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Estate of Edward W. Knoster v. Ford Motor Co.
200 F. App'x 106
3rd Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 KNOSTER, ESTATE OF EDWARD W.

by Irene Ad Knoster as Administratrix

Prosequendum; Knoster, Irene indi- Rea;

vidually; Sylvia Appellants, Ann COMPANY,

FORD MOTOR Party

Defendant/Third

Plaintiff, Knoster, Party

Irene Third Defendant.

No. 05-3355. of Appeals,

United States Court

Third Circuit.

Argued 2006. June Sept.

Filed *2 Murray Mary S. (Argued),

Thomas J. OH, O’Neil, Sandusky, Murray Murray, & Appellant. for (Argued), Campbell L. Bucknum Susan P.C., Conroy Wayne, & Campbell Edwards PA, Appellee. for FISHER,

Before: CHAGARES and REAVLEY,* Judges. Circuit * Reavley, ting by designation. Honorable M. United Thomas Circuit, Judge sit- States Circuit for the Fifth intersection, shaped OF THE Mrs. Knoster down-

OPINION COURT moment, At that shifted. whatev- CHAGARES, Judge. Circuit reason, er the Taurus accelerated toward evening July On the a one-car pace. the intersection at a furious In a County, crash Hunterdon New vehicle, desperate struggle to control the claimed Edward Knoster’s life. In this Mrs. Knoster slammed the brake and *3 case, Knoster, diversity appellants Irene failed; jerked the wheel. Her efforts the Rea, Sylvia and the Estate of Edward through car sailed the intersection and Knosters”) (collectively, Knoster “the seek building. crashed into a stone farm Mrs. damages to recover from the car’s manu- survived, her daughter Knoster and facturer, Company. Specifi- Ford Motor injuries Mr. Knoster’s were fatal. cally, they bring failure-to-warn and de- parties’ dispute The core of the was the sign-defect Jersey claims under the New cause of the Taurus’s acceleration. The (“PLA”), Liability Product Act Stat. suddenly Knosters claimed that it took off -11, §§ Ann. 2A:58C-1 to and an addition- having stepped without Mrs. Knoster ever al claim under the New Consumer gas pedal. theory on the Their (“CFA”), Fraud Act Ann. N.J. Stat. engine pro- the vehicle’s electronic controls § 56:8-1 to -106. signals capable duced transient electrical The District Court dismissed the con- activating open- the cruise control and evidence, sumer fraud claim at the close of ing input. the throttle without driver jury rejected and a the failure-to-warn pull gas pedal This failure would then design-defect appeal, and claims. On to the floor and car careening send the challenge Knosters two of the District over, forward. After it was the failure evidentiary rulings, its in- Court’s would leave no detectable evidence behind. structions, and its dismissal of the con- theory, In support of this below, explain sumer fraud claim. As we produced from Ford documents several evidentiary neither the District Court’s studies, testimony of Mrs. Knoster and rulings duty nor its instructions on Ford’s Rea, expert testimony Ms. and the of Sam- to warn contained reversible error. But Sero, engineer. uel an electrical did, design-defect its and instruction we argued story Ford that the Knosters’ is disagree with its conclusion that the PLA physically impossible. It claimed that subsumes the Knosters’ fraud consumer accelerated, the Taurus it must have done part, claim. will therefore affirm in We reached for the so because Mrs. Knoster in part, reverse and remand for further accidentally stepped gas. on the brake but proceedings. In support argument, Def. Br. at 5. of this I. sought reports pro- Ford to introduce two Highway duced the National Traffic As parties we write for the and the (“NHTSA”). Safety Administration The Court, provide only we a brief District will launched a comprehensive NHTSA investi- sketch of this case’s facts. It was a gation reported into incidents of sudden weekend, Fourth-of-July Irene October, 1987, acceleration in and after driving family Knoster was home from a years report it issued a detail- two work picnic her 1993 Ford Taurus. Her (“the ing findings Report”). its Rea, NHTSA daughter, Sylvia was in the front seat, husband, Report concluded that “two NHTSA passenger and her Edward Knoster, independent, or more intermittent failures sat in rear on the driver’s simultaneously would have to occur approached side. As the Taurus the crest opening way T- in a steep, winding leading of a hill to a cause throttle would consequence more any fact that is of after the incident.” be difficult to detect (“JA”) than it would be According probable Appendix probable Joint 3695. less NHTSA, is This standard “is this confluence events without evidence.” JA Ten “virtually impossible.” logical threshold of high, not once the years later, attorney Sandy peti- McMath relevancy largely the matter is satisfied reopen tioned the matter. the NHTSA trial court.” within discretion JA 4124-29. The NHTSA’s Office of De- Steele, United States review, Investigation fects conducted omitted). (3d Cir.1982) (internal citation April, deny- issued document claim their automobile sud- The Knosters Denial”). (“the ing the McMath petition accelerated, and denly and spontaneously important part JA Another 4130-64. that such an event is reports concluded testimony Ford’s of re- defense was 3695, 4162. “virtually impossible.” JA *4 tired He employee Koeppel. Ford William Thus, believed, reports if tend to make attempted to the Knosters’ rebut assertion consequence “a fact less that reports that a in sudden-acceleration rise they satisfy the dictates of probable,” and coincided with Ford’s introduction of elec- Rule 401. engine tronic controls. though reports Even are rele Upon considering the and evidence vant, they hearsay and are also thus are charge, jury rendered for verdict they not unless fit within an admissible followed, Ford. appeal This the Knost- exception hearsay rule. to the See Fed. present questions ers six for our review. 803(8)(C) provides R.Evid. 801-02. Rule First, Report were the NHTSA exception public reports “setting an for (collectively, McMath Denial reports”) “the findings resulting forth ... from an factual hearsay either or not irrelevant within the investigation pursuant authority to made exception Second, public for records? did law, granted by unless the sources of infor Mr. Koeppel’s testimony include inadmissi- mation or circumstances other indicate Third, lay response ble opinion? to the reports lack of Public trustworthiness.” jury’s query, did the District im- Court presumed trustworthy “and the party are properly limit the scope duty Ford’s to bears opposing their introduction the bur Fourth, warn? should the court have in- enough den of coming nega forward with jury structed the on section 3 of the Re- factors persuade tive to court (Third) statement Torts: Products Lia- report admitted.” See should not be In re bility? Fifth, should it have instructed the Co., 105, Nautilus Tanker Motor F.3d jury Jersey’s on New consumer-expecta- omitted). (3d Cir.1996) (quotation The tions test for defectiveness? And 803(8) Advisory to Rule Committee notes sixth, was error dismiss the Knosters’ provide a list of factors for helpful courts consumer fraud claim? willWe address (1) investigation’s to consider: timeli question each in turn. (2) ness; experience expertise of the (3) official; hearing whether was held

