Dоes the term "remains” appearing in the statute governing mortuary science and practice, MCL 338.870(6); MSA 14.509(10)(6), 1 include only the body of the decеased or does it also include the clothing worn by the deceased at the time of death? On November 3, 1981, the trial court ruled that the term did nоt include clothing, and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal of right. This question of first impression comes to us on facts which are not disputed and are derived from the pleadings.
On July 12, 1978, the Alger County Sheriff’s *434 Department discovered the dead body of plaintiffs’ decedent, Michael Espinoza. The county medical examiner determined that the decedent died as the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the chest. It was furthеr determined that the decedent, who was clothed with a camouflaged hunting outfit, had been dead for approximately 48 hours preceding discovery.
The medical examiner promptly released the decedent’s body to defendant Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Homе at Munising. Plaintiffs were notified on the same day that the body was discovered, and made arrangements for the transfer of the decedent tо the Balbirnie-Apostle Funeral Home of Muskegon, Michigan. Upon receipt of the body, defendant detached the clothing worn at thе time of death and commenced embalming procedures. Decedent’s clothing was incinerated, allegedly because of sрoliation from bodily fluids and insect infestation. Late in the afternoon of July 13, 1978, defendant released the decedent’s body and personаl effects, consisting of a pair of glasses and an empty wallet. Burial took place in Muskegon July 18, 1978.
Not convinced that their son had committed suicide, the Espinozas requested the decedent’s body be disinterred and subjected to an autopsy by a pathologist. Autopsy was conducted on February 22, 1980, by Dr. Henry De Leeuw, Muskegon coroner, who concluded that the cause of death could not be determinеd without extensive study of the clothing worn by the decedent at the time of his death. On October 10, 1980, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant for violation of § 10 оf the mortuary science act, supra, which provides that no person shall send or cause to be sent "the remains of any deceased person without first having made *435 due inquiry as to the desires of the next of kin”. Depositions were taken in lieu of trial. On November 3, 1981, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1). From such judgment, plaintiffs appeal of right.
The relevant portion of § 10 of the mortuary science аct reads as follows:
"A public officer or employee, or the official of a public institution, convalescent home, privаte nursing home, maternity home, public or private hospital, physician or surgeon, or other person having a professional relаtionship with a decedent, coroner, or other public official having temporary custody of the remains of the decedent, shаll send or cause to be sent to a person or establishment licensed under this act the remains of a deceased person withоut having first made due inquiry as to the desires of the next of kin and of the persons who may be chargeable with the funeral expenses of the dеcedent. If next of kin are found, that person’s authority and directions shall govern the disposal of the remains of the decedent. A person or establishment licensed under this act receiving the remains in violation of this subsection shall not charge for service in connection with the remains before delivery of the remains as stipulated by the next of kin. This section shall not prevent a person or establishment licensed under this act from charging and being reimbursed for services rendered in connection with the removal of the remains of a deceased person in case of accidental or violent death, and rendering necessary professional services required until the next of kin or persons chargeable with the funeral expenses have been notified.” MCL 338.870(6); MSA 14.509(10X6). (Emphasis supplied.)
The narrow question is whether thе term "remains” should be read to include the clothing worn by the decedent at the time of death. As both sides to this controversy recognize, thе fundamen
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tal goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Spartan Asphalt Paving Co v Grand Ledge Mobile Home Park,
The initial inquiry is, therefore, whether the term "remains” as used in the statute is ambiguous. Although the term "remains” is not a frequently used one, it has distinct definition. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary offers this definition: "a dead body”. Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d ed) defines "remains” as: "a dead body; corpse”. Interestingly, the words "corpse” or "dead body” are the precise words which plaintiffs claim the Legislature would have used had it intended to include only the organic human residue. Accordingly, we find that the plain meaning of the term "remains” is a biological corpse, not inclusive of clothing or other personal articles.
Assuming,
arguendo,
that the term "remains” does not have a clear and precise meaning, but instead is ambiguous and subject to interpretation,
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we still conclude that the Legislature intended the word to refer exclusively to a corpse оr dead human body. Where words are ambiguous, legislative intent may be ascertained by looking to the purpose and objectives sought tо be accomplished.
Smith v Grand Rapids City Comm,
In summary, we hold that the word "remains”, as used in the applicable statute at the time of the incident complained of, did not include the clothing of the deceased. Accordingly, we rule that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendant.
Affirmed. No costs, a question of public importance being involved.
Notes
At the time of decedent’s death in 1978, the applicable statute was the mortuary science act. The mortuary science act was repealed by