167 Iowa 557 | Iowa | 1914
The will in question gave to the children of decedent, Maud May Henry Lawson and Harry Henry, $500 and $25, respectively. The will was executed in 1895. At the time of his death, the decedent owned a home worth from $10,000 to $15,000. At the time of his death he was engaged in manufacturing a certain article used for cleansing purposes. Such business had yielded a profit of $4,000 per annum. One witness estimated the value of the “business” at $35,000. The record does not disclose what property was owned by the decedent at the time of the execution of the will.
The salient fact which was put forward by the contestants in proof of the mental unsoundness of the testator was his denial of the paternity of his son.
The decedent was first married at Oregon, 111., in 1873, to Josephine Schott. Three children were born of this marriage. The second-born died in infancy. The other two are the contestants. The daughter was born in 1874, and the son December 15, 1876. About 1877 or 1878, the decedent and his wife .separated. The occasion of the separation was that the decedent professed to believe that his wife had been guilty' of infidelity, and that he was not the father ’of' the youngest child. So far as appears in this record, he disclosed
The assignments of error are directed in large part to complaint of rulings of the court in rejecting offered testimony. We need not dwell upon these in their details. We think that some of the testimony which was rejected by the court was admissible. Even though such testimony be deemed as admitted, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury still remains.
If the contestants had been entitled to go to the jury on the whole ease, we think they would have been entitled to introduce this testimony as strengthening their ease before the jury. It added nothing, however, to their mere right to have the case submitted to the jury.
The paternity of the child was established by legal presumption, and this was sufficient of itself to carry this element to the jury, if the other, elements of the contest had been sufficiently supported.
Whether the evidence which the decedent claimed to have of the infidelity of his wife was credible or plausible does not appear. It does not appear that he ever communicated it. His conduct was at all times consistent with his belief. The father and son never spoke to each other. The decedent was kind and tender to his daughter, and aided her substantially in acquiring an extensive education. On the subject of his belief as to the paternity of the son, he was not communicative. All that he ever said on the subject was said at the beginning to two or three close friends and to the wife herself. Whether the evidence, therefore, which satisfied his mind was such that no rational person would be likely to believe it, or was such that no person could believe, and yet be rational, is quite beyond the possibility of proof. In the absence of such proof, some other evidence than mere erroneous belief is essential to the contestants’ case.
Now, doctor, assuming that a young man marries a girl about sixteen years of age, whom he has known about two years, and whom he loved with a strong, passionate love, and by his wife he has born to him two children, a girl and boy whose paternity he never questioned, and three years after the
Did this evidence entitle the contestants to go to the jury 1 We are clear that the expert was quite outside of his realm. Except as to an appropriate definition of “insane delusion,” there was nothing in the hypothetical question that was subject to expert opinion. The recital of evidence furnished a basis for inference. The inferences to be drawn were such as would fairly arise in the mind of the ordinary person. The full effect, then, of the question and answer was that the physician drew his own inferences of fact from the recital of evidence, and applied his own conception and definition of “insane delusion.” It rested solely upon the jury to draw the inferences of fact, and upon the court to define “insane delusion,”
We had occasion to consider the principal question in the recent case of Hingst v. Jones, 166 Iowa, 329. The facts shown therein presented a stronger case for submission to the jury than do those in the present case. Our conclusion in that case is quite conclusive against the appellants herein. To the same effect, see Potter v. Jones, 20 Or. 239 (25 Pac. 769, 12 L. R. A. 161), wherein the subject of insane delusion is fully discussed.
The order of the trial court is — Affirmed.