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Esling v. Krambeck
663 N.W.2d 671
S.D.
2003
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*1 provided employ- provide remedies as his notice day under the 180 rule set prior judicial contract seeking ment to re- forth in essence, SDCL 3-21-2. he view.” Nemazee v. Mt. Sinai Medical action, seeks the benefit of a tort which Center, 109, 477, 56 Ohio St.3d 564 N.E.2d can brought in circuit court without the (1990). remedies, exhaustion of administrative but also seeks to procedures avoid the under This situation is similar to

[¶ 14.] the contract grievances. See O’Toolev. facts this Court’s recent decision in ¶77, SD System, Retirement 2002 SD Services, Department Small v. Social 347. attempted This case, 2003 SD 659 N.W.2d 15. In that route is improper and the circuit court did aggrieved party appeal an failed to not err in granting summary judgment. but, instead, administrative determination directly later went to circuit court assert- [¶ 17.] Affirmed. ing proper because the new of action cause was framed as a GILBERTSON, Justice, Chief ¶ declaratory However, judgment. Id. 8. SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER appeal the failure original to determi- MEIERHENRY, Justices, deprived juris- nation the circuit court of participating. ¶20. diction. Id. This Court held that proceeding attempted with the action contrary

would be to the exhaustion of requirement.

remedies Id. 16. The circuit court correctly de- challenge termined that this to the RIF 2003 SD 59 necessarily comply decision to had with the ESLING, Holly Baker, John J. Paul procedures set forth either SDCL 3-18- Baker, Baker, Meredith, Gloria David 13-46-1, proceeding 15.2 before Steinmeyer Farms, Inc. and Save Cen- to the circuit Though allegations court. Valley Association, Appel- tennial wrongdoing are apparent in Chilson’s affi- lants, davit, argue Chilson did not in the circuit provisions court that the properly file grievance were tolled. “Since the stat- Jerry KRAMBECK, Mayor Spearfish, run, ute of summary limitations had judg- and the Common Council of the presumed ment is to be correct and the Spearfish and the Lawrence

burden is on [Chilson] establish that the County Commission, appellees. statute of limitations was tolled.” Witte v. No. 22473. ¶34, 9, Goldey, Instead, 269. argues Chilson that because Supreme Court of South Dakota. seeking money he is damages for breach of Argued Jan. 2003. contract inapplicable. those statutes are Through this route attempts Chilson May Decided statutory avoid both the requirements for

challenging the employment decision and

the school grievance procedures. district’s In framing argument, his Chil- attempts

son characterizing avoid

as a tort action because of his failure to *3 Spearfish. zoning, the City

with For designated was to be as an Agricultural Conservation District with AG designation, a Rural Service District tax except county airport, was to which for its zoned use. Rich- of Richards & Reed C. Richards Law- September Dakota, ards, Deadwood, Attorney South rence Commission authorized its appellants. chairperson annex- sign Lawrence Fitzgerald, John ation to include the Outka, Bruce Attorney, State’s *4 time, airport. At same under SDCL the Attorney, Dead- County Deputy State’s 9-4-5, the Lawrence Commission Dakota, wood, Attorneys appel- for South passed a the an- approving motion County. lee Lawrence nexation of described in unplatted lands Hood, Dardis, Nies & Lester Nies of later, petition. Spearfish A week Dakota, ap- Spearfish, Attorney South for Planning a hearing Commission scheduled al. pellee Krambeck et voluntary petition, on the annexation public published hearing notice of on the KONENKAMP, Justice. later, Approximately matter. one month of a appeal In this from a denial Spearfish Planning Commission held certiorari, circuit we review the writ public Despite objections hearing. its Spearfish City ruling court’s here, territory under a volun- lawfully annexed unanimously Commission recommended tary petition for annexation. We affirm. approve City Council the annex- notices, petition. published ation After

