246 P. 324 | Cal. | 1926
This appeal was taken from an order of the court granting two motions for a new trial. The original petition herein was filed by David J. Baird, a minor, by his guardian, Lydia M. Valencia. Thereafter an amended petition was filed by said minor through his said guardian, praying for partial distribution of the estate of David J. Baird, deceased, to said petitioner as the adopted son and heir of *492
said deceased. There have been three trials of the issues involved in this proceeding, from the judgment in each of which an appeal was taken to this court. The opinions rendered therein are reported in
The judgment rendered at the first trial of the issues involved herein was reversed on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing the demand of petitioner, the respondent herein, for a jury trial. On the second trial the verdict of the jury was in favor of petitioner. This court reversed the judgment therein on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that the decedent had adopted petitioner as his child within the meaning of section 230 of the Civil Code. The case in due time came on for trial for the third time. It was tried before a jury, and, like the second trial, resulted in special verdicts in favor of petitioner. The court adopted the special verdicts, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered its decree of partial distribution in petitioner's favor. From this decree or judgment the executors of the last will and testament of said deceased and those claiming interest in said estate adverse to petitioner appealed. On this appeal this court again reversed the judgment of the trial court, and in doing so it held that the former decision of this court had established the law of the case, but further held "that apart from the doctrine of the law of the case the evidence received on the last trial is insufficient to sustain the special verdicts, or to support the findings, and that a case of adoption has not been established." (Estate ofBaird,
After the filing of the remittitur in the lower court, petitioner, on the fifteenth day of April, 1924, filed his notice of intention to move for a new trial and "that the former verdict and the purported decision and judgment herein rendered against him upon his petition and amended petition for partial distribution be vacated and that a new trial be granted." The grounds set forth in said notice upon which said motion would be based were all those designated in section
"And in this regard the court in accordance with said section
From this order the said Veronica C. Baird, Benjamin H. Baird, and Thomas R. Baird have appealed. The appeal is brought before this court upon a bill of exceptions.
It will be noted that the order granting a new trial was granted on all the grounds enumerated in section
"4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial;
"6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law;
"7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application." *495
We might mention at this time that the respondent thereafter moved to dismiss said appeal but said motion was denied by this court (Estate of Baird,
1. Newly discovered evidence. Of the affidavits presented by respondent in support of his motions for a new trial are those of Lydia M. Valencia and Mary Westerfeld. In these affidavits the affiants therein refer to certain statements made to them by Miles T. Baird since the last trial of this cause. A counter-affidavit was filed by the said Miles T. Baird, in which he stated that he had not seen either said Lydia M. Valencia nor the said Mary Westerfeld since the year 1914, and that the statements made by them respectively in their affidavits were false and untrue. The only argument advanced by respondent to sustain the order of the trial court granting the motions for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is that as the conclusion of the trial court upon conflicting affidavits is conclusive, it evidently believed Miss Valencia and Miss Westerfeld and therefore believed that Miles T. Baird had committed perjury and "if Miles T. Baird had committed perjury on so important a matter as detailed in the affidavit of Miss Valencia the propriety of a new trial hardly seems to be an open question." In other words, it is claimed that the newly discovered evidence on the part of respondent would impeach the witness Miles T. Baird, who testified to material and important matters involved in this controversy. It has been repeatedly held that evidence impeaching in its character is not sufficient to justify the granting of a motion for a new trial (Waer v. Waer,
Notwithstanding our opinion that the purported newly discovered evidence on behalf of petitioner would be inadmissible upon a subsequent trial of this cause, if one were granted, for the reason just stated, we will, nevertheless, discuss it in its relation to the issue involved herein, even though this can only be done at considerable length. The four affidavits of Lydia M. Valencia, Mary E. Westerfeld, Mary A. Reed and Robert Jackson, we understand, contain all the newly discovered evidence upon which the respondent relies to sustain the order of the court granting his motions on that ground. The other two affidavits presented by respondent and used at said hearing were by his attorneys. They did not purport to set forth any newly discovered evidence, but simply set forth facts showing due diligence on their part in the procurement of the newly discovered evidence. The document before referred to as a "demurrer, objection and resistance" was not sworn to, and we do not understand that respondent in any way claims that it contained any statement of facts which could be legally used on said hearing. We will therefore confine our discussion to respondent's four affidavits above referred to.
