172 Pa. 185 | Pa. | 1896
Opinion by
This case depends upon the inferences to be drawn from the evidence submitted to the orphans’ court. The auditing judge readied one conclusion while his associates reached the opposite one, and it becomes necessary to inquire whether the evidence fairly sustains the decree made by the majority of that court. It appears that several persons, among whom were Heck-man and Shafto, had arranged to organize a company for the manufacture and sale of brick. Shafto was the only one of the number who was an experienced brickmaker, and his judgment as to the preliminary arrangements, including the selection of materials and the location of a brickyard, was relied on by all his associates. He was at the same time the agent of Ward, employed by him to secure a tenant for a brickyard owned by him, with the promise that he should have one quarter of the rent obtained. Under these circumstances he directed the attention of his associates to Ward’s property, proposing a lease of the yard and of the right to take the clay, to be paid for by a royalty of one dollar per thousand bricks, with a minimum royalty of twenty-five hundred dollars for the first year and four thousand per annum thereafter. Two or three of his associates, including Heckman, visited the property at his instance. The brick company had not been organized. A meeting was brought about by Shafto between Ward and his own associates in the brick enterprise, which resulted in a lease upon the terms Shafto had proposed.
Heckman was to become the president of the company when it was fully organized, and the lease was executed by him on behalf of the company then in process of formation, and as soon as the company was in condition to take it he assigned it directly to the corporation. This was done in pursuance of an understanding to which his associates, including Shafto, the agent of the lessor, were parties. The bills were thereafter made to the Philadelphia Brick Company, presented to its officers, and paid, except in one instance, by its checks.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence we think the knowledge of Shafto was notice to his principal that the
We are not prepared to adopt the conclusion reached by the court below that the bad faith of Shafto in his dealings with his associates rendered the contract he had negotiated between them and his employer absolutely void. As to any right of action or interest of his own, that result might well follow; but we can see no reason why the lessor should not recover for his royalties, at least as to so much thereof as he was actually to receive. It is not necessary however to enter upon that subject. We place the affirmance of this judgment on the ground already indicated. The agent negotiated this lease. He knew perfectly well who was to be the lessee, and by whom the enterprise was to be conducted. He was himself a member of .the company for whose use and benefit Heckman became temporarily a substitute ; and it would have been a fraud on Heck-man for Shafto to attempt to hold him personally responsible for what he well knew was understood to be the obligation of the corporation. The principal cannot secure the benefit of the contract and repudiate the means by which its execution was induced. He stands on the ground on which his agent has put him.
The assignments of error are overruled and the decree is affirmed.