Background City public hearings Council held three on petition A voluntary annex- [If following annexation. The presented under 9-4-1 was ation adopted unanimously: actions Reso- were Spearfish Planning Commission for annexation, lution 2001-33 Ordinance zoning. concurrent for zoning, and Ordinance 905 for the locally known as property involved rural service district. Valley.” It coun- includes the “Centennial ranches, Daryll ty airport, few small Council found Ranch), territory value Propp (formerly Frawley subject land total to vol $1,913,730 peti- untary and the John ranch. The annexation was and that $1,435,298 approximately signed owners tioned consisted value (89.94%)1 2,000 acres shared common border the annexation In cal County Airport Lawrence 440.00 acres no assessed 950,000 (insured value) hanger $ Public structure Airport Private Lessees Custis, 23,030 P. $ Daniel Jr. * 15,940 $ Duane Berke 15,280 Krogstad $ Rich 6,190 $ Bill Povandra 108,280 $ Ted J. Miller culating territory, the total value of the change “The the annexed area Spearfish included the contrary insured val to the initiated ordinance.” County Airport public ue Standard of Review hanger privately and the value of the Our review of certiorari airport hangers ground owned on leases.2 proceedings is limited to whether chal court, officer, To overturn the lenged board, or tribunal applicants filed for a writ of certiorari. had and whether it regularly decision, its the circuit pursued court subtracted authority. Spearfish Peters v. privately airport Comm’n, the value of the 105, 6, ETJ Planning value, hangers from the finding total 883. Certiorari proceed the private owners did not constitute ings “cannot be used to examine evidence of ... the ... territory sought purpose “owners to for the of determining the correct Nevertheless, be annexed.”3 the court finding....” ness of a Willard v. Civil public Falls, held that the insured value of the Service Bd. Sioux 75 S.D. hanger properly (1954). included the total Constru value of the ing and that the a statute entails answering question *5 law; thus, of more owners than three-fourths of the we review the circuit court’s signed total value had petition. statutory The interpretation Ridley de novo. applicants appeal, asserting following Comm’n, Laurrence 2000 SD (1) ¶ 143, 5, (citations errors: “The and county exceeded 619 N.W.2d omitted): their authority accepting the values purpose The statutory con voluntary used in the petition.” struction is to discover the true intention (2) “The authority exceeded since of its the law which pri is be ascertained (3) the annexed area contiguous.” is not marily from the language expressed in the 165,720 Star Aviation $ Other Estate Tracts Real Ranches, Frawley 130,530 Inc. $ 404.77 acres 87,830

William Carlstrom $ 154.57 acres 49,220 Richard Carlstrom $ Family 185,070 Uttke Limited Pt. $ 280.00 acres * 176,640 John H. $ 797.24 acres $1,913,730 Total $1,435,298 of Value 75% $1,721,150 Value of Petitioners Percentage Petitioners of Value 89.94% * non-petitioner Denotes 2. Airport improve- The Lawrence properly total value of the within the boundaries, ments located including $1,595,230. within its without the leased is Of privately hangers ground on leases amount, petitioners accounted for public hanger building. and the The annex- $1,402,650 percent or 87.93 of the total value. signed by ation owners Thus, required value was well over the private hangers, which were assessed for tax statutory minimum amount of not less than purposes property. as real three-fourths of the total value of the seeking annexation.

3. We need not review the correctness of the circuit court’s decision to exclude the value of private hangars ground. on leased Anderson, only term means City v. “value” SDCL 9-4-1 City Rapid statute. ¶ 7, N.W.2d 291-92 the value” of real 2000 SD “assessed sub- (citations omitted). The intent of a ject statute and there- Legislature fore, upheld from what the is determined the circuit court erred when it think said, than we it should rather what city’s decision include insured phrases Id. in a said. Words public airport hanger have value of the plain meaning their given must be territory. statute total value of the On Guttormson, 1996 SD and effect. Moss v. precise point, the statute is silent. ¶ (citations 76, 10, 551 N.W.2d omit- Accordingly, we must as [¶ ted). statutes, presume we interpreting meaning certain the of the term “value” as not Legislature did intend Statutory used in 9-4-1. wording review a trial result. Id. We absurd given ordinary meaning, unless it clearly fact under the findings of court’s appears from the context another and its erroneous standard conclusions meaning is intended. Douville v. Chris the de standard. law under novo ¶ tensen, 33, 11, 2002 SD ¶ 146, 5, Rapp, SD Marion v. not statutory When term is de 88, 90. N.W.2d fined, according it we construe to its ac cepted usage. Spearfish Planning ETJ

