Richard ESPINOSA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 46699.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 11, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 1973.
494 S.W.2d 172
At the trial the appellant called Stubblefield and Jones to testify in his behalf. Stubblefield testified that although the appellant was in the car, that neither he nor the appellant knew that Jones was going to rob the attendant at the Enco station and that they in fact had no part in the robbery but that after the robbery and prior to their arrest they had gone to a place to eat breakfast. Jones invoked the privilege of the
The jury was charged on the theory of principals and was further instructed that the appellant‘s mere presence at the scene of the alleged robbery, if he were present, would not make him a principal.
The evidence is sufficient to show the appellant‘s guilt as a principal to the offense of robbery by assault and to sustain the jury‘s verdict. The jury evidently rejected the defendant‘s theory of the case. See and compare Hughes v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 166 (1973) and Hill v. State, 466 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
At the punishment phase of the trial proof was made of the prior conviction which was alleged for enhancement purposes as well as several other felony convictions.
The appellant‘s second ground of error is: “The admission of hearsay testimony created an unsubstantiated conclusion in the jury‘s mind that the defendant was responsible for other crimes in the community.”
Under this ground of error our attention is directed to the places in the record concerned with the broadcast of the description of the robbers and the car. No objections were made to such testimony at the time of trial and the only allusion made to other robberies was made by defense counsel in his cross-examination. The record does not support this alleged ground of error. No error is shown.
In the remaining ground of error it is asserted that the arraignment of the appellant in the presence of the jury constituted reversible error. The only objection made at the time of arraignment was that the prosecutor was shouting and that he should arraign the appellant in a more calm manner. No other objection being made, no error was preserved. Roberts v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 849 (1973); Stewart v. State, 473 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971) and cf. Minafee v. State, 482 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The judgment is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the Court.