To maintain their title the demandants show, in the first place, that the tenant, who formerly owned the demanded premises, conveyed the same to Jesse Sargent by a deed dated March 29th 1843; that Sargent conveyed to Stephen Barker by a deed dated September 11th 1843 ; and that by successive conveyances this title has come to the demandants.. The tenant’s answer to this is an oral contract, which he alleges that Barker, while seised of the land, made with him, by which he became entitled to an interest in the land, or the price paid for it, if it should be sold, and by which Barker agreed to hold the estate in trust for his benefit, and that the conveyance by Barker was therefore in fraud of his right; and that the demand-ants and all those through whom they claimed from Barker had notice of this agreement.
The statement of such a defence to a writ of entry would
We can see no reason, upon the other facts reported, why all the tenant’s pretence of interest in the demanded premises did not vest in his assignees when he went into insolvency ; nor any sufficient objection to the validity of the conveyance by the assignees to the demandants. The questions of the trust and the alleged fraud would seem also to have been conclusively settled against the tenant in the suit in equity in the United States courts. But the grounds of our opinion first stated are decisive, and the tenant must be defaulted.
Judgment for the demcmdants.