Analysis Decision Comm’n, at Territory 1. Value ordinary meaning at 885. The of the term first contend that price “value” “the monetary worth declaring prop- court it the circuit erred services, something; goods, the amount of city to insured er for the use the or money something will command in *6 public hanger. argu- To address this the an exchange.” Dictionary Black’s Law ment, language of 9- we review the SDCL (7th ed.1999). 1549 Voluntary that 4-1. under [¶ Several courts have declared that requires petition statute must be (1) in voluntary annexations the “assessed val- by than signed: not less three-fourths (2) voters, property ue” of the must be used. But registered by of the and the those cases all dealt with statutes owners of not less than three-fourths of territory sought the the word or some the value of to be included “assessed” vari- State, The annexed.4 SDCL 9-4-1. ation of it. Phoenix 58 of challenge 8, (1941); Ariz. do not the first element.5 Rath- 117 P.2d 87 Thain v. City Alto, er, the they dispute whether second re- Palo 273 78 Cal. Cal.App.2d met, (1969); quirement regarding Rptr. Spo- was the “value 240 Johnson v. kane, territory.” They Wash.App. insist the 19 577 P.2d 164 provides part: territory sought 4. SDCL 9-4-1 to be to the mu- nicipality. governing body municipality, upon of a receipt petition describing aof written appears registered It that there five vot- are any territory contiguous boundaries to ers, Carlstrom, and Jane Richard William municipality sought be annexed to Carlstrom, Meyer, Gwen and Steven who re- may by municipality, in- resolution territory seeking side within annexation. part any clude such or thereof signed voluntary petition All five for an- petition Therefore, municipality if the within such over nexation. well three-fourths signed by not less than three-fourths of the registered residing in the voters area by registered signed seeking voters owners of not as re- quired by less than three-fourths value of SDCL 9-4-1.

