*1 Dist., Aug. Div. Three. B005226. Second 1986.] [No. HAFNER, J. Deceased. of CHARLES
Estate HAFNER, Petitioner and v. L. Respondent, HELEN al., et Objectors and Appellants; JOAN HAFNER HAFNER, Claimant Appellant.
KIMBERLY
Counsel *6 Miller, Fine, Miller, C. Douglas Perzik & Friedman and Steinberg, Bogan & Goldstein for Objectors and Appellants. A. Bulloch for
Lloyd Petitioner and Respondent and for Claimant and Appellant.
Opinion DANIELSON, issue The principle this case is: as between presented by J. innocent, the surviving, husband, wife and children of a and his bigamous innocent, surviving, child, putative and their is spouse1 who entitled 1We use the term meaning “wife” as decedent’s wife whose to decedent had dissolved, never been and the term “putative spouse” 4452 of the as it is defined section Civil Code. is, as to estate when that estate to the husband’s intestate succeed is, as to children, the husband’s separate property wife surviving spouse, quasi-marital property? that, to the of the estate as one-half property, goes We hold separate for distribution pursuant and four children of the decedent wife surviving 221) (hereafter and the the Probate Code section to former section 221 of as goes quasi-marital other one-half of the Probate 4452 and former section 201 to Civil Code section pursuant (hereafter 201).2 section Code Proceedings Background Below3
Factual (Charles) (Joan) J. were and the decedent Hafner Joan Hafner Charles York; 1954, 12, it the first marriage on June in the State of New married in College took residence up for each of them. their Following marriage they Point, Point ever College has continued to live in or near New York. Joan Joan three daughters, since. The between and Charles produced 1955; 25, Catherine born December Kotsay, all of whom are now living: Hafner, 18, No- Mayorga, 1956; Dorothy born born Lillian November vember 1957.4 with was pregnant 1956 Joan learned that she
In or March of February Charles left of 1956 May her second child and told Charles. April where he would Joan, her know letting notice and without without prior Catherine, child, and Joan moved back was sick be. At that time their first her; from Charles. she received no who support supported parents, Joan Charles left 1957. briefly early were reunited Joan and Charles Joan, third with their then pregnant 1957. February for the last time in He told York in 1957. child, May street New on the Charles encountered specified. unless otherwise to the Probate Code are 2Hereafter all sectional references January 1985. effective rewritten extensively amended and Probate Code was Code, (Prob. January in effect before governed by Code This case Probate *7 6103.) § decision, or otherwise court’s statement of the trial background 3The factual from drawn dispute. and not in controverted These facts are not appeal augmented. the record on from as 459, judicial have taken we Evidence Code section appellant’s under request Pursuant to are contained appellant’s opening brief A appendix notice of the documents listed in Melton, No. NWC v. case files: Hafner following Angeles Los Court Superior Hafner, Conservatee, 5121B case No. NCP (personal injuty); of Charles J. Conservatorship Hafner, Deceased, (probate). SEP 13891 case No. (conservatorship); J. and Estate of Charles While appeal. this appellants to Joan are also 4Decedent’s three children Hafner to Joan we we shall also refer opinion, refer to Joan as in this Hafner Joan collectively appellants. three as children decedent her, “I hear are you to have another going baby,” and asked her whether she would like California. go Joan “What replied, guarantees would I have that won’t leave me you pregnant again?” Charles “There’s replied, no guarantees.” 1958,
In Joan filed support proceedings against Charles in the 1956, New York court. In family $12 she obtained a week per child support order and in 1958 she $20 obtained similar order for week. per Charles made four in 1958 support payments but never made other any payments. 1958, In Joan consulted an matters, New York on the attorney support but, because the expense to locate required California, Charles in she 1961, did not the matter. In pursue Joan abandoned further any efforts to obtain warrants in the New support York family because such efforts caused her to lose time on her job. last
Joan saw Charles in the New York family court in 1958 when he was before the court on a brought warrant. Shortly after that support appearance, told Joan that acquaintance Charles had gone California. From 1958 1982, until his death in Joan and Charles never saw or communicated with each other Joan again. knew that Charles was in California but did not know where in California. thereafter,
Beginning Joan continuously considered her to Charles for all to have practicable purposes ended and that they would never reconcile or even see each other again. babies, for short intervals to
Except have their Joan was at all employed Charles, times following her marriage to and was so at the employed time of the trial below. She reared the three daughters herself and decedent. school,
In August, after shortly from graduating high Joan com- menced aat working magazine and continued until company August, when she left because she was with her first pregnant daughter. April, went she to work on the line of a rubber assembly on a company, machine on putting snaps baby pants. for a three-month Except lay-off have her third baby she on stayed that machine for about twelve when years, moved She company away. started the minimum and later wage became worker. After piece two weeks of she went to work unemployment glove orders, manufacturing as an order company, starting picker, filling and later as a stock supervisor, making sure that the orders were picked sent out. She was still so at the time of the trial of the within employed *8 action and had then been at the working i4Vi glove factory years. Charles; it unclear whether she did a divorce from Joan never sought convictions, lack of financial a divorce because of religious not seek until resources, marriage At no time from their in 1954 or a lack of interest. 25,1982, ever file to dissolve did Charles proceedings death on December his was in full and effect at the still force to Joan. Their marriage marriage his death. of Charles’ time (Helen) when he met Charles in 1962 was Helen L. Hafner
Respondent was as a Helen had at a bar where she barmaid. working beer patron November, husband, Eldon in 1961. Pomeroy, from her second separated wife, Joan, in his New York on told Helen that he had divorced Charles Joan, he had three children of that with that adultery, charges in in lieu of child he had an a house given support. that interest up and had been in a fire destroyed further stated that the divorce records Charles faith, Helen, in relied on these and good representations York. in New thereafter; had actual be true she no knowledge them to continuously believed to believe otherwise. grounds reasonable or Mexico, 1962, Helen and went to enable Helen Tijuana, Charles July in a a divorce from and Pomeroy marriage ceremony obtain participate Helen, Both of those were objectives accomplished. good Charles.
