutral accounting; and it excluded a large amount of cash receipts prior to 2002, which was allegedly based'on Cliffs stance that the estate was not required to account for estate assets prior to a 2002 settlement agreement. For these reasons, Rogers asserted that the accounting was materially deficient under the estates and property codes. See Tex. Estates Code AnN. § 404.001 (requirements for estate accounting).; Tex. PROP. - Code ANN.
At the 2015 hearing and in post-hearing briefs, appellees argued that Hazel’s actions had left the trusts without the resources to pursue litigation. Appellees argued that because Rogers had already done much of the preparatory work at the behest of the arbitrator, his appointment would thus foster an efficient resolution to this suit, which was just the latest in a long series of lawsuits concerning a thirty-year-old estate. See De Berrera v. Frost,
Thus, by the time the probate court аppointed Rogers, it had heard evidence that Hazel had transferred valuable trust property to herself and to Cliff. In the wake of the 2014 hearing, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that Hazel did not have the right to take certain of these actions, and this holding was later affirmed. See Hoskins,
Taken together, the appellees’ evidence and persuasive argument favor the conclusion that Hazel breached the trust, and that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in appointing Rogers to take the first step toward remedying this alleged breach: creating a report to map out the current state of the assets. However, Cliff presents multiple arguments against this evidence. First, Cliff contends that rather than “some evidence” of a “breach of trust,” a higher showing is required before the probate court could appoint Rogers to create a report. See Tex. Prop. Code. Ann. § 114.008(a)(5); Butnaru,
However, whereas receivership is usually a severe remedy, we find none of that severity present in the probate court’s order. The harshness normally resides in the fact that, to a greater or lesser extent, a receivership strips the defendants of control over their entity or their possessions, displacing a trustee, a corporate board, or an owner in favor of court control. A receiver normally has the following duties and powers: (1) take charge and keep possession of the property; (2) receive rents; (3) collect and compromise demands; (4) make transfers; and (5) perform other acts in regard to the property as authorized by the court. Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.031. Here, the probate court granted none of these duties or powers to Rogers, even though the trustees requested it. Instead, Rogers was only to develop a report on the current status of the estate’s assets. The power and responsibility to take ac
Rather than the harsh control of a true receivership, the probate court’s order resembles another remedy: the appointment of an auditor. “When an investigation of accounts ... appears necessary for the purpose of justice between the parties to any suit, the court shall appoint an auditor or auditors to state the acсounts between the parties and to make report thereof to the court as soon as possible.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 172; Diana Rivera,
Despite Rivera’s attempts to characterize the court’s actions as appointing a receiver, the order at issue merely appointed an auditor to review Rivera’s accounts and to report the results. The auditor was not authorized to take over the financial aspects of Rivera’s law practice. Moreover, the order specified that the auditor would be authorized to commence the examination only if Rivera failed to provide the information to the court herself.
Id. In many ways, Cliff stands in a similar position to the appellant in Diana Rivera, asking this Cоurt to reverse an order which contains none of the harsh court-control of a true receivership. Rogers was assigned the same duties as the auditor in Diana Rivera, and the probate court only granted Rogers these duties after Hazel “failed to provide the information to the court herself.” See id.
In other ways, this case resembles In re Estate of Herring,
In the past, this Court approved of the appointment of a receiver to partition property within an estate where the heirs cannot agree, noting that “the appointment of a receiver will solve most, if not all, of the vexations and problems confronting the parties on the issue of partition, as well as management of the properties. ...”
Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Gonzalez,
Cliff next moves to strike all evidence presented at the July 3, 2014 hearing. Cliff contends that we may not consider this evidence, given that it was presented on a different date than the July 15, 2015 hearing. Cliff also points out that the probate court prefaced its order by stating: “Having considered the motion, the responses thereto, and the argument of counsel, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part as follows .... ” Cliff contends that we should interpret this as a statement that the probate court considered no other information in reaching its decision, and further contends that this means we must not cоnsider the evidence presented at the 2014 hearing either. In support, Cliff cites the rule that recitals contained in the judgment are. presumed true unless there is a conflict between the judgment and record. Parks v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co.,
We disagree. Generally, an appellate court may presume that a trial court took judicial notice of its own records in the same case. Vahlsing, Inc. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co,,
Here, there are several circumstances which strengthen a' presumption that the probate court judicially knew what had previously taken place. See id. For one, the record evidence relates not only to the “same case,” but to the same Issue within the case. See McCurry,
As for Cliffs argument concerning the order’s recital, when the court stated that it had considered the “motion, the responses thereto, and the argument of counsel,” the probate court did not state that it considered no other sources of information besides the motions, responses, and arguments. Moreover, Cliffs reliance on Parks is misplaced; that case held that a judgment recital broadened the probate court’s apparent range of considerations, not narrowed it. See
In his final set of arguments- against the appellees’ evidence, Cliff contends that the probate- court abused its discretion because only Hazel breached the trust, and the current trustees committed no breach of trust. Cliff impliedly asserts that Hazel’s death and the appointment of a'successor trustee rendered any past breach of trust harmless and made Rogers’s appointment unnecessary.