677 (1978). contrast, appurtenant land; 9-4-1 does not which is incidental SDCL “value of the terri- and that which expressly by state that the is immovable law.” value. If SDCL tory” Accordingly, must be the assessed 43-1-3. it proper was to limit for the Legislature city had intended “value” consider value of the value,” certainly airport to “assessed it could have land and value of airport specific statutory hanger Johnson, done so. di- affixed to land. Without See therefore, rection, think question Wash.App. (city we 577 P.2d 164 comes down to a of reasonableness. property matter was included the valua tion property seeking annexation); for certiorari [¶ 10.] With review Thain, 400, 401, Cal.App.2d 78 Cal. limited whether the question (“ Rptr. 240 the territory’ ‘value of means jurisdiction had whether it regularly improvements the value of land and there ask, we pursued authority, did the on”). act in or in an excess its- authority? irregular pursuit of its Given Second, was it reasonable scope the broad of the word “value” in to use the insured of the county 9-4-1, only appli unreasonable Or, owned hanger? put another way, how cation of the statute would constitute an should the property value the Lawrence Thus, jurisdiction. act excess of the County Airport reasonably determined? city’s “action sustained unless in will be Again, the silent statute is on how the did some act proceedings [its] forbid [it] this, should be valued. Given by neglected den law or to do some act any reasonable method valuation would required by Valley law.” Centennial Save course, appropriate. seem Of Ass’n, Schultz, Inc. v. hanger appraised could have had (S.D.1979) v. State Bd. (citing State Johnson, county assessor. See Assessment Equalization, S.D. (even Wash.App. though 577 P.2d (1892)). 53 N.W. tax, exempt from county assessor assess the property could First, was it reasonable purposes). valuation Or it could have include the owned han value of the private had a appraisal. nothing But ger purposes SDCL 9-4-1? We *7 our particular type ap law mandates a of County, conclude that it Lawrence was. praisal in a showing this instance. Absent body politic, right as a underinsured, that the building was its Spearfish proper to include its replace insured value the cost of reflects ty city within the limits. After it is deter totally destroyed. ment should it be mined that of the property the owner question may properly petition pur- for that for the volun We conclude poses 9-4-1, tary 9-4-1 directs the insured value of SDCL SDCL city hangar value of a valuation. consider the was reasonable (the County’s territory airport) seeking scope ann Our limited to whether review is “territory,” exation.6 The term as used had and whether it 9-4-1, synonymous regularly pursued authority. Spearfish SDCL with the Comm’n, property Planning term “area” and real ETJ 1997 SD 105 at within ¶ 6, view, “land; that property area. Real consists of at our N.W.2d 883. land; authority. that which is affixed that acted within its 9-4, pronouncement publicly property explicit There is no in the should be statutes, municipal any implication. Chapter SDCL excluded is there such nor Next, city’s ac applicants seeking Clearly, contend annexation. [¶ relationship legit tions a rational to a of the insured value bore use purpose. imate find no airport hanger government to determine val- We public protection violation equal rights. 9-4-1 violates purposes of SDCL ue for They rights. believe their constitutional Although appli valuation methods the two different they suffered specify cants do not whether (i.e. public hanger of the the insured value or due procedural denial of substantive of the real assessed value and the process that neither rights, we conclude by the to deter- purposes) tax used process due has been violated. Procedural value of the mine the protects rights, certain substantial such as equal protection pro- and due their violates life, liberty, property, that cannot be of applicant valuation rights. The cess deprived except accord with constitu the value of land included both Esling’s tionally procedures. adequate Tri as calculated improvements and the land Ass’n, County, Inc. v. Brule Landfill purposes. for tax by the assessor (Tri SD 619 N.W.2d 10-6-35. SDCL IT) (citations omitted). Procedural process only “is requires due flexible and equal traditional 15.] Under [¶ procedural protections particu such as the analysis, clear from test it is protection (citations lar situation demands.” Id. Meidinger, Aberdeen v. 89 S.D. omitted). (1975), 412, 415, implicate any legiti 9-4-1 does not Applicant Esling received classes, suspect or funda macy, gender, personal containing letter the annexation un rights be reviewed mental and should petitions attorney and his attended the first the rational basis test. Under the der public hearing Planning before Com test, SDCL 9-4-1 prong Meidinger Likewise, all hearing mission. notices of people. Lyons v. applies equally to all published, duly were and notice Laboratories, A Div. Lederle American clear, public, applicants timely, (S.D. Co., Cyanamid unequivocal. None of the were 1989). peti inclusive of all The statute is life, Ap deprived liberty, property. are tioners who owners within plicant Esling, example, continues to uses single the annexed formerly property, own his which was arbitrary No classifi standard: “value.” currently zoned agricultural zoned Likewise, prong cation exists. the second Agricultural as an Dis AG Conservation Meidinger test has been met. City of Spearfish trict within the and is used to method ascertain bears proper under a Rural Service District for relationship between the classifica rational *8 ty purposes. tax government in legitimate tion and some presented Similarly, The a no substan [¶ 18.] terest. was with voluntary petition territory process to annex it tive due violation has been shown. process and “A of contiguous to be within the violation substantive due deemed path community growth. types governmen occurs when ‘certain of natural Under 9-4-1, then tal the required [breach] the was acts Due Process Clause SDCL im regardless procedures met the minimum used to petition confirm that ” plement County In Tri requirements. value and voter deter them.’ Landfill Ass’n, 32, “value,” on Brule mining indepen County, relied Inc. v. ¶10, (2002) (Tri territory of “value” for the 151 dent evidence