with faith, divorce and were valid. believed both the Following 1962, Charles lived as husband Tijuana return from Helen and their wife. husband, 21, killed in an accident on June second was Pomeroy,
Helen’s 1963, was Helen consulted advised that her attorney In June was invalid in Pom- divorce from California. Pomeroy Following Mexican Nevada, went to Las Vegas, Helen and Charles participated death eroy’s 14, After that on October marriage ceremony, marriage ceremony. ain returned to Los area where Angeles and Charles lived they Helen wife until out as husband and Charles’ death. held themselves They Hafner, child, born December 1964.5 Kimberly one had was in an injured Charles seriously automobile On September disabilities and left him with brain dam- permanent physical accident the nine employment.6 During him rendered months incapable age Helen recovery period, faithfully and his attended subsequent the hospital rights “protective” cross-appeal protect her of a 5Kimberly filed a event Hafner appeal. judgment on modification of reversal condition such that he have found that Charles’ could 6The trial children had he desired to do their so. Charles Helen also Joan and with communicated wedding in brother’s San Jose in 1975. and attended sister visited his *9 to needs his as his and so wife continued to do for some nine years until his death. $69,000 and
Charles Helen accumulated approximately in and hospital bills doctor as a result of the accident. Those bills were not paid until $900,000, 1975, Charles’s action was personal injury settled for in $600,000 netted decedent after fees. Helen attorney’s attorney, Weldon, Charles were as Charles’s appointed co-conservators 1975. The settlement was personal injury accounts placed conservatorship ad- ministered under court supervision. assets were conservatorship sub- to transferred Charles’ sequently probate administrator following Charles’s death. 25, 1982,
Charles Hafner died intestate on December leaving estate $416,472.40; his appraised entire estate probate consists of remainder of the proceeds personal injury settlement. his 1974;
Joan learned of Charles’s apparently she personal injury was not able to visit him financially Joan following accident. learned Charles’s Christmas, 1982; death a few after days she did not attend his funeral and did not know where it was.7
Petitions for letters of administration were filed Helen and by by Joan on 14, 1983, 21 and January February By respectively. stipulation com- petitions were taken off peting calendar and a bank was admin- appointed The bank istrator. administrator is not a to this party appeal. filed a
Helen petition (former determination of entitlement estate 1080), § be the wife claiming surviving of Charles and seeking have court determine the probate entitled share in the persons distribution estate. of Charles’s (Joan three daughters) filed
Appellants response petition interest, and a statement their to a asserting claims share respective estate, children, as his Charles’ surviving pursuant section Hafner, Charles, 221.8 child of filed a Kimberly also statement of interest estate. myocardial death was coronary 7The cause of Charles’ acute infarction caused artery athersclerosis, injuries which was related to the sustained him in the accident. rights set forth the section 221 of Probate Code of a 8Former of a separate to succeed to shares decedent who died intestate. children That 1983, repealed by chapter Statutes of section page operative section January applied dying The former section to estates of decedents January before 1, 1985, and estate in the case at bench. applies to Charles’ *10 to with should succeed they, together Kimberly, claimed that Appellants found that if Helen were estate under section and even entire Charles’ should, the court under equitable prin- a faith good putative spouse to be divide the estate them. among ciples, Helen, and acting to without Joan stipulations prejudice
Pursuant cause, and filed in the Helen was awarded a family their through attorneys $1,800 and death. from after the date of Charles’s month allowance per 1, 1983, $1,800 Later, a allowance of November commencing family and $400 Helen to and allowance of family month was ordered payable per Joan, both until trial of the for was ordered to petition month payable per were without Such stipulations expressly preju- heirship. determination in Joan Helen their respective positions controversy to either dice in allowances should be full charged with the all such and provision estate, distributive share of would oth- such person’s against reimbursed. erwise be on trial on Fol- January came nonjury
Helen’s petition trial, of the rendered its statement of de- the conclusion court lowing 1, 1984, cision, it Helen had a in which concluded that February on to Charles’s entire estate as under surviving spouse succeed right court concluded Helen Code section 201. The also Probate it be faith and that would inequitable good Charles’ her Charles’ entire estate. deny 27, 1984, and entered its the court made deter- February judgment
On allowance, and order for family entitlement to estate distribution mining with its statement of decision. in accordance Appellants Kimberly from that notices timely judgment. Hafner filed appeal
Contentions (1) trial erred in contend that court the entire awarding Appellants Helen, in the absence of the putative spouse, estoppel against estate Joan, children; (2) trial wife, Charles’ improperly applied wife and children decedent in as disinherit favor so equities the trial court’s decision as to the spouse; his putative family law, as a matter was not was erroneous supported by allowance evidence.
Discussion Findings The of decision set forth certain court’s statement findings upon trial were based. judgment Among decision and these findings its
are: 1954;
1. Joan and Charles were married June on neither legally Joan divorce, annulment, nor Charles ever obtained or other dissolution of their Joan death; never knew of marriage; Charles’ Helen until his and three were their daughters born of
2. Helen and Charles participated marriage ceremony Tijuana, Mexico, Nevada, and another Vegas, Las ceremony 14, 1963; on October at all times to and death Charles’ Helen including *11 believed faith that her good with Charles was valid and marriage wife; Charles had obtained a valid from previously divorce his at all times 14, 1963, on after October Helen was a faith good of Charles; the of marriage Helen and Charles was invalid in that the [void] of prior Joan and Charles was an marriage existing Charles marriage; had Helen one child.
3. The entire estate of Charles consists of the remainder the of proceeds of Charles’ settlement. personal injury
4. Joan is not act or estopped by omission on her to assert any the part of invalidity the (Italics of Charles marriage and Helen. statement [void] decision.) of Joan, Charles, reason of with privity would be to chal- estopped the of
lenge validity Charles’s of to Helen because Charles’s misrepresentation to Helen The his divorce from Joan. three regarding Charles, Catherine, Lillian, of Joan daughters would Dorothy be for the same estopped reason.
The Status the Parties of was, 12, 1954,
Joan Hafner at all times from the June until death Charles, decedent, of the wife of Charles The (spouse) Hafner. trial married, court found that Joan and Charles were each for the properly first 12, 1954, time, on June and that neither had ever taken any steps dis solve their marriage.9 was,
Charles Hafner at all June times from until his death, the husband of Joan Hafner. note (spouse) We that Charles was not of Helen. That status belongs or only party a void trial who the court finds to have believed in parties (Civ. Code, 4452.) of the void validity § faith The good trial did not find in this case. so (Civ. Code, § 4452) was the of Charles from
Helen 14, 1963, October until death. (1) “Marriage only by death of provides: Code section 4350 dissolved one 9Civil (2) jurisdiction decreeing of judgment competent a court a dissolution parties, of the nullity." marriage, judgment of
of the Hafner, the three daugh- and Dorothy Lillian Mayorga Kotsay, Catherine Hafner, Charles, Helen and the daughter and Kimberly ters Joan and Hafner.10 Charles, decedent Charles all children of were Property Character of intestate estate Charles’s view the character We must wife putative spouse. surviving from the perspectives (a) Joan Perspective From Joan, the entire estate was probate separate property
As to Charles, the decedent. Joan, and was living separate was a married married to person,
Charles *12 1975, in to was received him money by pursuant the time from injury. of his claim for for damages personal settlement received, was in settlement money At the time Charles’s personal injury “(a) 1975, All money Code section 5126 in provided, part: Civil pertinent a ... for personal injuries . . . married for by person damages received . to an for the settlement or of claim . . agreement compromise pursuant if of the such injured person is damages separate property such money ... is received . . .: [11] . . . While either spouse, if he or she is from other living spouse.” is the injured person, separate 5118 which 5126 consonant with Civil Code section Code section is Civil and accumulations of a spouse “The earnings in part: provides, pertinent are from the other spouse, separate property . . . and apart while separate of the spouse.” Helen
(b) Perspective From the is Helen, estate property. the entire probate quasi-marital As to At of Charles. was the spouse that Helen trial court found Code,11 case, 4452 of the Civil former section events of this the time of the equally relationship extends and child parent “The provides: 7002 Code section 10CiviI parents.” of the marital status regardless every parent, child and to every 1 2, 1984, 1671, effective chapter section was amended Statutes Code section 4452 1Civil marriage is liable 1, 1985, an annulled property of quasi-marital provide that the January upon effect the resolution have no amendment would parties. The 1984 for debts of the by this case. presented the issues of The Law Act part Family enacted in provided, part: pertinent “Whenever a determination is made that a or is void voidable and the court finds that either or both believed in faith party good parties valid, that the marriage shall such or declare party parties have the and, status of a putative if spouse, the division of property issue, divide, shall accordance with Section ac- property the union quired during which would have been or community property if the quasi-community union had property void or been voidable. Such shall be termed property ‘quasi-marital property.’”12 Principles Applicable to Intestate Succession Quasi-Marital Property of a Void Marriage
It is settled that case aof void or voidable marriage, as between putative and the other as spouse or between the spouse, surviv and the heirs ing putative spouse of his or her decedent other than the decedent’s surviving legal spouse, the is entitled to share spouse accumulated their partners during void voidable It is also settled that the share which the putative spouse is is the entitled same share quasi-marital as the would receive as an actual and there if had been a valid marriage, i.e., it shall Leslie, be divided (Estate between the equally parties. Cal.3d supra, 133]; Code, P.2d Civ. Cal.Rptr. *13 4452, 4800, §§ subd. (a).)