II. and, so, hearing conducted; how the was The Knosters claim that the NHTSA (4) “possible problems.” motivation Report and the McMath Denial are irrele- held that the reports vant District Court hearsay. and constitute inadmissible 401, sufficiently trustworthy, are and we Under Federal Rule of Evidence rele- review vant evidence “make[s] existence determination for abuse of discretion.1 argue 1. The contrary. Knosters de stan- are to the See novo Coleman Home (3d applied, precedents Depot, dard should be but our 306 F.3d Cir. operation.” “An abuse of discretion is a clear error of learn more about its JA 4134- not 36. The NHTSA’s methods do dimin judgment, simply and not a different result reports’ presumption reliability; ish the arguably ap- which can be obtained when Nautilus, they it. reinforce 85 F.3d plying the law to the facts of the case.” electromagnet 113. Even if the NHTSA’s Co., Infinity Group SEC v. testing swept broadly, ic could have moré (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotation omit- hardly judgment” it was a “clear error of ted). jury reports’ probative let the assess the reports The Knosters contend that the Infinity Group, value. See F.3d at untrustworthy are three reasons. 195; generally see Jarvis v. Ford Motor First, they dispute reliability (in Co., Cir.2002) 283 F.3d mat They argue NHTSA’s methods. alleged ter where sudden acceleration claim of Report’s NHTSA extensive test weight given to the conclusions “[t]he ing representative on 10 vehicles inac was report the NHTSA ... was a matter for They curate. note the Audi re decide.”). testing, ceived electronic and even that Second, the Knosters contend that their preliminary. Reply Pl. Br. at objection “main to the admission of the Br. at 1. The Knosters also claim that the preju- McMath Denial the enormous [is] single McMath Denial was the work of a engendered by dice its ad hominem at- *5 employee NHTSA who did than no more expert, tacks on the Knosters’ Samuel talk people. test drive vehicles and PI. Reply Sero.” Br. at 3. If the Knosters characterizations, Br. at 19. These howev thought unfairly the McMath Denial was er, unfairly diminish the extent of the prejudicial, they should have raised an ob- undertaking. preparing NHTSA’s In the jection under Federal Rule of Evidence Report, the NHTSA NHTSA studied re so, 403. But even the McMath Denial acceleration; ports of sudden interviewed not does contain ad hominem attacks. It drivers; systems, braking examined “fuel “plainly wrong;” states that Mr. Sero is controls;” systems, driving per and and theory that his has been “addressed and experiments. formed tests and JA 3693- rebutted;” sup- that “no evidence” credible 94. It also supplemented its own consider it; position ports up that he “takes the expertise independent panel able an with responsible that drivers are not for the engineers, of mechanical and electrical vehicles;” operation safe of their and that professors, Ray MIT and Magliozzi even of testing “misleading” “completely his and Talk.” National Public Radio’s “Car See JA inconsistent with real world driver behav- Denial, 3750-67. As to the McMath the 4144-45, ior.” JA 4158-59. These Investigation performed Office of Defects against person; arguments are not the research; array “[i]nspected wide var against person’s they arguments are the ious Ford vehicles to understand cruise testing methodology. Rugge- and his operation;” specifi control studied vehicle Aldisert, Logic Lawyers: ro For A J. cations; (3d and disassembled one of Ford’s Legal Thinking Guide to Clear ed.1998).2 ... Dump “Mechanical Vacuum Valves The McMath Denial focused 2002) (“We admissibility disregarding signifi- the of evi- factors more review while cant.”) (internal omitted). quotation dence for abuse of discretion.... This stan- 803(8)(C)....”); applies dard to Rule United Versaint, (3d admissibility express opinion States v. 849 F.2d 831-32 2. We no on the Cir.1988) ("Under 803(8)], testimony. this Court [Rule Sero’s The District Court of Mr. hearing, the district court reserved must decide whether conducted a Daubert but it issue, by giving weight ruling at undue on the and Mr. Sero testified abused its discretion slight factors of relevance trial. See Def. Br. to trustworthiness in the only by methodology specialists mastered and be upon testing Mr. Sero’s Comm. unfairly Fed.R.Evid. 701 Adv. prejudicial. and was not field.” omitted). (internal quotation *6 Cir.1991). However, to party when a fails two JA causal inference on occasions. See for object we review error. Abrams plain hearsay He also referenced (3d 1204, Lightolier, 1213 50 F.3d Japanese from the Canadian and reports Cir.1995). Furthermore, objecting if the governments. JA 2575-79. party testimony, elicited the she cannot be challenge appeal. Knosters, however, heard to on its admission not contem- did Console, 641, See United States 13 F.3d object to any of this testimo- poraneously (3d Cir.1993). 