679 III). statute, process Substantive due Under the term with an analysis examination begins “contiguous” “territory separated includes ¶ 13, at Id. allegedly “interest violated.” from municipality by reason of inter- 151-52. 641 N.W.2d at Under Tri vening ownership of used golf land as a III, that applicants are unable to show any by or land course the State of they protected property have a interest any South Dakota or subdivisions thereof.” being applicants not annexed. The cannot 9-4-1. Our review of cases other deprived validly they that have been argue jurisdictions “contiguous” reveals that has jurisdiction, they because interpreted “adjacent,” been to mean “ad- in a protected property have no interest or joining,” having a “substantial common Furthermore, particular zoning law. even ¶ Anderson, boundary.” 77 2000 SD at Esling protected proper- if had a applicant (citations omitted). at 293 N.W.2d interest, ty he has not demonstrated that Here, the annexed of assessed for his use adjoins physically The city. public insured value and for the County Airport, land owned a subdivi- ¶ 11, “truly at hanger was irrational.” Id. Dakota, sion of the State South shares a ¶ 20, at a 153. To sustain Spearfish. common border with the process claim founded on a substantive due Further, length SDCL 9-4-1. total zoning dispute, applicants show must territory the annexed from east to west is “government’s that action ‘suffi- miles, more than three the depth and ciently ‘truly or irrational.’” outrageous’ territory ranges north to south from ¶ (citations Id. at N.W.2d at one-half mile to one-half one and miles. omitted). conclude that and We applicants’ This fact defeats the contention the other were full due applicants afforded is the type this of annexation com- process protection equal under the “corridor,” monly “strip,” referred to as a law. lasso,” or “shoestring,” “long disallowed by majority courts, including Contiguous Territory ¶ Anderson, Court. 77 at SD 19.] The con (citations omitted). sum, N.W.2d at finding tend that the circuit court erred in territory contigu- we conclude territory “contigu annexed was city, ous to shares a common border of Voluntary ous.” annexation under SDCL width, length any reasonable lacks 9-4-1 requires be physical or significant irregular barriers “contiguous.” appli annexed must be shapes, unjustified no narrow cor- argue cants question enclaves, ridors, islands unannexed Spearf is not to the “contiguous” City of territory. argument ish. This fails in both law and Next, we whether consider contiguous, fact. To be terri (1) encompasses community tory contiguous city, must: (2) and is interests, interests natural and reasonable. encompass community of (3) city documented in detail consider- a natural constitute and reasonable Anderson, ation of the inclusion. 77 at SD *9 292; finding that annexation encom- Rapid 612 N.W.2d at Krebs v. and its City of (S.D.1985); passed In City, Big community a of interests. addi- N.W.2d Streeter, tion, petitioners Sioux v. that “we Township 272 N.W.2d stated share (S.D.1978). community a common bond and interest n with Zoning Spearfish and wish to be community.” contributing members Finally, applicants [¶ 25.] designa change contend that the Big Township, Sioux Agriculture zoning tion A-l to an from AG at Court wrote: N.W.2d this in the Agricultural Conservation District annexation natural and reasonable [a] contrary initiated annexed area is to the following justifica- may result from the county zoning ordinance. In June orderly from the resulting a need tions: County passed a the voters of Lawrence development and of the munici- growth county zoning ordinance initiative pal corporation; an outflow benefits response Ranch proposed Frawley to the including and facilities to the services development. recognized The ordinance a outlying territory correspond- without portions that of the annexed terri certain monetary inflow of contribution for ing historically tory designated been as have in an resulting uncompen- such benefits Agriculture by A-l the Lawrence municipal corpora- burden to the sated Comprehensive Plan Zoning and Ordi tion; need expressed or an provided nance. The initiated ordinance and outlying territory has services change no of Centennial municipal corporation facilities that the Valley period a approved be allowed for provide. and to willing is able years. of six Krebs, at 130-31. See also 9^4, city Under SDCL ch a has Here, city that the annexation found authority contiguous to annex territo- reasonable, natural since it was and ry. Municipal subject ap- annexation compatible County’s with com- proval county if the by the commissioners Moreover, plan. the annexed prehensive unplatted, in this territory is as it was within territory is the boundaries case. 9-4-5. Lawrence Coun- SDCL protection Spearfish Department Fire fire ty authority ap- had the Commissioners district, 40-2, Spearfish District School Furthermore, prove the annexation. the retail trade and medical service language of the initiated ordinance did not city. area of the The annexation encom- limit authority commissioners’ passes community a of interests and is approve A proposed annexation. natural and reasonable. city comprehensive planning powers corporate within its and can also limits contend that the zone all within miles of its three a improperly long annexation excluded es- corporate concurrently limits with development located tablished residential county zoning commission. ch 11-2 SDCL adjacent airport property. to the This 11-4; ch Lincoln compelling if argument might city (S.D.1977). Johnson, But initiated the annexation. this is a Although and the residents of has never Court development may did not seek to be an- the issue of a addressed whether territory upon contrary nexed. not zone We conclude did ordinance, jurisdic- authority ap- county zoning exceed its other proving petition. The an- tions have. These courts have held it has “contiguous,” territory, nexed once annexes encom- interests, ter- passes zoning jurisdiction is a over that community exclusive Lomond, ritory. natural and inclusion Ben Inc. v. Idaho reasonable Falls, 209, 212 City Spearfish. P.2d 92 Idaho