The contribution each the proportionate of the parties property the void or voidable union acquired during is immaterial in this state be it cause is divided as community would be divided property dis upon (Vallera of a valid (1943) solution v. marriage. 681, Vallera 21 Cal.2d 761].) 683-684 P.2d [134
These decisions, were principles by established numerous judicial enactment, 1969, were made of our law part positive by 4452, Act, Civil Code section of the part Law effective Family January 1, There is no that reason believe that enact Legislature, by ment, (Cf. intended those v. change (1976) Marvin Marvin principles. 815, 660, 681 106].) 557 P.2d Cal.Rptr. 18 Cal.3d [134 (Civ. Code, valid community property 12There can be no in the absence of a 687; 186, 561, (1984) 133].) Estate Leslie Cal.Rptr. § 37 Cal.3d P.2d [207 193 689 The Family have prior strug cases decided to the enactment of the Law Act “community property” be gled applied with the term to which cannot be since which, otherwise, of community there is no valid but has all of incidents 4452, by property. Legislature problem directing In Civil Code section our has resolved this with “quasi-marital property.” be termed It is considerable relief that that such we use term here. Pu- Entire Intestate Estate to the Awarding Court Erred The Trial tative Spouse for its cited the trial court as authorities the cases
We have examined is for a None of the cited cases authority find them wanting. decision and were the trial court in the before on the facts issues decision case bench. to be understood in the of the in an is light
The used language opinion court, and cases are authority the issues then before facts and (Code Civ. adjudicated. not considered therein and actually propositions 470, Proc., 1911; (1974) v. 12 Cal.3d 484 § Cebados People [116 233, 241]; Fe Craig City & v. Santa 526 P.2d McDowell Cal.Rptr. 176, 33, 344]; 38 351 P.2d Coats (1960) 54 Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. Springs [4 671, 441]; (1984) P. Karlin v. (1911) Cal. 679 Zalta v. 160 Coats [118 379]; and see authorities collect- 154 976 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d [201 Witkin, (3d 1985) § ed. 753- Appeal, ed at 9 Cal. Procedure pp. 755.) is, as the court in this case between the issue before principle hand, decedent, wife on one and children on the under his good bigamous marriage,
decedent’s faith putative spouse other, to his intestate estate? who entitled succeed concluded under circumstances of this
The trial found and case, had to succeed to the entire estate under Probate Helen a legal right conclusion, of that section 201 as a surviving spouse. support Code (1948) Estate Krone 83 766 at 770 page court cited Cal.App.2d [189 (1952) 685], P.2d 741], of Foy Spee P.2d Estate [240 (D.C. 1955) 132 Hobby F.Supp. v. Cal. Woods dling Kunakoff v. 773]; P.2d and then (1958) sought to buttress 166 Cal.App.2d v. Bank & Co. also Union Trust Gordon citing its decision *14 681, 644]; (1960) P.2d Estate 689 182 Cal.App.2d [254 of McAfee 79]; 553, (1961) Estate Long 556-557 198 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d [6 of 105]; 732, Goldberg Estate Cal.Rptr. 738 203 [18 Cal.App.2d of 626], 402 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d the of the cases relied trial upon by none court With one exception, bench, at to the facts of case and fact a situation similar presented Gordon, & Co. v. (Union Bank Trust supra) facts of that one exception the facts of this case that from it distinguishable and clearly fairly are so court’s the trial decision. supporting or authority is not precedent 681, Gordon, 116 was Cal.App.2d v. supra, Bank Trust & Co. Union decedent, Sara, Leo, the first of and wife contest between in fact a Elsie, Leo’s wife. The bank was administrator special of Leo’s which estate consisted of entirely which Leo and Elsie had accu property their 21-year mulated during and was in the nature of marriage 1921, and Sara Leo had community property. married in New York in and a Sara decree of obtained in In separate maintenance 1927. 1928 Leo California, moved to and in he sued Sara Nevada and divorce divorce; a of 1929, obtained decree Sara was served in that In action. Leo married Elsie and lived with her as husband and wife until died he in 1950. Milton, In Sara married and she obtained an annulment of that on the 13-year marriage of fraud. In an ground action title to quiet estate, in Leo’s the court property held that Sara was “by estopped of law and from every principle Nevada equity decree or attacking (id., 689) its at asserting invalidity” because she had p. in and acquiesced relied it when she upon married Milton. The court found that Leo and also Elsie had faith good that the was putative marriage, ac property quired that Leo had during union. of his interest in it will. disposed bench, its decision case the trial relied court upon principally Krone, Estate supra, Cal.App.2d of Krone,
In Estate supra, 83 three adult children of of decedent aby previous filed a claim of in their interest father’s estate declaring of the estate was the separate property of the decedent in that his wife was his lawful wife because at the of their time marriage her divorce from her former husband had not final, become a final though decree entered 10 months later. The surviving wife also filed statement of claim of interest that she alleging had been decedent married in lived as hus- April together band wife until his death in other facts which alleging were set forth trial court. findings
“The found that and his wife lived and [decedent cohabited had] and wife from date as man of their until attempted marriage decedent’s death; that at the time such of neither had that as any property; joint of their efforts the result parties personal accumulated $16,412.51; that at the time the value of marriage appellant believed decedent, faith and that she was the wife lawfully wedded due good law to her ignorance required year one after the lapse decree; had she obtained an interlocutory entry interlocutory *15 13, 1934, former husband February decree from her and that final 19, 1935, was entered until therein or 10 February months judgment decedent; after her that she had marriage no information purported her claim of to decedent until illegality marriage re any by filing estate; (Id., to an interest in the 767.) of their ...” at spondents p. claim found that the decedent reviewing implicitly On appeal, a The court stated marriage. wife were putative his partners to a matrimonial union is term marriage’] applied [‘putative “[t]he faith celebrated in good by in due form and has solemnized which been void or is either infirmity of some legal but which reason both parties the belief that the mar such is essential basis of voidable. The 681, 684.)” (Estate 21 (Vallera Cal.2d valid. v. Vallera riage Krone, 768.) reviewed several The court then p. 83 Cal.App.2d supra, efforts due joint with the division of acquired cases dealing property entered into in good or voidable marriage a void during of the partners a faith, marriage by “that the dissolution of putative and concluded upon is to take the same annulment or death the [surviving spouse] decree of entitled as a legal spouse.” would have been share to [he she] 769.) (Id., at p. were contesting of Foy, supra, Cal.App.2d parties
In Estate a (wife) and the decedent’s son by of the decedent putative spouse wife had been cele Decedent’s his putative prior his divorce from his wife. following prior brated in the interlocutory period intestate; Decedent died estate consisted entirely The court held that the wife/widow putative nature community property. former Probate Code section was to take entire estate under entitled 331-332.) (Id., at 201. pp. v. was a between Hobby, controversy supra, F.Supp.