660 for ny. therefore review its admission We Abrams, at 1213. plain error. See 50 F.3d 701, lay Rule cannot be opinion Under to Koeppel’s stray two references Despite technical, scientific, on or other “based conclusions, jury his causal remained knowledge of specialized scope within the Moreover, reject accept to them. free 701(c).3 In Rule 702.” other Fed.R.Evid. of a opinions largely duplicative his were words, testimony lay from a ] must “result[ Report. in reasoning everyday similar discussion the NHTSA process familiar (“[Wjhen life,” to can opposed process Report, as a “which See NHTSA JA 3745 response Asplundh Mfg. part a 3. Ford cites Div. v. Benton was in to the concerns ment 1190, by Judge Asplundh. Eng’g, expressed Cir. Harbor Becker in States, Notes; 1995) Sipes v. F.R.D. 701 Adv. As- United Fed.R.Evid. Comm. (deter- 59, (S.D.Cal.1986), proposition plundh, 57 F.3d 1200-01 & n. 14 for the permits lay spe- mining "it is not opinion Rule 701 based on for us to rewrite "commending knowledge. Congress is- th[e] cialized amended rale” but nonetheless But 2000, plainly Conference Rule 701 in new rale sue to the attention the Judicial and the Indeed, Evidence”). supercedes Advisory these cases. the amend- Committee Rules of suggest jury media on the matter and reto-warn claim. The asked whether focus question regarding there are unknown mechanical or electron- it should “answer the a causes, design ic ... some incident-involved driv- warning specifically about may ... system general ers conclude their vehicles or in the cruise control fault.”). Thus, must be at even about an event of sudden acceleration no testimony improper, it did not “under- matter what the cause.” JA 3291. Over mine the fundamental fairness of the trial” objection, respond- the Knosters’ the court miscarriage justice.” a or “contribute to question ed: “Your answer to number 3 Pa., Osei-Afriyie College v. Medical design should based on the of the be ” (3d Cir.1991). 937 F.2d 881-82 system.... cruise control JA 3291. On appeal, argue that Ford had Koeppel’s allegedly All of other im duty danger to a of sudden warn about proper during statements were made cross acceleration no matter what the cause. “if testimony, examination. As to this abstract, argument In the the Knosters’ all, there was error at was invited A regard in this has some merit. failure- error and cannot now be a basis for rever proof claim not Console, dependent upon to warn sal.” See 13 F.3d at 660. We separate design of a defect. The defect therefore conclude that the admission of “is not a in the failure-to-warn case flaw Koeppel’s lay opinion was not reversible product,” structure or error. warning unsuspecting “the absence of a IV. potentially users that can injury.” Corp., cause v. Keene jury’s The next issue concerns the Coffman 593-94, 628 A.2d 710 request supplemental instruction.4 Thus, duty Ford’s to warn involved the jury question during When a asks a delib danger generally, of sudden acceleration erations, duty respond “the court has a danger any specific not a cause. with supplemen ... and the form and extent of tal instructions are within the sound dis Nonetheless, liability charge “strict cretion of the court.” Beardshall v. Min should tailored to the factual be Int’l, Inc., uteman Press 664 F.2d Campos situation.” v. Firestone Tire & (3d Cir.1981). Nonetheless, we exercise Co., A.2d 305 Rubber plenary legal review over claims of error Limbach, (1984); see also 949 F.2d at 1259 *7 charge and “must determine whether the must, (stating charge light n. 15 “in fairly adequately as a whole and taken evidence, fairly adequately and sub- jury.” in submits the issues the case to the jury.”). the issues in the case to the ]mit v. See Limbach Co. Sheet Metal Workers case, In cause of sudden this (3d Ass’n, 949 F.2d 1259 n. 15 Int’l an activation of acceleration asserted was Cir.1991) banc) (internal (en quotations by the cruise control transient electrical omitted). possible, If this failure was not signals. of sudden accelera- jury’s Question danger 3 there was no request