681 City (1968) County cease to 1. The and im- (county zoning [¶ 33.] ordinances properly Taylor diluted the city); land annexed to v. value of Es- apply to 837, by 726, ling’s property Bowen, including air- 272 N.C. 158 S.E.2d (after port property (N.C.1968) county in the lost valuation. zone); City South San jurisdiction is fundamentally It unfair to Berry, Cal.App.2d Francisco sweep up unwilling in a landowner “vol- (1953) (same); P.2d untary” expedi- the simple Planning & & County Louisville Jefferson using ent county-owned value of Fortner, 243 Zoning Comm’n v. S.W.2d dilute property to the value of unwill- (same). (Ky.App.1951) ing property. landowner’s owns Here, then, the initiated [¶ 28.] total area 38% of the of the real in estate once the zoning apply ordinance ceased this annexation. Absent value as- county’s territory was removed from the signed airport Esling’s property, this rea- jurisdiction by annexation.7 For property constitutes 30.5% of the total val- son, it matters not whether the zoned property.8 ue of the There could not have agricultural as residential. the land as “voluntary” been a annexation of this land authority. city properly exercised its including county- without the value of the respect, the cir- disagree In one we with property Esling’s because refusal to prema- cuit issue was court sign petition would have been fatal hold, instead, has Spearfísh ture. We pro- the annexation effort. SDCL 9-4-1 exclusive to zone the petition part vides long- and that the no territory is signed by annexation must be “the owners subject county zoning to the initiated er of not less than three value fourths of the ordinance. territory sought to be annexed!.]” Affirmed. It was unreasonable to include the [¶ 29.] airport property determining Justice, GILBERTSON, Chief peti- value of the annexation MEIERHENRY, and ZINTER generally tion. exclud- Public Justices, concur. determining ed in value for annexation. public streets, example, alleys, park- For SABERS, Justice, dissents. ways e.g. are sidewalks excluded. See .SABERS, Justice, (dissenting). Holmes, County City Denver v. (1965). I dissent actions of P.2d because the Colo. 902-3 right case were annex- ation, illegal. unreasonable and should not to do right but it have the properties review of the record 8. A reveals that The amount and value of the Spearfish immediately zoned the involved are: upon annexation. 440 Acres No assessed value $950,000