In support, Cliff points to the text of the statute, which authorizes several remedies in the event of a breach of trust, one of which is the appointmеnt of a receiver. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 114.008. This section states:
(a) To remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or might occur, the court may:
(1) compel the trustee to perform the trustee’s duty or duties;
(2) enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(3) compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust, including compelling the trustee to pay money or to restore property;
(4) order a trustee to account;
*312 (5) appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust;
(6) suspend the trustee;
(7) remove the trastee as provided under Section 113.082;
(8) reduce or deny compensation to the trustee;
(9) subject to Subsection (b), void an act of the trustee, impose a lien or a constructive trust on trust property, or trace trust property of which the trustee wrongfully disposed and recover the property or the proceeds from the property; or
(10) order any other appropriate relief.
Id. Cliff observes that many of the remedies are phrased in the present tense and seem to be addressed toward the current trustee. See id. Cliff argues that because of the present-tense phrasing and orientation toward the current trustee, these remedies should only be applied to remedy breaches committed by a current trustee. He reasons, therefore, that the probate court abused its discretion in applying one of these remedies to cure Hazel’s past breach.
We disagree. Cliffs focus on the statute’s verb tense is misplaced. “Consistent with the legislature’s instruction under the Code Construction Act, we should not focus on verb tense in determining legislative intent because words in the present tense include the future tense.” In re Nabors,
We conclude that there is some evidence in the record which supports the conclusion that Hazel breached the trust, and we have addressed each of Cliff’s arguments against this evidence. See id § 114.008(a)(5); Butnaru,
IV. Appointment op a DisinteRested Receiver
By his third issue, Cliff contends that even if a receivership wаs otherwise appropriate, Rogers was not an appropriate person to fill that role. According to Cliff, the probate court abused its discretion in appointing Rogers, because such a position can only be filled by a neutral, disinterested person. Rogers has admitted that his fees as receiver were paid by Leonard Hoskins following the arbitration proceedings, and it is undisputed that Leonard has filed suit against Clifton in
“By statutory definition—as well as necessity—a receiver must be both a non-party and disinterested in the outcome of the case.” Wiley v. Sclafani,
Cliffs argument is unavailing. Our review of the record confirms that when Leonard petitioned the arbitrator to appoint a receiver, the arbitrator’ ordered Leonard to pay the receiver’s fees. It is undisputed that the arbitration agreement provided the arbitrator with authority to assess any party with costs. See In re C.A.K.,
Finally, appellees point out that when the probate court appointed Rogers in this separate litigation, the court ordered that Rogers’s fees would no longer by paid by Leonard, but would instead be paid out of the estate. Thus, to the extent that Leonard’s fee-payment created any potential for conflict, the probate court took corrective action to mitigate such a conflict. We conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Rogers as a suitable receiver. Wiley,
V. Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Notes
. Other appellees identified in this appeal include: Joe L. Carter Jr,; the Estate of Hazel Q. Hoskins; Blake Hoskins; Brent C. Hoskins; R. Dyann McCully; and George P. Morrill III.
. For ease of reference, we assign Cliff masculine pronouns.
. Hazel and National Bank of Commerce were the two original trustees of the trusts according to the Will. National Bank of Commerce resigned as trustee shortly after Cowboy died. Hazel served as the sole trustee of each trust for approximately thirty years.
. The bankruptcy court had authority to enter this arbitration order from its role presiding over previous Hoskins-family litigation.
. We find nothing in the record regarding arbitration after the appeal in Hoskins v. Hoskins.
. Cowboy’s will provided that the district court judge, acting as an individual and not in an official capacity, would appoint successor trustees.
. Hazel died on October 26, 2015, after the notice of appeal was filed.
.- We offer no opinion as to whether an order confirming a receiver is not an order which "appoints a receiver,” and would therefore not be subject to an interlocutory appeal under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, See Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (emphasis added); Diana Rivera & Assocs., PC v. Calvillo,
. Even assuming that appellees' jurisdictional arguments had merit, the parties have neglected to mention another potential source of appellate jurisdiction: probate cases are an exception to the "one final judgment” rule for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. De Ayala v. Mackie,
. The only order giving the receiver control over the trusts was entered by the arbitrator, not the probate court.
. To the extent that Cliff's argument has any merit, we note that the trial court expressly considered “the motion” and the "responses thereto,” both of which were complemented with excerpts from the 2014 hearing, and "the argument of counsel” at the 2015 hearing, which summarized portions of the evidence from the 2014 hearing.
. Cliff also moves to strike from the record all evidence and argument presented at a different hearing held May 6, 2014, as well as a report from Rogers which, Cliff alleges, was received by the trial court on March 13, 2016. We deny his motion to strike the May 6 portion of the record for the same reasons stated above. Rogers's report plays no part in our consideration of this appeal, but we need not strike it from the record in order to signify that we do not consider it. See Tex. R, Apf. P, 34.5(c); Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc.,