The Estate of Buford L. Anderson (the “Estate”) filed Missouri state-law claims for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay against Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (“Safeco”). The district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of Safeco, and the Estate appeals. We affirm.
I.
Buford Anderson was riding in a car driven by his ex-wife, Janice Anderson, when flood waters swept the car off of a private drive. Mr. Anderson was thrown from the vehicle and ultimately died. At the time of the incident, the vehicle Ms. Anderson was driving was insured by Sagamore Insurance Company (“Sagamore”). The Estate sent a letter to Sagamore seeking to recover damages under the policy and stating that Ms. Anderson was at fault for the accident. Sagamore denied the claim, stating “that the main contributing factor” to the accident was “poor repairs to the driveway” and that “the contractor that repaired the driveway [was] the liable party.” Sagamore did not deny that Ms. Anderson’s policy was in full force and
At the time, pursuant to Missouri law, Mr. Anderson had an auto-insurance policy with Safeco that included uninsured-motorist coverage. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 379.203. After receiving Sagamore’s letter denying “payment,” the Estate filed a claim with Safeco. It submitted Saga-more’s response as evidence that Safeco was now responsible for payment under Mr. Anderson’s uninsured-motorist policy provisions.
The Safeco policy, in relevant part, provided:
A. [Safeco] will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:
1. Sustained by the insured; and
2. Caused by an accident.
C. “Uninsured motor vehicle” means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type: 1. To which no bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident____[or]
4. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident, but the bonding or insuring company: a. denies coverage....
Safeco denied coverage on March 27, 2007, finding that the Sagamore “letter clearly indicate[d] the host vehicle was insured at the time of this loss” and that the Estate had failed to present sufficient documentation that the death “was the result of an auto accident caused by an uninsured motor vehicle.” Safeco cited to Part C.l of its insurance policy. The Estate responded to Safeco’s denial of coverage on April 9, 2007, by asserting Safeco’s liability under Part C.4 of the policy. The Estate claimed that Part C.4(a) “specifically provides that an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ includes, as being within coverage, a tortfeasor whom has liability insurance, but the underwriter of which denies liability.” Safeco refused payment, and the Estate then filed suit for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay.
II.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the district court.”
Murray v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
The policy does not specifically define the term “coverage.” “When interpreting language of an insurance policy that is not defined,” Missouri law instructs us to “give a term its ordinary meaning unless it plainly appears that a technical meaning was intended.”
Mansion Hills Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that it would be “unreasonable in the context of uninsured motorist insurance to define ‘coverage’ to include a denial by the liability insurer of the insured’s fault in the accident.” To allow for such a definition would conflate “coverage” with “liability” when the two are not synonymous.
See
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) (defining “coverage” as “[i]nelusion of a risk under an insurance policy; the risks within the scope of an insurance policy,” and “liability” as “[t]he quality or state of being legally obligated or accountable”). Several courts have noted this distinction in pointing out that “coverage” relates to whether the policy was intended to apply to a particular claim, whereas “liability” addresses the viability of the claim on the facts.
See Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
The Estate further argues that Safeco is estopped from arguing that Ms. Anderson did not meet the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” under Part C.4(a) of the Safeco policy because Safeco failed to reference this provision in its March 27, 2007, letter denying coverage. We also find this argument without merit. Safeco properly informed the Estate that it did not believe that the accident involved an “uninsured motor vehicle” within the meaning of Part C because Ms. Anderson had an insurance policy in place. Safeco was not required to anticipate the Estate’s erroneous argument that it was asserting liability specifically under Part C.4 because the definition of “coverage” encompassed a tortfeasor with liability insurance but whose underwriter denied liability in that particular instance. This creative use of estoppel is simply an incorrect application of the law, and, as Safeco notes, “[w]aiver and estoppel operate, when applicable, to preserve rights already acquired ... and not to create new rights, new causes of action.”
Associated Indem. Corp. v. Miller-Campbell Co.,
Finally, because the Estate has neither established that uninsured-motorist coverage exists nor alleged that Safeco engaged in inappropriate tactics when seeking to avoid payment, it cannot establish Safeco’s liability for vexatious refusal to pay.
See Cedar Hill Hardware and Const. Supply, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover,
III.
Having considered all of the claims presented, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.