Hangar: Appraised Value: Real Estate Ranches, $130,530

Frawley Inc: 404.77 acres 87,830 $ Carlstrom: 154.57 acres $185,070 Family Uttke LP: 280 acres $176,640. Esling: 797.24 acres *11 Second, surrounding [¶ of landown- there is no “outflow of expense 39.] so at the County that will be liable properties jus- ers. It is not the to the services” annexed to taxation, it is and the municipal tify for corresponding the need inflow of not be property fact, of should diluted his compensation. by annexing In not by the purposes entity for annexation adjacent airport, the to the the subdivision of will not bear the burden annex- which the annexing received the benefits ation. pro- the other without burden The annexed was viding 35.] 2. services.

[¶ natural or reasonable inclu- not a Third, expressed [¶ there is 40.] no only therefore is artificial- sion and need for for this services annexed territo- ly contiguous. ry. Finally, City if willing the City The land annexed provide able to and facilities for services inclusion and not a natural or reasonable developed this subdivision only artificially contiguous. therefore is should have been included in the annex- an- support of determination ation. natural in- and reasonable nexation was stated, Simply County the City, clusion, majority “the opinion states developer Propp land to be wanted was natural City found that mind, annexed. With this ultimate in goal reasonable, it was compatible since they only property necessary annexed comprehensive County’s with Lawrence contigu- to the Propp physically make land by finding simply plan.” This City. ous to the This is not a reasonable rezoning led to untrue. The annexation extension, merely legal ploy natural it is area in direct contravention of the get developer, to what and Coun- prohibited which initiated ordinance such ty get voters; not rezoning could from the Furthermore, zoning changes. annex- land Exit 17 so around that it could excluded the residential subdivision ation in developed piecemeal fashion. adjacent airport property which is County [¶ 3. The acted unrea- strip in a into extends sonably ignoring the initiated or- Exhibit A attached property. See hereto dinance. Voluntary Map. Annexation as annexation meets 37.] This none of County’s disregard [¶ blatant majority opinion the criteria cited of the voter’s initiated un- ordinance was Big Township Sioux from determine Propp Spearf- reasonable. and the whether the annexation is reasonable and years change ish been battling have (S.D.1978). natural. 272 N.W.2d 924 the zoning purpose around Exit 17 for the piecemeal development property. of this First, it does not result from County voters Lawrence have con- orderly growth orderly because sistently and ef- legally thwarted those strip not have an growth does unannexed attempt by forts. The last the voters of the A, Voluntary in the See exhibit middle. to make will County their known was Map Annexation attached hereto. This pro- initiated ordinance of June 2001 which a similar at- Court reversed part: vided Anderson, Rapid City City of tempt where [w]hereas narrow city attempted strip Comprehensive annex a Plan areas that airport proper- agricul- land in to annex the been as A-l designated order have ty- compliance Compre- ture with the Zoning Plan and Ordinances that when a hensive Commission disre- *12 agriculture gards A-l zones be the clear intent require comprehensive of a plan allow areas of it authority. maintained to suitable exceeds its e.g. See Save County Valley to be retained Centennial Association Inc. v. Schultz, uses,[and] (S.D.1979). prevent scat- agricultural non-farm, development ... history [b]e tered Given the and the de- change zoning veloper, it ordained that no was aware that approved pe- City’s step ... be or allowed for a first change would years riod of six from the date of By signing this area. the volun- of this ordinance. adoption tary petition, the Commission disregarded the desire of its constituents (emphasis supplied). question There is no and exceeded authority. This behind in this ordinance is di- language run scenes end un- overreaching, rectly development proper- aimed at illegal reasonable and and should not be ty surrounding City, Exit 17. Now the sanctioned this Court. developer simply have found way around improper get the will of We should order the circuit County. the voters We have held court to vacate this annexation.

Case Details

Case Name: Esling v. Krambeck
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: May 21, 2003
Citation: 663 N.W.2d 671
Docket Number: None
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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