Speedling Health, (wife) and the Education Secretary spouse surviving putative to whether the wife/widow had the same status putative and Welfare as be as a widow would have and would therefore intestate taking insurance benefits” under the social security receive “mother’s eligible Krone, 766, the United States District supra, act. Citing “community was entitled to succeed to Court held that and therefore entitled to the benefit. security in California social property” interlocutory and decedent had married during spouse putative divorce, de- and had for until years lived following together period death. cedent’s Woods, wrong for an action 116 Cal. was supra, App.2d Kunakoff v. was an (wife) was whether a
ful death and question (Code Civ. law. death of the statutory the meaning wrongful “heir” within that, in the case of Krone, held Proc., the court 377.) § Citing supra, estate “husband’s” could succeed intestacy, therefore, that, she an 201, and Probate Code section under former death under wrongful action was entitled to bring “heir” and as such Procedure section Code of Civil *16 553,
Estate McAfee, supra, is not Cal.App.2d for authority any to this thing case. was an relating from an appeal order appointing McAfee order, an administrator of an estate. The court reversed reviewing that the out trial court had failed to pointing make findings, or had made on material conflicting findings, issues. The court mentioned Estate of Krone, supra, Cal.App.2d that the commenting trial court not, would have to find whether the and, decedent was married legally if whether there a (Id., 556-557.) at putative marriage. pp.
Estate Long, supra, was an Cal.App.2d an appeal from order final It decreeing distribution of an estate. a presented contest be tween the wife, the decedent half-siblings and the decedent’s surviving Emma. The half-siblings whether questioned Emma was legally divorced from her former husband at the time of her marriage decedent. Ruling that the presumption validity of the second had not been over come, the held married, court that Emma and decedent were validly that for a few items their had except been acquired their through joint efforts, and that all of the should be distributed to Emma except for decedent’s and that one-half of the separate property separate property Krone, dictum, be distributed to her. In the court cited supra, and stated that if there had been a decedent, between Emma (Id., Krone would have 738.) The Court of applied. p. Appeal affirmed. Estate Goldberg, supra, 203 was a contest between Edith, Sam, the second wife of and three of Sam’s children first for succession to Sam’s marriage, intestate estate. The court reviewing affirmed the trial court’s that Edith ruling was Sam’s good-faith putative Krone, and, citing supra, ruled that Edith was entitled to the same share the “community as she would have property” received had she been his actual wife. sum, Gordon,
In for Union Bank & v. except Trust Co. supra, 116 Cal.2d which is clearly distinguishable from this case because of its facts none of the relied compelling estoppel, cases by the upon trial concerned, i.e., facts issues with which we present are a Krone, interests of wife and a In competing legal putative spouse. Foy, Goldberg, was between controversy putative spouse the de- cedent’s children a prior marriage. Long, competing interests were a wife and the decedent’s half Speedling stands siblings. only for the wife be proposition certain may eligible social benefits security based her decedent upon “spouse’s” earnings, and Ku- establishes only can be a plaintiff a wrong- nakoff ful death action. stands for relevant to the nothing case at bench. McAfee *17 even lesser relevance are of cited the trial court by additional cases Five above, and do not require reviewed at bench than the cases to the case the Thus, relied upon by we find that the cases in this opinion. discussion from. and the appealed decision judgment trial do not its support court a Decedent and the and Children Surviving Spouse As Between the of Are Enti- and Children Spouse Spouse, Surviving Decedent’s Putative Decedent’s Estate in an Intestate to the Property to Succeed Separate tled case at bench is in mind that the issue presented We bear decedent, wife a of of legal interests resolution of competing proper wife, estate. to his intestate and his succession putative Leslie, Court, in decid- our Supreme In Estate Cal.3d supra, of of an intestate decedent surviving spouse a contest between the ing putative observed that marriage, and the children of that decedent by prior each claim “[tjhere surviving spouses be cases in two or more may However, that scen- share of property. intestate the decedent’s separate (Id., at this time.” not be resolved ario is not before this court and need case, we find substantial 11.) fn. at is such case bench p. of the rights legal and protect establish public policy precedent in the estate of their community, and the children of the spouse, legal parent. are favored highly We and the family first note that marriage California, by statute and by as evidenced of the State policy public countless decisions our courts. of de legal spouses claims of resolving
In decisions competing to succeed to right as to and the decedents’ putative spouses, cedents estate, of the quasi-marital have awarded one-half our courts the decedent’s to the dece property to the and the rest property will. heirs decedent’s or as disposed dent’s 739], the Cal.Rptr. Estate Ricci Viola, wife of and his Henry, the first and legal was between contest of de- issue was Antoinetta. At heirship putative spouse, efforts of decedent as the joint been result acquired which had cedent Viola and Henry of their void during years and Antoinetta 1907; never terminated and marriage Italy married were Meanwhile, death in 1956. came Henry Henry’s in force until remained faith, in ceremonial Antoinetta, in good participated California. as husband and together lived and Antoinetta Henry Henry
with intestate, died, in 1956. The trial Henry until thereafter continuously wife wife of found, alia, was the that Antoinetta inter that the Henry, of the second had presumption validity overcome, been and that there was no basis in the evidence for an estoppel trial against Viola. The court decreed that one-half of the should *18 be awarded to Viola and the other half to Antoinetta. The Court of Appeal concluded the decision of the trial court was the evidence supported by and the law and affirmed the decree.
In its the opinion, reviewing quoted from Fam- extensively Burby, 359-360, Law for ily California at Lawyers, pages setting forth his com- ments on the in the distribution of problems arising accumulated property in a void or voidable Professor had written: marriage. Burby ‘“Some dif- is if ficulty presented claims are a conflicting asserted by legally recog- nized and a spouse putative Of course the spouse. claim of a putative must be limited spouse to the acquired during continuance property of that It seems that one-half relationship. obvious of the in property question to the belongs The other half putative spouse. belongs to the com- legal (husband and munity and should be legally recognized spouse) distributed as any other under the same community property circumstances.
