Esmond v. EsmondEsmond v. Esmond
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Willis
delivered the opinion of the court.
Cornelius W. Esmond died testate, March 16, 1906,” leaving him surviving no widow, four sons and two daughters. His will was admitted to probate, April 12, 1906, and two sons were appointed executors thereof. Their inventory filed April 21, 1906, showed that he died seized of about fourteen hundred acres of land and more than $40,000 in notes and accounts. Among the notes were three signed by Samuel C. Esmond, a son, for, respectively, the sums of $1240, $840, and $3,708. The note for $3,708 was dated September 19, 1891, due five years “after date with interest at 5% per annum, on which interest payments were endorsed to September, 1893. A writing in the following words and figures was found among the effects of the deceased:
‘ ‘ State of Illinois, f County of Cook. 1s
Whereas, I, Samuel C. Esmond, have received of my father, Cornelius W. Esmond, certain sums of money, which is evidenced by- three promissory notes, executed by me and delivered to my father, which notes are now held by him; now in consideration of my said father’s foregoing collections of said notes at this time, I hereby agree and consent that the various amounts for which said notes were given, and the interest due thereon, shall be taken .and considered as an advancement to me, and the same to be so treated in the settlement of his, my father’s estate.
Dated November, 1900.
Provided, the $3,708.00 note may be subject to any defense which I may have against said note, on the final settlement of my father’s estate.
(Signed) Samuel C. Esmond. [Seal.]
Acknowledged by J. H. Fowler.”
On March 12, 1907, the executors filed a report in the Probate Court in which they charged these notes against Samuel C. Esmond or deducted the amount from his distributive share. On May 27, 1907, he
From the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the cross errors assigned.
It is contended that the Probate Court had no power to deduct the amount of the $3,708 note from appellant’s distributive share of the estate; that the executors should have proceeded in a suit at law, and obtained judgment before undertaking to set-off the note against his distributive share; and that by the course pursued, he was deprived of a trial by jury; and that the statute of limitations was a defense.
In support of his contention that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to deduct the amount of this note from his distributive share, appellant invokes the rule laid down in 14 Cyc. 121, and cites early Massachusetts
Executors have the right, and it is their duty to retain a sum equal to the indebtedness of the distributee of an estate, and apply the same in payment thereof before paying any money on his distributive share. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 139 Ill. 368. Probate Courts have • original jurisdiction in the settlement of estates and may exercise equitable as well as legal forms of procedure. Spencer v. Boardman, 118 Ill. 553; Shepard v. Speer, 140 Ill. 238; Bliss v. Seaman, 165 Ill. 422; Heppe v. Szczepanski, 209 Ill. 88. The Probate Court has jurisdiction to settle all questions in determining the distribution of estates, including advancements and indebtedness of legatees and distributees. Spencer v. Boardman, supra; Shepard v. Speer, supra; Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 44; Ames v. Ames, 148 Ill. 321; Blake v. People, 161 Ill. 74. They have that right even if the indebtedness is barred by the statute of limitations. Hurd’s R. S., sec. 17, chap. 83; 1908, Jeffers v. Jeffers, supra; Steere v. Brownell, 124 Ill. 27.
We hold the court has authority to determine the amount of appellant’s indebtedness to the estate, and ■ authorize the executors to deduct such amount from his distributive share. Jeffers v. Jeffers, supra; Hurd’s R. S. 1908, sec. 66, chap. 3; Hayward v. Loper, supra. If there were any doubt on this subject, it is removed in the present case by the writing signed by appellant November 19, 1900, wherein appellant, in consideration of decedent’s foregoing collection of
The statute of limitations is no defense to this note. Hurd’s R. S. 1908, sec. 17, chap. 83; Jeffers v. Jeffers, supra. If it were, the agreement of November 19, 1900, is such a recognition of the note and request to forego its collection at that time, that the statute of limitations would not bar its collection. Moreover, the executors had deducted it from appellant’s distributive share, and had filed their report before the expiration of ten years from the time it was due by its face.
Appellant contends that by the course pursued he was deprived of a trial by jury. It is not true that every person under all circumstances has a right to a trial of his cause by a jury. For instance, if one gives his promissory note for a sum of money secured by a real estate mortgage, if he is sued on
There are many questions arising in the settlement of an estate in the Probate Court between executors and distributees and heirs and persons holding advancements, including the settlement of the accounts of the executors, which are not of a nature to entitle a party to a jury trial. Probate Courts exercise an equitable jurisdiction in all matters that arise in the settlement of estates. We are therefore not satisfied that appellant had a right to a trial by jury. But section 7 of the act establishing Probate Courts provides that: “The Probate Court shall have the power to impanel a jury for the trial of issues or matters of fact in any matter or matters pending before the court.” Therefore, if the matters relating to this note for $3,708 were such that appellant was entitled to a jury trial, then the Probate Court had power to give him that trial under this section just stated, and so did the Circuit Court on appeal. But he did not demand a jury trial. In Heacock v. Hosmer, supra, it was
We are of opinion that there is no reversible error in the record in the respects alleged by appellant, and therefore, without determining whether the Circuit Court should have dismissed appellant’s appeal from the Probate Court, the order is affirmed.
Affirmed.