The affidavit of Lydia M. Valencia is as follows:
"That on two separate occasions since the last trial of the above entitled cause, and while the same was pending on appeal, Benjamin H. Baird, a half brother of the deceased, and one of the parties to the above entitled matter, called upon affiant and the petitioner at his own request. He stated that the object of his visit was for the purpose of settling the case out of court, and he wanted to know just what amount affiant would take to settle the claim of her son, David Jennings Baird, to the estate of his father. Said Benjamin H. Baird further stated that he was going to see to it that affiant would take good care of his brother's child, and that he would force affiant to accept his terms of settlement as he had the power and the influence. He further stated, on one of these occasions that he and his mother knew all about the existence of the child prior to the death of his brother, David Jennings Baird; that the deceased had told his mother, Veronica C. Baird, that petitioner was his son and that they had many conversations and arguments *497 concerning the petitioner; that notwithstanding the objections of his mother, the deceased insisted upon keeping in his room, at the Fairmont Hotel, pictures of the petitioner; that in doing so the deceased had caused his mother a good deal of grief;
"Said Benjamin H. Baird further stated that both he and his mother believed that affiant was married to his brother David until affiant informed him to the contrary at the time he called at 230 I Street, San Francisco, immediately after the death of his brother.
"Affiant further deposes and says that on numerous occasions since the last trial of said cause, Miles T. Baird, a full brother of the deceased, called upon affiant and the petitioner. On one of these occasions, he said: `I was extremely sorry for my mother's hostile attitude toward David, but my mother believed she was justified in doing anything, whether it was right or wrong, to defeat the child's rights and, in doing so, I guess she is no different from most women under such circumstances.' He further stated that both he and his sister, Marie Sproule, had endeavored to get their mother to do what was right by the child but so far they had failed, as his mother was being influenced against the child by his half brother, Benjamin H. Baird. Said Miles T. Baird further stated that he and his half brother, Benjamin H. Baird, had actually come to blows over the fact that said Benjamin H. Baird had induced his mother to give false testimony in her deposition concerning her knowledge of the petitioner. Said Miles T. Baird further stated to affiant that both he and his mother had full knowledge of the existence of the petitioner long prior to the death of David Jennings Baird, and he stated that his mother, the deceased and himself had many arguments concerning the petitioner, and that the deceased had informed his mother that he was the father of the petitioner and that he was going to do what he thought was right regardless of her objections; that said Miles T. Baird further stated that he and his mother were in Europe at the time they received news of the death of his brother David; that before coming to America, they had talked over the possibilities of a contest over his brother's estate, and whether or not deceased had left a will providing for the child, and whether the deceased was married to affiant. *498
"Said Miles T. Baird further stated that if the case were again tried, he would gladly appear as a witness for the petitioner and tell the whole truth. On some of his visits, he took the petitioner out riding in his automobile."
The affidavit of Mary E. Westerfeld refers to certain conversations had with Miles T. Baird subsequent to the former trial, in which she relates that he made statements to her similar to many of the statements set out in the above affidavit of Lydia M. Valencia. The principal matters contained in her affidavit and not found in that of Lydia M. Valencia were that Miles T. Baird had a number of small snapshots of respondent taken when he was a child and that Miles told her that these were sent to him by the deceased while he and his mother were in Europe and that he had kept them ever since and had exhibited them to his mother before the death of David J. Baird, and furthermore that he had seen the child and that the resemblance between him and the deceased was very striking. She further stated in her affidavit that on this occasion Miles T. Baird had told her that he had received letters from the deceased during his absence in Europe in which he mentioned the child as his own.