“‘A putative was involved in Estate Krone. The property was question acquired the continuance of this during relationship was claimed the wife by putative after the death of the husband. Her claim was resisted issue of a by former The court held that all marriage. of the to the force of property question passed by Probate Code section wife, the death either husband provides: “Upon one-half of the to the community belongs property surviving spouse; the other half is to the subject decedent, of the testamentary disposition in the absence thereof ...” goes spouse. The conclusion (husband’s reached the court seems be a The by to one. claimants proper issue a former be by would entitled to recover on marriage) only the theory that the constituted a of the question husband’s property part separate estate. But the was not of that property question type.
“‘A much more difficult would be raised if problem a claim were as- serted That was the by legally recognized spouse. situation involved in v. Union Bank & Trust Co. Gordon [supra] Cal.App.2d 681. The deceased husband devised and bequeathed one-half ac- wife, Elsie, quired during putative marriage putative and one- recognized half his children. wife claimed a legally to share right held, in his claim alia, estate. This was denied. trial court inter [The was legal deny validity estopped putative marriage wife] (it after divorce was because void because secured purported having domicile) husband in Nevada and without established a sufficient she to enter into another In the absence of the marriage. purported argu- the husband’s validity deny that she estopped ment excluding legally recognized is no sound reason there marriage, her husband made during puta- her share in acquisitions from belongs It is true that one-half tive recognized community half to the legally the other belongs but be can excluded recognized spouse which the upon legally there no basis Ricci, (Estate supra, share therein.’” from proper 148-150.) pp. case of Union Bank & Trust went on to “The Co. say:
The Ricci court Gordon, it wife was not entitled in which was held that v. supra, *19 decided on estate her husband was correctly share in the of deceased to authorities, but, the the wife legal of as we analyze the basis estoppel, To so the do could have been excluded without estoppel. penalize could not husband, and would be wife who had been deserted her by an innocent states that the ‘Upon to section 201 of the Probate Code which contrary wife, the be- community death either husband or one-half of property of in . .’ are no facts the record to the . Here there longs surviving spouse; (Id., 150.) at p. of the doctrine justifying of application estoppel.” of the learned “In conclusion we with the statement following agree law of in his memorandum ‘Yet the case this trial under judge opinion: each absent of other is state it seems clear that of the two widows Thus, it would in a between them seem to the whole estate. contest entitled and to divide the equally, awarding both logical equitable property to which contributed to wife the half she putative [presumably] giving husband deserted wife the half over which the has normally but legal 151-152.) (Id., testamentary control.’” at pp. 485], (1970) 10 660 was Cal.Rptr. v. Freitas Cal.App.3d
Sousa [89 Manuel, Maria, Catherine, of his wife pu- between legal contest estate, all of which had been Manuel’s tative as to spouse, Catherine their during efforts of Manuel and void joint acquired 1905; in in Portugal were married they and Manuel Sousa Maria marriage. to California in his name changed Manuel emigrated had one son. with marriage ceremony in Catherine to in and participated Freitas to faith that she was married lawfully believed good Catherine as wife and husband until Manuel died in 1962. him Manuel and lived with all Cather- left of his devising bequeathing Manuel a will estate one-half to Maria and one-half ine. The trial court awarded the modified the that Cath- holding Catherine. The judgment Court Appeal one-half, erine as a being good-faith was entitled to share putative Manuel and community and the other half spouse, belonged legal will, of one-half of that half his dispose Maria. Manuel had right half, estate, As belonged but other one-fourth of the Maria. gross 1392 the Court of cited Estate Ricci and from Pro- authority, Appeal quoted Ricci,
fessor comments as set forth above. Burby’s Estate Atherley Cal.Rptr. 97], Ruth, Harold, A.L.R.3d was a contest between wife of wife, Annette, his determination Harold’s intes- heirship tate estate. Ruth and had Harold were married in 1933 and two children. Harold left Ruth in 1947 and Harold and Annette. Annette lived joined 1969; from together 1947 until Harold’s had children. In death no they Mexico, 1961 Harold obtained invalid divorce Ruth in and in from Ruth, Harold, Harold married Annette in Nevada. and Annette were in time; touch with each other from time to shared in the knowl- common they Ruth, Annette, of Harold’s edge with his cohabitation with invalid divorce from Ruth and his void with Annette. Most of Harold’s estate had been accumulated of his cohabitation during period Annette, with both before and after the void Mexican divorce and Nevada The trial court held that Ruth was the held that Annette implicitly was Harold’s estate spouse. *20 of a comprised mixture of real and personal including property, separate and property joint tenancy The of property. Court the Appeal, applying Freitas, 660, rule of v. supra, Annette, Sousa 10 held that the Cal.App.3d was entitled to one putative spouse, half of the total estate as well as those which were hers assets by separate or ownership joint tenancy survivor- and that the rest of the estate was ship, of the legal marriage and succession; intestate that passed by Ruth had an interest in that property but, children, as the since spouse Ruth and Harold had two the on extent of her interest it depended whether or was community separate was reversed The property. judgment with directions. part (1974) 36 Estate Vargas Cal.Rptr. of Mildred, 1], was a contest between A.L.R.3d the first and wife legal of Juan, wife, Juan’s for Juan’s Josephine, competing intestate children, estate. Mildred and Juan were married in raised three for 40 lived until Juan’s death continuously years together 1969. Juan children, were married in four raised Josephine lived to for 24 until death in Juan’s 1969. Neither Mildred gether years nor Jose other, knew of the existence of both the “families" phine though lived in the Los area. The trial court ruled that Angeles Josephine Juan’s pu tative of Most the assets were after spouse. acquired the during of the dual-familial Court of period relationship. affirmed the Appeal trial court’s division of estate the between the wife equally legal and the on “Since statutes and equitable principles, stating: judi cial decisions no sure for guidance the resolution the controver provide the sy, court cut the Gordian knot of probate claims and divided competing wives, that the theory two on presumably between the the estate equally are shares of equal prop entitled wives of bigamists innocent practicing No has of the bigamy. injury the active during accumulated phase erty is not of Solomon required and the wisdom visited third parties, been upon 719.) (Id., at p. result.” justice to perceive con- has every it is clear light foregoing estate, as between to a decedent’s intestate the issue of succession sidered has awarded one- spouse, and a surviving putative a surviving spouse half and the other half of the quasi-marital children, under the of section provisions or legal spouse, 4452 was designed provide It Civil Code section appears 4800, in the with section division of accordance quasi-marital property voidable or event of their or an annulment void parties their voluntary separation.
