Essling v. MarkmanEssling v. Markman
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Todd
William W. Essling and Richard L. Lehr challenge the constitutionality and enforcement of
Essling and Lehr are both over the age of 65. They claim that the state has wrongfully interfered with their right of contract and their right to privacy because of their age. They claim this deprivation occurred without due process of law.
Minnesota Statute
The issues presented are:
1. Does
2. Does the statute apply to travel insurance policies?
1. We begin our analysis by considering the appropriate standard of review. Strict scrutiny is required when a fundamental right is limited or a classification is based upon a suspect class. In that situation, the law will be upheld only if it is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. Absent a fundamental right or suspect class, minimal judicial scrutiny is appropriate. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Under this standard, if the record indicates that the Act is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose, it should be upheld. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981). The same analysis applies under either due process or equal protection analysis. Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn.1980).
Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has recognized freedom of choice or contract as fundamental rights sufficient to invoke strict judicial scrutiny. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28, 54 S.Ct. 505, 511-12, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). Similarly, age has never been considered a suspect classification. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Hence, minimal judicial scrutiny is appropriate.
It is also a basic principle of constitutional law that the Act is presumed valid and the burden is on the challenging party to prove its invalidity. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2213, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978).
The classification is rationally related to achievement of that purpose for several reasons. First, the classification is tied to
Finally, the Act requires insurance policies which purport to supplement Medicare to meet minimum standards. This is a reasonable approach to the problem of potential insureds receiving insufficient coverage.
Essling argues that this approach is not rationally related because the state should be regulating the insurance industry rather than penalizing those individuals over age 65 and covered by Medicare. However, the legislature is not required to “strike at all the evils at once.” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981). Essling “cannot prevail so long as ‘it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.’ ” Id. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 723, quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). It is “up to the Legislature * * * not courts to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.” Id. at 469, 101 S.Ct. at 726, quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1030, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963). Based upon these considerations, Essling has failed to show that the legislative facts upon which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably have been conceived to be true by the legislature. Id. at 464,101 S.Ct. at 723. The statute is upheld under the “rational basis” test.
2. The trial court concluded that the act unconstitutionally applied to travel insurance policies. This result is correct, but we conclude that the reasoning is over-broad. We observe that the Act fails to indicate expressly its applicability to travel insurance policies. When the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the legislature controls.
The stated purpose of the statute is
“An act relating to insurance; establishing standards applicable to accident or health insurance policies which purport to supplement medicare benefits
* * *.” Act of May 29,1981, ch. 318,1981 Minn.Laws 1473, 1473. Although this is merely the title of the Act, we may rely upon it as an indicator of legislative intent.
The intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the law;
(3) The mischief to be remedied;
(4) The object to be obtained;
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
In determining this intent, we also must remember that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result—
Relying upon these rules of construction, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the Act apply to travel coverages. There is no indication in the record that travel accident and health insurance has contributed to the evils sought
Affirmed.
Notes
. For documentation of the abuses which had occurred see House Select Comm, on Aging, Abuses in the Sale of Health Insurance to the Elderly in Supplementation of Medicare: A National Scandal, H.R.Doc. No. 160, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
. Statutory titles are required by the Minnesota Constitution.