The involved Indeed, the Knosters’ on the verdict sheet —the Knosters’ failu- tion to warn about. be; rather, we diversity case view of what state law should In case such as the sub apply existing interpreted jucLice, apply we law of the are to state law as the substantive governs proce- by highest court in an effort to state whose law and federal the state’s pre- parties dispute that court would decide the dural law. The do not that the decide how Co., Koppers Jersey applies legal us.” Inc. law New herein. cise issues before substantive of Co., Further, "adjudicating & 98 F.3d 1445 a case under v. Aetna Cas. Sur. when Cir.1996). law, impose we are not to our own state free at the time of product existing defect proposed warning stated that disconnect- distribution, proof of a ing the cruise control would abate dan- sale without or Thus, defect, under ger completely. specific JA 3163. when the incident theory, own failure their cruise-control plaintiff: harmed the necessary predicate was a to the failure-to- (a) ordinarily a kind that occurs was of 2922 (plaintiffs warn claim. JA coun- defect; and product as of Cf. a result stating my understanding that sel that “it’s (b) case, not, solely particular in was to is within the failure warn subsumed than product of causes other result case.”). design defective The District existing the time of sale or defect at properly instructed the Court’s answer distribution. jury that speculate should not about (Third) Restatement Torts: Products of wholly causes of sudden acceleration un- (1997). Liability § It supported by the record. therefore Jersey long applied has a version New “fairly adequately and submitted the is- cases, products res see ipsa Jakubow- in the jury,” sues case to the and we will Manufacturing, ski v. & Mining Minn. judgment affirm the to District Court’s as (1964), 177, 184, 199 A.2d 826 Limbach, the failure-to-warn claim. See Jersey Supreme ex- the New Court 949 F.2d at 1259 n. 15. v. plicitly adopted Myrlak section 3. See 84, 103-04, 723 Authority, Port 157 N.J. (1999). however, Myrlak, A.2d 45 consider We next whether Dis case, Ford manufacturing argues trict Court erred failing instruct the holding design its does not extend to de- jury under section 3 the Restatement Br. at disagree. fects. Def. 52-54. We (Third) Liability. Torts: Products Un Jersey rec- Supreme New Court has law, der New a design-defect claim ognized availability of circumstantial usually requires “proof by plaintiff of a proof product “that the is defec- show design reasonable alternative the omission of a manufacturing tive because flaw of which renders the not reason design See Scanlon General ably Cavanaugh Corp., safe.” See v. Skil defect.” 582, 592, A.2d Corp., 65 N.J. (2000) (internal Motors 164 N.J. 751 A.2d 518 omitted) (1974) (internal omitted).5 quotation quotation The District Court added); here, (emphasis see also Suter v. San used this standard Knosters Co., Angelo Foundry & Machine According contend that this was error. them, 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d More- appropriate test of defec over, is provided by Myrlak adopted tiveness in this case section 3 without pro section Restatement—the not lim- qualification, provision duct s-liability analogue loquitur. ipsa res manufacturing ited to cases. See 157 N.J. provides: It 103-04, 723 A.2d Restatement *8 (Third) § may