However, 4452 did repeal the enactment of section nor 5126 and former sections section 221 of Probate Code supersede the Civil Code. the distri governing There are no Probate Code provisions ato void or void bution of on death a party quasi-marital property However, recognizes able Code officially Civil section of “quasi-marital status creates the classification “putative spouse,” *21 if and necessary, for the division of that property,” provides property, i.e., By to Civil Code division. analogy, section pursuant equal division of the of the of a to an recognition right equal distributing should be followed and quasi-marital property applied the of a on death to or voidable a void party we were to sections and 5118 If Civil Code apply provisions of and entire intestate estate would strictly, literally, mechanically, Charles’ and, 221 of the Probate to former section be separate property pursuant children, Code, and be Joan and the four Helen would would distributed to receive nothing. hand, to to Civil Code section only
On the if were look other we construction, Charles’ entire intestate and to it the broadest give possible community were the estate be it though would treated as and, 201 of the former section Probate Charles to and Helen pursuant Helen, the four Code, and Joan and children the entire would go estate would receive nothing.
If the entire estate were distributed to Joan and the four children we would ignoring 4452; be of Civil Code denying purpose section if were the entire estate distributed to Helen we would be ignoring Civil Code sections 5126 and denying 5118 and purpose former Code, 221 of Probate section as well as the which strong public policy favors and and the protects marriage The result either family. such case would unfair and be unconscionable. grossly
It is that our clear statutes are not designed for the provide unique conflict, circumstances in this case. When statutes are in present others, some in irreconcilable requirements being opposition only the chancellor can protect innocent render justice. a just
Since distribution of the estate among parties is statute, this case out by any cries for firm but fair provided hand of for its resolution. equity law its
“‘Equity chancery necessity has origin exceptions law, of rules of law those cases where the application reason of its would universality, create the affairs of men.’ injustice [Cita- (Estate 714, 718.) Vargas, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d tions.]” The duty demands, first to be In this case equity equitable. equity hold, and we that one-half of the estate should Helen, be distributed to Joan, and the other half to putative spouse, spouse, the four Charles, children of as provided by former section 221 of the Probate Code. This result is fair. inherently
With we this result will have done all equity parties and will have honored the of all of the spirit statutory provisions apply. Finding Trial as Court’s Is Not Relevant Estoppel to the Issues of This Case *22 Decision, that, its Statement of the trial court found on the
single Helen, issue validity Charles’ to Joan marriage not was by act or omission on her estopped any to assert the part of that invalidity The court then found that Charles would have been to chal- estopped and, therefore, lenge children, his to Helen and their marriage Joan three also by privity, would be so The court it estopped. stated that did not consider the latter to be to its but finding necessary decision would make nevertheless. Inasmuch the trial finding as felt some apparently have some that had may to make finding, compulsion compulsion decision, briefly. we discuss it effect on the court’s ultimate will As First, is: this appeal we remember that the central issue presented by husband, and his children of a bigamous between the wife and estate? entitled to succeed to his intestate who is putative spouse, Charles, Joan, or their chil here whether or We are not concerned with to marriage Charles’ validity dren are from challenging estopped be so that Charles would estopped. Helen. Established indicates precedent (1982) 138 (In Cal.Rptr. re Recknor Marriage Cal.App.3d [187 issue the trial court. 805].) But was not the before 34 A.L.R.4th not, not, extend we do “Does privity And need reach question, facts and children under the of the actor to innocent wife estoppel i.e., would to to Charles extend of this whether such as estoppel case?” and their children. and bar Joan conscience. Estop is justice good foundation of estoppel where his conduct right asserting to from person
pel applies prevent it; the truth stating it is a bar to it to assert makes unconscionable him an doctrine. It is when it be unfair to state it. equitable would Estoppel unfair one from taking to prevent acts It defensively only. operates another, to one seeking an unfair advantage but not to give advantage (1960) 182 (Peskin Phinney to the doctrine. v. invoke 558, 575.) Es 389]; Cal. v. Merida Franklin Cal.Rptr. create to mitigate injustice, be should toppel employed prevent it. or aggravate Charles,
If, Joan were estopped deny with by privity Helen, then, the same reasoning, of Charles’ to Helen validity Charles, Charles’ deny with would be estopped by privity concerned, would find them as is Joan and Helen Joan. Insofar estoppel in a deadlock. selves children, that Joan and finding that the trial court’s
It appears Charles, of his mar- validity would be to deny with estopped privity would in the record which nothing to Helen There riage gratuitous. in this case. of the doctrine of justify application estoppel to Succeed and the Children Are to Assert Their Rights Joan Entitled Charles’ Intestate Estate *23 and Joan by
The in this are the claims tensions case competing estate, to of intestate the children succeed to the Charles’ separate property as to claim as quasi-marital property. Helen’s to the entire estate opposed
Those were the issues raised the to be pleadings adjudicated tensions, court. trial In the to those Joan was not litigation estopped Charles; the own validity assert to the were not children Charles; to assert their status as estopped the children of and Joan and the children were not to assert their to succeed to the estopped rights separate in Charles’ intestate estate as in former section 221 provided Probate the Code. seen,
As we have our California courts have decided such issues one-half of the awarding to quasi-marital property children, the other half to the or in legal spouse, legal spouse accordance with decedent’s will. The case at bench is similar in some to Estate respects Vargas, supra, stated, in which Justice 718: Fleming “The page case is the fact that the laws
present complicated by regulating succession . . and the . of marital are not to disposition with designed cope extraordinary circumstance of at the of two purposeful bigamy expense innocent The parties. laws marital succession assume compliance with law . . basic . do not provide contingencies arising during course of felonious For reason activity. this resort equitable principles (Fn. omitted.) becomes here.” particularly appropriate was case Vargas, As in resort would equitable be principles case at bench. particularly appropriate The Granting Family Allowance Putative Was Spouse Contrary to Law contend that the trial award
Appellants court’s of a allow family Helen, ance error putative spouse, contrary law that the statute for a authorizing allowance to provides family “surviving of a decedent but does not so to a spouse” provide surviving putative spouse. former section 680 of the Probate Code provided, pertinent “(a) children, minor and ...
part: surviving spouse, are entitled to such reasonable allowance out of estate as shall be for their necessary circumstances, maintenance to their according during progress settlement of the estate.” 1, 1985, Code,
The 1983 amendment Probate effective January rewrote those but made no in section 6540 of the Code Probate provisions substantial changes the pertinent portion.
1397 (Black’s or husband.” The word means “One’s wife “spouse” ed.) 1258; Farmers Insurance (5th see Menchaca v. Law Dictionary p. 117, 607].) (1976) 128 Cal.Rptr. 59 Exchange Cal.App.3d [130 one that a have more than spouse statutes do not person The contemplate 4401, Code, Code, 281.) § (1); Pen. (Civ. § one time. subd. at noted, found Joan Charles were we have the trial court that As had to dissolve that mar- in and that neither taken any steps married 1954 riage.13
Therefore, of his death. was Charles’ time Joan Helen and Charles was invalid found that the of The also Helen a divorce from Joan. in that Charles had never obtained [void] under the spouse” did as a “putative never Charles’ Helen spouse. qualify section 4452. faith” of Civil Code “good provisions is entirely statutory given by to a allowance is right family
The does not authorize the pro- 680 the Probate Code. That section section other than the court to for the benefit persons bate make allowance 728, (1954) 42 Cal.2d 730 (Estate Blair therein. persons specified [269 612].) P.2d 680 of section that prerequisite “It follows provisions from express (Estate is be the decedent’s widow.” allowance that the claimant family 773, 623]; (1971) Estate 778 Cal.Rptr. Casimir 748, 724].) Cal.2d P.2d Brooks 750 [171 know of no they reported stated their brief opening Appellants entitled to family decisions California holding brief but cites no such discusses the subject allowance. Respondent us, we have none. case to found role of a situation such as that is not the the courts In legislate.