The affidavit of Mary A. Reed sets forth that she was not acquainted with the petitioner or his mother, Lydia M. Valencia, but that she had been acquainted with John Rush Baird during his lifetime and that he had stated to her that his brother David had told him that he had been secretly married to Miss Valencia and that said David Jennings Baird was apparently embittered towards his two stepbrothers, who were then quite young. She further set forth in her affidavit that she was well acquainted with Veronica C. Baird, met her in Paris and had frequent conversations with her concerning the relationship that existed between her son David and Miss Valencia and concerning the existence and paternity of respondent, in which conversations Mrs. Baird said that under no circumstances would she recognize or acknowledge the child, and that Mrs. Baird was very embittered towards Miss Valencia and that she had left San Francisco and gone to Paris to live on account of the notoriety her son had brought upon her through his association with Miss Valencia. *499
The affidavit of Robert Jackson set forth that he was in the employ of David Jennings Baird during the year 1907, and that in the year 1908, while Mrs. Baird was staying at the Fairmont, she and her son David had an argument concerning this child and that David told him that his mother took him to task about his association with the child and its mother and tried to persuade him not to go near them, but that he told his mother that he knew his own business and was his own boss and that no matter what she said he was going to look after the child, meaning the respondent; that on this occasion, after the altercation, he took David from the Fairmont Hotel to 230 I street, where respondent and his mother were then living; he further referred to Mrs. Baird having detectives employed to follow her son David; he also stated that he had frequently met Miles T. Baird during the lifetime of his brother David and had several conversations with him concerning the child, in which Miles told him the child looked exactly like his brother Dave and that he felt extremely sorry for the child and would like to help him, but was unable to do so on account of the opposition of his sister and mother to the child. He further related a conversation that he had had with John Floyd, who for a number of years was in the employ of the Baird family. These conversations related to Mrs. Baird's knowledge of the child and that she wanted that fact kept quiet, and that Mrs. Baird had purchased for him the house in which he was then living on Eighth Avenue.
In order to properly consider these affidavits and their bearing upon the issues involved in this proceeding it will be necessary to ascertain the prior determinations of this court as to the issues before the court and the evidence produced in support thereof on the former hearings. Upon the second appeal of this matter this court held that four things are essential to the adoption of an illegitimate child by its father: 1st. He shall be its natural father. 2d. He shall have publicly acknowledged himself to be its father. 3d. He shall have received the child into his family. 4th. He shall have otherwise treated it as his legitimate child. (Estate of Baird,
The determination by this court as to the legal effect of the evidence then before the court has established the law of the case and was binding upon the trial court as well as upon this court (Estate of Baird,
Taking up now the affidavits on behalf of respondent in support of his motions for a new trial, the question for decision is, would the matters set forth therein, if proven at a subsequent trial, be sufficient to establish those facts which this court has held were necessary for the respondent to establish in order to prove his adoption and which he failed to establish at the former trial? In other words, would the purported newly discovered evidence, together with the evidence before the court upon the third trial, establish the three essential elements of adoption which this court held on the last appeal were not proven at the former trial of this matter? For, unless the newly discovered evidence, with the evidence then in the record and already before the court, would at least tend to establish all three of said essentials, it would be insufficient to warrant the court in granting a new trial on said ground. We will discuss said newly discovered evidence only as it relates to two of said elements of adoption — receipt into the family and treatment as the legitimate child of said deceased. This court on the former hearing (Estate of Baird,
2. Insufficiency of the evidence. The order granting respondent's motions for a new trial, as we have already seen, in addition to specifying in effect that it was granted upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, contained the following: "And in this regard the court in accordance with said section
While this order is not entirely free from ambiguity, we understand its purport to be that the trial court specified as one of the grounds for granting the motion for a new trial the insufficiency of the evidence to support the decision or judgment entered by said court in pursuance of the order of this court, and further specified that the court did not believe the testimony of certain witnesses who had testified on behalf of the appellants herein. (In the order they are designated as "certain witnesses who testified on behalf of the respondent to the petition herein"), and, for *503