It inferred the harm 3.6 Restatement’s comments be that sus- by plaintiff by point “product design tained caused a that a was out when confusingly, co-Reporter 6. As ex- 5. Somewhat the PLA makes the the Restatement’s has technically plained, practical No. 1 absence of "a feasi- "Tentative Draft limited design” application ipsa ble alternative a N.J. of the res doctrine to manu- Stat. defense. Nonetheless, 2A:58C-3(a)(l). § facturing defect But after "intense Ann. “the cases.” an process,” plaintiff’s that statute does not alter burden to deliberative limitation Twerski, dropped. failure a show defendant’s to follow reason- See Aaron D. Inside Restatement, 839, design.” Cavanaugh, Pepp. 24 able 164 L.Rev. 842-44 alternative 7, N.J. at A.2d 518. 751 114 product 593,

causes the in to malfunction a N.J. at “Generally A.2d 673. manner identical to that is, which would ordi- speaking, product the older a the more narily aby manufacturing be caused de- prove difficult it is to that a defect existed fect,” may apply. section 3 See Restate- while in the control the manufacturer.” (Third) 3,§ ment comment b. Id. But some cases the can evidence sufficiently possible exclude other causes The first recognizes element of section 3 “without product’s age.” reference to the a product utterly sometimes fails so 4, Id. at n. 326 A.2d 673. Plaintiffs experience” “common indicates it beyond need not exclude other all causes would not have done so absent a defect. doubt; question is whether their evi- 105, Myrlak, See at N.J. 723 A.2d dence, believed, “permit[s] an Lowensten, inference” Inc., Mettinger v. W.W. cf. 293, 309, defectiveness. See v. Yamaha N.J.Super. 678 A.2d 1115 Sabloff Co., 365, 366, Motor 283 A.2d 321 (App.Div.1996). The accompa- comments (1971) curiam); (per nying section Jerista v. Mur- provide example of an cf. 175, 192, (2005) ray, 185 N.J. airplane wings. that loses its 883 A.2d 350 See Restate- (the (Third) 3,§ ment Similarly, applicability ipsa “depends comment b. of res a predates case that the balance of Myrlak, probabilities”); the New Terrell v. Motel, Jersey Supreme bicy- Court stated that a Lincoln N.J.Super. cle without functioning brakes is “self-evi- (App.Div.1982)(stating 443 A.2d 236 that a Suter, dent[ly]” defective. See ipsa “res expressly instruction be [can] 170-71, Here, 406 A.2d 140. the Knosters upon plaintiffs ability conditioned to prove introduced evidence that the Taurus sud- by pre- his version of the incident a fair denly any accelerated without input. driver evidence.”).7 ponderance of the credible evidence, If the believed that then the Mrs. Knoster and Ms. Rea testified that dangerous Taurus was as and as useless as suddenly the Taurus spontaneously plane wings without or a bike without input. accelerated without driver And de- functioning experience” brakes. “Common spite the age, Taurus’s Mr. Sero testified teaches that so manifest a failure that it design.8 did so as result of its If would not ordinarily occur in the absence believed, this support evidence would of some defect. Myrlak, 157 N.J. at determination the trier of fact that the 105, 723 A.2d 45. possible Knosters excluded other causes. (Third) 3,§

