62 A.2d 900 | Pa. | 1948
These appeals are from an order made in an escheat proceeding. The appellee has filed motions to dismiss which are denied for reasons which we shall hereinafter state.
The proceeding under review involves $92,800 in paper currency of the United States of America in various denominations found, as the petition of the escheator avers, by one Benjamin Lieberman in a corrugated box or carton, securely tied with cord, in the cellar of a house, owned and occupied by him and his wife, at 2131 So. 4th Street, Philadelphia, and found, moreover, in circumstances indicating that the money had been voluntarily and intentionally placed or hidden where it was found. The petition further avers that the money was not Lieberman's; that he had no knowledge of how it came to be where he found it; and that he had voluntarily turned it over to the Philadelphia Bureau of Police where it came into the protective custody of James H. Malone, Director of Public Safety. For the discharge *54 of his duty in the premises, Malone rented a safe deposit box in a central city bank in the name of "The Director of Public Safety of Philadelphia" and therein deposited the money where it has since remained and still is. In addition to the matters just stated, the petition set forth the due appointment of the escheator; that the money is without a rightful owner; and that it is in the custody of Director Malone as trustee, bailee or depositary. The petition concluded with a prayer for a summons against the custodian, public notice of the proceeding by advertisement and an adjudication escheating the money to the Commonwealth.
Following due publication of the notice required by the preliminary order of court, appearances were entered and answers were filed for three separate claimants or groups of claimants, viz., one by Lieberman and his wife who claimed ownership of the money as the finders thereof and as the owners of the property where it was found, another, by creditors of a bankrupt milk company who claimed the money as the rightful property of the bankrupt whose bookkeeper Lieberman had been, and the third by the administrator of a decedent who, it was averred, was the owner of the money and had hidden it in the house at 2131 So. 4th Street, Philadelphia, for purposes of concealment. Each of the answers claimed the money for the respective respondents. The answer by the creditors of the bankrupt milk concern also included a prayer that the petition for escheat be dismissed on the ground that the funds were not subject to escheat under the laws of the Commonwealth. A substituted trustee of the bankrupt's estate was later granted leave to intervene to pursue the claim of the bankrupt company and its creditors.
On these pleadings, a hearing was entered upon by the court below. At the outset of the hearing, the Liebermans formally withdrew their claim to the money as the finders thereof or as the owners of the property where it was found and, in lieu thereof, claimed status as informers *55 in the escheat proceeding and the compensation to which the law entitled them as such. Before the taking of testimony on the remaining claims had been completed, the motion to dismiss the proceeding was formally renewed. Further hearing on the claims was postponed, argument on the motion was had and, thereafter, to wit, on May 20, 1948, the learned trial judge entered an order which, without expressly directing the dismissal of the escheat proceeding, did as much, in effect, by awarding the money in suit to the Commonwealth, not as an escheat but upon a theory of reversion to the sovereign apparently evolved from the ancient law of treasure trove. The award was not made in reliance upon Sec. 3 (6) of the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 80 (20 Pa.C.S.A. § 1.3) applicable where a decedent dies intestate leaving property and survived by no one capable of inheriting under the Act. To the order entered, the claimants filed exceptions which, after argument, were dismissed by the court en banc in an order entered on July 6, 1948. The two remaining claimants, or claimant groups, took these several appeals on July 12 and July 15, 1948. On September 22, 1948, the court, sua sponte, entered an order as of July 6, 1948, designed merely to clarify the order of that date.
The ground on which the appellee has moved to dismiss the appeals is that they were taken either belatedly or prematurely, depending upon whether the order of May 20, 1948, or of September 22, 1948, is considered the appealable order; Sec. 12 of the Escheat Act of 1889, P. L. 66, 27 P. S. § 45, requires that an appeal from a decree of escheat be taken within thirty days of the filing of the adjudication, and the instant appeals were not taken, as already noted, until July 12th and 15th. The appellee argues that inasmuch as "efforts at rehearings do not extend the appellate period fixed by statute" (citing Commonwealth v. Irwin,
Coming to the merit of the appeals, it is apparent from what we have already indicated that the order *57
entered below must be reversed. At the procedural stage which the litigation had reached, the question for decision was whether the escheator's petition averred a prima facie case for escheat. And, such continues to be the justiciable question here. Whether the Commonwealth might be able to claim the fund as treasure trove is not presented by the record in this case. Anything we might say, therefore, in that connection would be but a dictum at best, the same as in the one case in this State where the law of treasure trove was discussed but not followed:Huthmacher v. Harris's Administrators,
It is, of course, the duty of a petitioner for escheat "clearly to aver a case within some act or acts of assembly":Commonwealth ex rel. v. Pennsylvania Co.,
A further instance wherein the court below deemed the petition deficient was in its averment that there was no known rightful or legal owner of the money. The learned trial judge held that the averment to such effect was but a conclusion of law and, forthwith, discarded it as an insufficient pleading. An averment of a legal status, or the lack of it, of course does rest upon a legal conclusion. But, such an averment is also one of fact in the sense that there is no known person capable of supplying the factual incidents necessary to the creation of the legal status of ownership. And, that is the meaning to be imputed to the petition. How else, it may be asked, could an averment that property is without a rightful or legal owner be pleaded? An averment to such effect is obviously essential to an escheat proceeding. The court below denominated the things done or performed with or concerning the money after Lieberman found it as "nonoperative facts" and said that they were without legal influence or effect upon the question *59 of ownership. So much is correct, but the fact that the money ultimately came into the hands of a trustee or depositary, where it now is, is of materiality to the question as to the propriety of escheat.
The remaining objection advanced to the petition is that it avers the circumstances of the finding of the money by the Liebermans (on their own property, moreover) and that, consequently, there is a finder's qualified ownership to be imputed to them (cf. Warren v. Ulrich, supra) which directly controverts the averment of the petition that the money is without a rightful or lawful owner. The fact is, as already stated, that the Liebermans disclaimed formally of record any right to the money as the finders thereof; and, as they are under no legal duty or obligation to press such a claim, their disclaimer, so far as they are concerned, is effective, and the money is, consequently, without a known rightful or lawful owner. Furthermore, the petition directly avers that Lieberman was not the owner of the money and that he had denied having any knowledge of the owner or how the money came to be where he found it. Even had the Liebermans not disclaimed any right to the money as the finders, the question of law as to whether the facts established a finder's right in them to qualified ownership of the property would still be a matter for adjudication under the pleadings in the escheat proceeding. Jurisdiction of subject matter never depends upon whether or not relief is grantable under the proven facts: see DeWaele v.Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
Our conclusion is that the petition pleads a prima facie case of escheat under the laws of the Commonwealth and that the matter should be proceeded with to full and complete hearing and a final adjudication of all issues involved.
Order reversed with a procedendo; costs to abide the final outcome. *60