ESTATE OF Mauricio CORNEJO, by and through its representative, Jeanette SOLIS; et al. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al. and Matthew Meneses; et al.
No. 12-56847
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
July 23, 2015
Argued and Submitted July 8, 2015.
6. We also reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the unfair competition and misappropriation claims, because the success of those state-law claims is tied to whether Bizar owned the trademark at thе time of Dee and Herman‘s alleged infringement. Reviewing de novo, Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir.2001), we conclude that the district court should apply Arizona law to these state-law claims. Taking into consideration the factоrs outlined in the Restatement, Arizona—the place where Bizar resided when the alleged infringement took place—“has the most significant relationship between the occurrence and the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1971); see Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 495 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that Arizona follows the Restatement‘s choice-of-law analysis). Dee and Herman have not argued to this court that Bizar‘s state-law claims are preempted by federal law, but we note that the district court relied on precedent interpreting federal copyright law, rather than federal trademark law, in its preеmption analysis.
7. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Dee and Herman on Bizar‘s breach of contract claim. As we have explained, the contract terminated in 1991, and the cоmplaint identifies no actions taken by Dee or Herman before 1991 that could have constituted a breach.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
Amy Field, Los Angeles City Attorney‘s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defеndants-Appellants.
Before: REINHARDT, FERNANDEZ, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Mauricio Cornejo fled from Los Angeles police after he was asked out of his car
Cornejo‘s children, as his successors in interest, brought suit for violations of his constitutional rights actionable under
Defendants challenge the judgment on three grounds. First, they argue that the children lacked Article III standing to bring Cornejo‘s
State law governs who receives a decedent‘s
On appeal, Defendants point out that an estate was opened for Cornejo, and thus its personal representative, Jeanette Solis, should have brought Cornejo‘s
Defendants next assert that the wrongful death damages should be reduсed to account for Cornejo‘s own negligence. Defendants failed to raise this argument at the district court. Their proposed judgment awarded Plaintiffs the full wrongful death damages given in the verdict. Likеwise, they neither moved to amend the judgment, nor included this issue in their motion for judgment as a matter of law. In fact, Defendants told the jury in their closing argument that damages would not be reduced, and conceded to the magistrate judge that they did not believe apportioning damages was appropriate in this case. Defendants offer no convincing reason why we should consider this issue for the first time here. See United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants waived it.
Defendants are also not entitled to qualified immunity. We review Defendants’ claim de novo, but we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1022 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc), cert. denied, U.S., 135 S.Ct. 1482, 191 L.Ed.2d 371 (2015). A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if plaintiffs have not shown facts that make out a constitutional violation or if the constitutional right violated was not clearly established. A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 453-54 (9th Cir.2013), cert. denied sub nom., Markgraf v. A.D., U.S., 134 S.Ct. 531, 187 L.Ed.2d 394 (2013). In this case, however, Plaintiffs have shown a violation of Cornejo‘s clearly established constitutional rights.
Defendants contend that Cornejo‘s right to medical care was governed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that liability was limited to cases in which officеrs were deliberately indifferent to medical needs. This is incorrect. In Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir.2006), we found that suspects have a Fourth Amendment right to “objectively reasonable post-arrest [medical] care” until the end оf the seizure. Id. This means that officers must “seek the necessary medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended by either promptly summoning the neсessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a hospital.” Id. (quoting Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir.1986)). Cornejo‘s seizure lasted at least until he arrived at the police station. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court correctly instructed the jury under Tatum, and the evidence is easily sufficiеnt to support the jury‘s finding that Defendants were liable on this count.
Defendants assert that Tatum is ambiguous about the standard for post-arrest care because it looks to Maddox, which did not set a firm standard. The part of Maddox adopted by Tatum, however, is plain: police must seek necessаry medical attention by promptly summoning help or taking the injured arrestee to a hospital.
Defendants’ violation was clearly established as well. The salient question is whether Defendants had fair notice their conduct was illegal, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), bearing in mind that fair notice is not found in the broad generality that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). In Tatum, we held that the constitution required the officers to obtain medical help when the decedent‘s labored breathing after being handcuffed made it clear he was in distress. 441 F.3d at 1099. That conclusion is directly applicable here.
AFFIRMED.