Section 3’s second See Restatement illustration element demands plaintiff possible exclude other 6. We therefore hold that the Knosters’ Scanlon, causes of the incident. may permit 65 evidence an inference defee- (Third) § 7. See also application Restatement illustration of section 3. But Scanlon held ("[Plaintiff’s] qualified expert presents cred- plaintiff “cannot ... be heard testimony ible that a defect in the automobile argue question foreign for reversal on a to the must have caused the accident. [Defendant’s] proceedings.” Generally speaking, initial Id. qualified expert presents testimony credible plaintiff necessarily "the is not confined to the that, equally likely independent explanation expert may his advance.” Sa- defect, speeding Driver lost control while 321; Scanlon, bloff, 59 N.J. at 283 A.2d highway. on the If the trier of fact believes that, (stating 65 N.J. at 326 A.2d 673 "as testimony expert, of Driver’s then an in- general proposition,” allows for Sabloff may ference of defect be established under "flexibility proof ... both in terms of Section.”). this case”). Here, theory of the *9 sought Scanlon, 598, a section 3 before the instruction Dis- 8. Ford cites 65 N.J. at 326 A.2d result, 673, "flexibility” trict Court. As a s proposition for the that the Knosters’ Sabloff attempt prove specific precludes a is available to defect them.

115 (“Some § 8, principle in the 3 applying of a courts proof tiveness under section to meet design product failing unneces- in of the alternative talk terms reasonable ”). To sary. expectations.’ say ‘consumer say is to is “self defect evident” instructing section under Instead loquitur. As ipsa for itself —res speaks 8, if the District stated that even the Court in anal- such, separate engage we need not proofs Knosters’ jury believed the —even test. consumer-expectations ysis of Suter’s suddenly accelerated without the Taurus gas on still stepping Mrs. Knoster the —it VII. safety “whether ben had to determine the vehicle, design of the efits from alternate Finally, argue by plaintiffs, greater proposed as were their PLA does consumer the not subsume disadvantages resulting than costs or therefore, and, claim the District fraud by proposed design.” plaintiffs caused the The dismissing in this claim. Court erred when, here, product’s as a JA 3158. But com prohibits “any unconscionable CFA manifest, al proof failure is reasonable fraud, false practice, deception, mercial unnecessary. Re design ternative is promise, misrepresentation, false pretense, (Third) 3, b; § cf. comment statement concealment, knowing suppression the or Charges New Model Civil 5.34C-1 fact intent any or omission of material with (stating that for “akin to defects rely in connection the that others with .... usual manufacturing defect[s] the sale or advertisement merchan Risk-Utility Balancing Test unneces ” § Pri .... Ann. dise N.J. Stat. 56:8-2. sary”). By focusing jury’s the attention they parties prove vate must suffered issue, “fair the District Court did not moneys prop an “ascertainable loss of ly adequately” apprise jury of the the erty” practice. as a result of the unlawful Limbach, properly issues it. before successful, § can re they Id. 56:8-19. If 949 F.2d at n. 15. therefore We will at damages treble and reasonable cover the judgment reverse District Court’s as However, torneys’ fees. Id. economic design-defect claim and for the remand v. damages are recoverable. See Gennari further proceedings. Realtors, 582, 612- Co. Weichert 13, A.2d 350

VI. PLA, 2 of N.J. Ann. Section the Stat. The Knosters also claim that the “con 2A58C-2, § method “established] sole sumer-expectations” applies. test In Suter ” action.’ prosecute ‘product liability Angelo Foundry & San Machine Com Int’l, Inc., Tirrell Navistar 248 N.J.Su- (1979), 406 A.2d pany, N.J. (App.Div.1991). A.2d 643 per. Jersey Supreme New Court stated that “product PLA defines the term liabili- product defect is when “self evident”— ty “any action” as claim or action ... i.e., proofs when “nature of [is] by product, irrespective harm caused [manufacturing] same as defect cases”— claim, theory except underlying if the then the can infer defect by an actions for harm caused breach of to meet “the reasonable ex failed warranty.” Ann. express Stat. 170- pectations purchaser.” Id. at 2A:58C-l(b)(3). Thus, § the PLA “effec- Although predates 406 A.2d 140. Suter tively statutory creates an exclusive cause no Myrlak years, test is Suter falling pur- of action for claims within its more than an alternative formulation Indus., Repola view.” See v. Morbark principle embodied section 3. See (Third) Cir.1991); 3,§ Tir- Restatement Note Reporters’ *10 rell, N.J.Super. at practice A.2d 643. loss and the unlawful condemned.” Nonetheless, claims for “physical damage Jersey Ramanadham v. New Ins. Mfrs. ... product “product Co., itself’ are not N.J.Super. 455 A.2d 1134 liability specifi- because the PLA action[s]” (App.Div.1982). Ford did not raise the cally damage excludes such from its defini- Court, causation issue in the District nor § tion of “harm.” N.J. Stat. Ann. 58C- appeal. has done so in this We will 1(b)(2), (3); Alloway see v. General Ma- therefore refrain addressing from the cau L.P., rine Ins. 695 A.2d 264 sation requirement and allow District (1997). Court to consider the issue in the first instance. The District pointed Court out authority dearth of New on how VIII. the CFA PLA and the relate to one anoth case, however, er. In JA 2941. this foregoing, there Based on the we will affirm overlap is no them. In between their CFA the District judgment Court’s as to the claim, only the Knosters seek economic evidentiary failure-to-warn claim and its damages resulting from harm to the Tau trial, rulings at design- reverse it as to the rus itself. PL Br. at Reply Br. at 20- claims, defect and consumer fraud and re- PLA excludes damages those mand proceedings. the case for further “harm,” from its definition of so the Knost REAVLEY, Judge, Circuit dissenting:

ers’ claim “product liability CFA was not a action.” § See N.J. Stat. Ann. 58C- I would affirm judgment. The case 1(b)(2), That critical readily fact dis was tried the claim that a defect tinguishes the two District Court decisions of the cruise control caused the accident. by cited In Pfizer, Ford. Walus v. against plain- That issue was decided (D.N.J.1993), F.Supp. plaintiff sued speed tiffs. It was the of the cruise con- worry Pfizer based on normally his wreck, setting trol resulted functioning might heart valve fail at some years the control was not defective. Six future plaintiff time. Id. at 42-43. The custody after Ford I lost of this vehicle see sought to recover for his emotional dis justification no for a I ipsa res issue. And tress, not harm to the itself. Id. see no by evidence of consumer fraud Morris, Inc., at 44. In Brown v. Philip Ford. (D.N.J.2002), F.Supp.2d the fraud claim physical injuries involved caused

cigarettes, cigarettes. not harm to Id. claims,

517. Unlike those

seek for harm to Tau recover

rus, and the PLA does not cover those

damages. The PLA cannot subsume

which it explicitly excludes from its cover age. We will therefore reverse the Dis CARCAISE; David S. Leslie

trict judgment Court’s as to the CFA Carcaise, J. his wife claim. clear, however, It is far from whether CEMEX, INC., Appellant cognizable the Knosters have a claim un- der the In CFA. order to sustain a CFA claim, Contracting Erecting, plaintiff must “a Industrial establish causal Inc., Third-Party relationship between ascertainable Defendant. Notes Third, claim that false stand, rendered misleading disclosures Ford Koeppel Mr. took Before untrustworthy. The reports the NHTSA about expressed concern Knosters that arguendo assumed District Court they testimony. Specifically, his scope of NHTSA, it held that Ford misled but an inference that he would draw worried trustworthy remained because reports increase sudden-acceleration alleged “represent[ed] Ford’s omissions from an increase in media reports resulted tiny only a fraction of the universe (“SA”) Supplemental Appendix attention. inde- information that ... and the NHTSA them, According to this inference 9-10. panel experts considered.” JA pendent from “a of reason- process does not follow thus agree analysis with 32. We life;” requires ing everyday familiar did not abuse hold that the District Court knowledge psychology specialized when it admitted its discretion Adv. Fed R. Evid. 701 statistics. See Report and Denial. NHTSA the McMath re- Notes. The District Court Comm. Koeppel testify about sponded that could III. observed, he he should the correlation The Knosters also contend to infer opportunity “offer[ ] Koeppel’s testimony included inad William 11. The their own conclusions.” SA lay opinion. missible Fed.R.Evid. 701. analy- Knosters’ attorney agreed with that ruling review the district court’s ‘We (“Sure, I with problem sis. SA have no Rule opinions were admissible under I .... correlation. It’s the causation that abuse discretion.” United with.”). Nonetheless, dur- problem have a Leo, 192-93 States Koeppel examination drew ing direct

Case Details

Case Name: Estate of Edward W. Knoster v. Ford Motor Co.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Sep 6, 2006
Citation: 200 F. App'x 106
Docket Number: 05-3355
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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