It us, should and leave the power legislate before courts exercise restraint Const., it, (Cal. our art. Legislature. where Constitution has placed Act, IV, 1.)§ enacted the Law Civil Legislature Family including 4452, rights Code section certain recognized gave It rewrote also substantial the Probate Code spouses. portions re-en- of former section and its effective including repeal Probate Code. actment with amendments as section 6540 of the present so for a amending family those did not Legislature provide statutes
13SeeCivil Code section footnote ante. *25 it for a could have done so if that spouse though easily allowance its intent. We cannot these had been attribute facts to oversight. of section 680 is not it a language ambiguous; clearly provides The is entitled to a surviving reasonable allowance. The spouse family judicial and decisions section 680 declare that it does not interpreting applying court to make for the authorize a allowance benefit of probate family other than those A is therein. not one of persons specified section 680 and the court’s award of a specified persons family allowance to a is to law. contrary Trial Court to the Family The Erred Allowance Denying Surviving on the Basis Its That Was Not an Heir Spouse Ruling She of also contend that the court erred in
Appellants denying family Joan, decedent, allowance and widow of the and surviving spouse her $400 allowance of terminating per month on previous stipulated of the below. entry judgment trial court Joan
The found ordered that was not entitled to a family allowance reason of its that “Helen has a ruling legal right succeed entire to the estate under Probate Code section 201 as a surviving spouse.” effect of The was to declare that since the court ruling had held that inherit, heir, would not Joan thus was not she was not entitled to a allowance. court erred. The to a family right family allowance does it depend upon claimant’s heirship, depends upon right support time at the of decedent’s death and existence of a statutorily specified decedent, between the claimant relationship in this case that of “surviving spouse.” brief
In their demonstrate that decisions of appellants reported our courts hold that “the right to allowance does family not rest or upon, equate with, the of ...” right inheritance. and that a allowance be family may awarded to a (Estate wife from living apart (1964) decedent. Woodward of 113, 781, 230 116 Cal.App.2d 1134]; 12 A.L.R.3d to the Cal.Rptr. [40 same effect (1936) see Estate Foreman 16 P.2d 99 Cal.App.2d [60 of 310]; Estate (1951) Coons 535-536 P.2d [237 291].) A entitled to a if entitled allowance family death, decedent’s support it is not that the spouse required actually (Estate such Brooks receiving at decedent’s death. support (1957) 724]; Cal.2d P.2d Estate Fallon [171 Foreman, 963]; Cal.2d Estate supra; 404-405 P.2d Estate Coons, supra.) above. contrary has cited no authority Respondent from husband to receive support of wife When right death, from withholding support granting exists at the time of his court, though of the probate discretion not a matter within the his estate is the reasonableness *26 determining discretion in court has a broad (1948) (Estate Secord for a allowance. family necessity of at 7 and authorities cited 81], see discussion P.2d 785-786 [192 Probate, §§ 517- Witkin, 1974) ed. Wills and (8th Law of Cal. Summary Joan, had a 518, 521, 5935-5941.) right as Charles’ spouse, pp. death, and it matters not the time of his Charles at to receive from support such she was not actually receiving support. that Code, (Civ. or . . .” her spouse. individual shall
“Every support for of other 242), is not liable the support spouse § but spouse “[a] from agreement. other is separate spouse when the spouse living Code, (Civ. 5131.) § . . .” of this case that Joan was living record
There is no evidence husband, Charles, is Indeed evidence agreement. her from separate and abandoned Joan and their children that deserted overwhelming Charles $80 a to their only gross support. in 1958 and thereafter contributed argument by asserting to counter Respondent appellants’ attempted it case of for allowance and that family this was a claimants” “multiple must, somehow, 682; former section ar- be treated under differently First, not valid. this not a claimant case. Section 680 is is gument multiple a are that those individuals allowance the “sur- having right provides others. can be one minor children” and certain There viving only spouse, case, or in this Joan. There were no minor children surviving spouse; listed members of other claimant cases categories eligibles. Multiple one more from each of two or more of the listed find or persons categories, Second, case; all an allowance. section 682 does not to this seeking apply reads, it “If or eligible family otherwise part: any person persons (Italics added.) under 680. is allowance Section ...” Helen not a person Therefore, under eligible” “otherwise section section does at all. apply our Court also brief that the
Respondent Supreme states opinion Leslie, . surviving “. . a in Estate accords Cal.3d supra, a That is gross the same as a rights surviving spouse.” The statement over-statement a truncation of original. misleading is, which has consid- in Leslie referred every “Virtually precisely, as same rights ered the issue has accorded surviving Leslie, (Id,., 203.) surviving legal spouse.” at The “issue” decided in p. object above surviv quotation, was: “this court holds that a ing entitled to succeed to share the decedent’s (Id., separate 204.) at property.” p. so,
Even our Supreme Court disclaimed such a resolution of expressly if controversy two more should claim an intestate spouses (Id., 11.) share. fn. p.
Conclusion above, On the basis of set as forth precedents, and equitable prin- we must reverse the and remand ciples, judgment the cause instruc- with tions.
We find that the the estate of decedent property Charles should Hafner be awarded to Hafner, one-half his putative spouse, Helen and the other half to be to and awarded divided among legal and surviving spouse, children, Joan, Catherine, Lillian, and his four Dorothy Kimberly, accordance with former section 221 the Probate Code.
The court shall also reconsider its previous decision as to a al- family wife, Joan, Helen, lowance Charles’ as well as for order shall allowances to Joan or to any paid Helen during the administration this estate shall be against the amount of charged the distributive share of to entitled, this estate which Joan or Helen shall be as was in the agreed filed November stipulation
Decision The is reversed. The cause judgment is remanded with instructions the court make and enter a new and different judgment consistent with this to Costs are awarded opinion. appellants.
Arabian, J., concurred.
LUI,
J.,P.