the reason that the court did not believe said witnesses, that the said decision and judgment was not sustained by the evidence. The order of this court directing the entry by the trial court of said judgment was made after consideration of all the evidence in respondent's behalf produced before the court at the third trial of this cause. After such consideration this court not only held that "the evidence received on the last trial is insufficient to sustain the special verdicts, or to support the findings, and that a case of adoption has not been established," but the opinion also declared that: "We further hold that the court erred in denying the motion for non-suit, in denying the motion for an instructed verdict, and in failing to enter judgment for appellants." (Estate of Baird,
3. The decision is against law. Under this heading the respondent contends that the supreme court upon the last appeal of this case (
It is further contended by the respondent that the supreme court cannot make findings of fact and base a judgment thereon. With this proposition of law we agree. We think it quite evident, however, that the supreme court in this case did not attempt to make any findings of fact. What it did do was to hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion of appellants for a nonsuit and reversed *506 the case for that reason and made its order directing said court to grant said motion and to enter judgment accordingly. It made no finding of fact whatever, but it found as a matter of law that respondent had not produced evidence sufficient to establish the allegations of his petition, and, therefore, that he had not made out a case for the jury. No findings of fact are necessary, nor have they any place, in an action where a judgment of nonsuit is rendered.
Respondent has presented an argument at some length upon the validity of section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, passed by the legislature between the last trial of this matter and the date of the decision of this court reversing the judgment therein. Respondent claims that if said order reversing said judgment was made pursuant to the authority of this section of the code, it was erroneous and illegal for the reason that the provisions of this code section have no retroactive effect, and even if they have such effect, the section itself is unconstitutional. We deem it unnecessary to consider the argument presented by respondent as to the validity of this section of the code for the reason that in our opinion the court had power to make said order of reversal independent of and aside from any authority which said section attempts to confer upon appellate courts. It nowhere appears that this court on the former appeal assumed to act under the provisions of this section and we do not understand that the respondent directly asserts that the action of this court taken therein was made by it by virtue of any authority conferred by said section. The validity of this section, therefore, is not material in this present proceeding.
Neither are we impressed with the argument of respondent that by the order of this court directing the trial court to enter a judgment of nonsuit he was deprived of a jury trial. He was no more deprived of a jury trial by the action of this court ordering such a judgment than he would have been had the trial court itself granted the motion for a nonsuit at the trial of said action. The granting of a nonsuit when the evidence of plaintiff is insufficient to support a judgment in his favor is not a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial (Bohn v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
4. Errors of law. The only error of law relied upon by respondent to justify the trial court in granting his motions for a new trial is based upon the action of the trial court in admitting testimony over the objection of the respondent covering the past history of respondent's mother prior to the time when her relations with the deceased, David J. Baird, commenced. This same question was before the court upon the last appeal and it was there held (on page 280) that such evidence should not have been excluded.
For the foregoing reasons there was not in our opinion any legal showing made by respondent to justify the trial court in granting his motions for a new trial. In arriving at this conclusion we are not unmindful of the well established and salutary rule which clothes the trial court with broad discretionary powers in the consideration and determination of motions of this character. While these powers are broad and extensive, they are not unlimited and their exercise is controlled by other rules of procedure equally well settled and beneficial in their application. One of these last mentioned rules is that where the trial court errs in the application of the legal principles applicable to a cause in granting a motion for a new trial thereof such action will be corrected on appeal just as readily as if the motion had been overruled (Schramm v.Southern Pac. Co.,
In our opinion the trial court in granting the respondent's motions for a new trial misapplied the legal principles applicable to this cause and for that reason we think said order should be reversed, and it is so ordered.
Shenk, J., Cashin, J., pro tem., Richards, J., Waste, C.J., and Lennon, J., concurred. *508