Acting
Dissenting.
decision
The majority’s
fails to
grant
Hafner,
surviving putative
Helen
spouse,
share of the
any
deceased’s sep-
arate
The
property.
ignores our
majority thereby
Court’s decision
Supreme
in Estate
Leslie
The majority 4452). These decisions (section eq- appellate applied section Code of a establish the right surviving putative spouse uitable principles during distributive share of accumulated a putative to a property succeed with Probate sections 201 201.5 (dealing under former Code union aas respectively) “surviving and quasi-community property community 4452 line doctrines equitable pre-section developed spouse.”2 succession as set forth not alter the formula for intestate cases did case, however, this resolution of does Code. The Probate majority’s formula for intestate succession. statutory alter section established the legal right enacting Legislature union acquired during property have been community property quasi-community would voidable, and termed this union had not been void or
if ’’ ‘‘ property. quasi-marital *28 4452, the has a vested share of section one-half putative spouse Under the the accumulated union. If during putative the quasi-marital property of to the of one each is entitled prior spouse, spouse dissolved death union of Death either to a quasi-marital spouse pu- one-half property. every has majority opinion page states: is clear that court 1393 which “[I]t 2The estate, surviving issue of succession to a decedent’s intestate as between the a considered surviving putative a has awarded one-half of the spouse, quasi-marital and legal spouse legal spouse, and other half to the and spouse the property children, section 221.” The cites provisions majority the of Probate Code] under [former 739]; (1962) (1970) v. 10 Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. 201 146 Sousa Ricci Freitas [19 Estate of (1975) 485]; Atherley Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. Estate 44 Cal.App.3d [119 660 758 [89 of (1974) 97]; Vargas Cal.App.3d and 36 81 A.L.R.3d Estate 714 Cal.Rptr. [111 of 779, 81 A.L.R.3d Cal.Rptr. 1]. Freitas, Ricci, Cal.App.2d and supra, in Estate 201 Sousa v. decisions The of present the de- Cal.App.3d distinguishable appeal are from because these 10 supra, The in the of section 5118. decision the Estate predate enactment Civil Code cisions applicability since Atherley, 44 758 did not consider of section 5118 supra, Cal.App.3d statute, enacted, after Ather- originally not effective until the decedent Harold as was that supra, Cal.App.3d Vargas, distinguishable The in 36 714 is death decision ley’s in 1969. present Vargas, in this In two women appeal. a factual not innocent unique situation under appeal, lived a double life. In this contemporaneously of a man had were victims who separate her long by been decedent and had learned to live life had deserted appellant emotionally, financially. and apart physically, from the decedent Thus, majority from rests its conclusion considers none of the decisions Code Civil appeal impact this and the enactment of presented situation in fact and 5118. sections 4452 union not tative does terminate the interest surviving spouse’s quasi- marital property.
A one-half surviving putative spouse’s interest quasi-marital property Thus, subject is vested to intestate succession other by any person. distribution of the legal decedent’s estate proper gives putative one-half of decedent’s entire section estate 4452.3 spouse pursuant general and which are Purporting apply equitable principles inappli- cable, the then concludes that majority legal only spouse the deceased’s four children are entitled to share the other half of the entire estate. The decedent’s thus holds that the majority surviving putative has no interest whatsoever in the decedent’s The separate property. violates former Probate Code section majority’s holding the Estate Leslie errs resolution this attempting thorny by problem decedent’s distributing on an “all or separate property basis. nothing” Leslie, the Supreme Court confronted with the claims conflicting deceased wife’s to a asserted separate husband putative son and a The question in Leslie prior was wheth- presented er the husband was entitled to succeed to a share of the deceased separate under the Probate Code rather than under equita- wife’s ble in Leslie principles. concluded the trial court had incor- determined rectly husband was not the “surviving decedent’s under former Probate Code section 221. spouse” cited Leslie the decision (1948) in Estate Krone 741], P.2d and stated that “Krone has been ‘to read recognize succession,’” as a for the [spouse] under purpose Code section Probate v. *29 citing Woods 166 Kunakoff 773], 65-66 P.2d reading clearly ap “[t]hat to the determination the of of a plicable separate property rights putative Leslie, (Estate 194.) 37 Cal.3d at spouse.” supra, p. of “To accord a surviving putative the decedent’s spouse rights separate honors rather than in- property disregards scheme statutory governing testate succession. & (Laughran and Inheritance Laughran [.Property Putative Rights Spouses in Selected Problems and Suggested of California: majority 3The putative spouse concludes that the of the decedent’s is entitled to one-half estate but under a analysis. different The trial court concluded that 4452 to succeed to the putative spouse section allows the merit, decedent’s entire estate. While arguable the trial court’s I would conclusion has interpret section applying only putative 4452 as one-half interest surviving spouse’s quasi-marital property spouse legal in the if the left a and/or children. spouse deceased also Solutions (1977)] 11 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. [45] at p. . . . .) Since creature purely but a right, or natural is not an inherent succession right a decedent’s separate inherits [citation], surviving a legal spouse statute of status a person having provide the statutes because ‘only Laughran, & (Laughran op. share.’ takes certain spouse” “surviving of 67.) accord a To p. surviving putative L.A. L.Rev. Loyola cit. supra, that a good simply recognizes ‘surviving spouse’ the status spouse faith of in the same spouse position put putative should belief Leslie, (Estate 68.)” (Id., at supra, p. legal as a survivor of added.) italics at p. 37 Cal.3d Leslie, a surviving reasoning the above-quoted Under While spouse’s separate share of deceased property. to a legal is entitled claims of with the two conflicting spous- was not faced in Leslie es, surviving putative legal reasoning rights spouses that the its to a law is instructive resolution this under the should be given parity to the deceased rights separate their Putting spouse’s respective appeal. share surviving putative legal that the spouses on requires par to which each is entitled separate property of the deceased’s that portion Code section 221. to under former Probate the decedent’s estate this should case distribution legal proper one-half of the taking decedent’s
result in the surviving putative
4452 as her
As to
quasi-marital property.
entire estate
section
pursuant
Leslie,
estate,
following
mandate in
the remainder
decedent’s
Therefore,
be treated
should
under
equally.
and legal
spouses
221, the
distribution
the re-
proper legal
former Probate Code section
should be as
estate
follows:
of that
mainder of
decedent’s
one-third
be divided
between
of the estate should
equally
surviving pu-
portion
two-thirds should
be distributed
remaining
tative
spouses;
to the decedent’s four children
both
shares
equal
relationships.4
the surviving
concludes that
is not entitled
The majority
is not a
allowance because she
within the
“surviving spouse”
to a family
6540).
(section
of Probate Code section
Section
meaning
pro-
children, and
that the
minor
hand-
dependent
vides
adult
spouse,
to an allowance
children are entitled
their
necessary
icapped
the administration of the estate.
maintenance during
*30
conclusion is unreasonable in view the Leslie mandate
The majority’s
with the legal
which accords a
status
spouse equal
for
here and
suggested
only difference between the distribution
4It should be noted that the
sep
decedent’s
by
majority
surviving spouse’s
share of the
that formulated
that the
given
legal
putative spouses and
arate
would be divided
surviving legal
entirely
spouse.
(See
Leslie,
all
essentially
purposes.
Estate
supra,
I would remand the matter to the superior court for modification of the judgment consistent with the distribution scheme set forth I above. would also the trial require court to consider the of a necessity family allowance to both under spouses section 6540.
Respondent’s petition review the Court Supreme was denied No- Bird, J., Mosk, J., vember C. were of the opinion that the should be petition granted.