214 N.W. 12 | Minn. | 1927
Lead Opinion
Defendant is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan. Plaintiff, a nonresident of Minnesota, prosecuted this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered in Illinois because of defendant's negligence at a time when plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's trains. The cause of action did not arise out of any business transacted in Minnesota. Defendant owns and operates a line of road between Chicago and points in Wyoming and another line between Chicago and the Black Hills in South Dakota. It has numerous branch lines. It is located in Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska and Wyoming. It crosses this state and has several branches in Minnesota. It has about 650 miles of road in this state with the usual railroad equipment and stations. One of the branch lines extends into Goodhue county wherein this action was commenced.
The statutes of this state authorize the service of a summons upon any railroad company by delivering a copy thereof to any ticket or freight agent of such company within the county in which the action is begun. G.S. 1923, § 9233.
Every foreign corporation is required, in order to transact business in this state, to appoint, in writing, an agent duly authorized to accept service of process and upon whom service of process may be had. G.S. 1923, § 7493. Defendant complied with this statute and the service in this case was made upon its duly authorized agent.
1. The established policy in this state permits the suing of transitory actions, against foreign corporations, regardless of the place where the cause of action arose, if they may be reached by *89
process. Herrick v. M. St. L. Ry. Co.
2. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." U.S. Const. art.
The case of State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, supra, however, involved a case brought under the federal employers liability act which specifically gave jurisdiction to the state court. Doll v. C.G.W.R. Co.
3 4. Defendant seeks to escape the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that by such action interstate commerce is unduly burdened and, hence, the statute attempting to authorize the service was ineffectual. Its claim centers about the cases of Davis v. Farmers Co-Op. Equity Co.
The gist of the decision in the Davis, as well as the Wells case, was the fundamental falsity of the particular statute, involved in each case, to permit a citizen and resident of another state to prosecute in the particular state a cause of action which arose elsewhere *90 against a railroad corporation of another state, which was engaged in interstate commerce, which neither owned nor operated a railroad in the particular state and which had not consented to be sued therein. The falsity of the statute consisted in its converting a mere soliciting agent into one capable of accepting service in actions of every kind. Many railroads have soliciting agents in most of the states and if all the states adopted a similar statute it would have a far-reaching effect and subject the company to litigation far from its real territory. It was held that such statutes would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Federal control was also emphasized. The disturbing element of interference with interestate commerce, under federal control, is particularly objectionable because the courts are jealous of the right of the public to have public servants give their undivided efforts and attention to their usual and ordinary duties.
In our judgment there is a distinction between a foreign corporation having only a soliciting agent in a state where it owns no property and where, as in the case at bar, it is an important factor in the business industry of the state. Defendant's large local holdings and commercial activities in Minnesota make it impossible to distinguish its position before our courts from residents of the state. For all practical purposes defendant is physically here. The courts have control over it. We need not consider theoretically whether a corporation may be present in a foreign jurisdiction. People's Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co.
Plaintiff's counsel argues that by filing the statutory prerequisite as a condition upon which it may do business in this state defendant has impliedly agreed to be bound thereby. The state may not require defendant to surrender its constitutional rights as a condition to its doing business in the state. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
Our statute requires that a foreign corporation doing business in our state shall submit to the jurisdiction of our courts by appointing an agent upon whom service of process may be had. This is a reasonable exercise of power to regulate business. It does not, in itself, impose an improper burden upon interstate commerce. Int. Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
It has long been settled that the presence in the state of a mere soliciting agent and nothing more does not make a foreign corporation present in the state so as to subject it to a suit and process of the state courts. People's Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co.
We must recognize the fact that under the circumstances of this case, keeping in mind the privilege clause of the constitution, it was reasonable to take jurisdiction. If so jurisdiction usually exists. F. M. Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank (D.C.) 286 F. 566; *93
32 Harv. Law Rev. 871, 885. The theory of being present in the state has done much to modify the rule requiring consent. 30 Harv. Law Rev. 676, 694. Defendant's engagement in business in the state doubtless commits it to a recognition of the right to serve process under G.S. 1923, § 9233, which is not here involved. Nor must we overlook the fact that interstate commerce does not exempt defendant from suits in the state courts under the same circumstances and at the same place as though it were not engaged in interstate commerce. Int. Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Harris v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co.
Giving due recognition to defendant's presence in the state and the absence of federal control, there is little in this case to invoke the doctrine of the Davis case. The burden to interstate commerce from this case is trivial. Defendant's line extends from the place of the accident into the county where the cause of action is pending. But defendant does not direct its attack at the burden incident to bringing the necessary witnesses in this specific case. The attack is general and in substance is aimed at what is sometimes referred to as "imported cases" which in themselves do not present a judicial question.
In our view it is not the domicile of a plaintiff which makes the burden to interstate commerce an unreasonable one. Indeed, when interstate commerce is involved there are no state lines. Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co.
The degree of the incidental burden rests more properly upon the distance between the place of trial and the point of origin of the cause of action, and where the amount of the claim is disproportionate to the apparent burden or interference.
Article
We think the authorities urged by defendant are not inconsistent with our conclusion which finds support in Harris v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co. supra; Rosenblet v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co.
5. We hold that G.S. 1923, § 7493, as here involved, does not violate the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
The holding in Davis v. Farmers Co-Op. Equity Co.
We can conceive of no good reason why the trial in Minnesota of a crossing case, for instance against the Milwaukee road, arising in the state of Washington, in favor of a resident of that state, is *96
any less an interference with, and burden upon the interstate operations of that road, than is the trial in Minnesota of a loss and damage claim arising in Kansas in favor of a resident of that state against the Santa Fe railroad. The decision in the Davis case, followed in the Wells case,
"That litigation in states and jurisdictions remote from that in which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees from their customary occupations; and that this impairs efficiency in operation, and causes, directly and indirectly, heavy expense to the carriers; these are matters of common knowledge. Facts, of which we, also, take judicial notice, indicate that the burden upon interstate carriers imposed specifically by the statute here assailed is a heavy one; and that the resulting obstruction to commerce must be serious. During federal control absences of employees incident to such litigation were found, by the Director General, to interfere so much with the physical operation of the railroads, that he issued General Order No. 18 (and 18A) which required suit to be brought in the county or district where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resided at the time it accrued. That order was held reasonable and valid in Alabama Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Journey,
This language of the Supreme Court, in my judgment, is sufficient to cover G.S. 1923, §§ 7493, 9231 and 9233, in so far as those sections permit suits by nonresidents against interstate foreign carriers on causes of action arising outside of the state and originating in transactions not within the state. In so holding, we are not overruling the Schendel case,
By section 6 of the amendment of April 5, 1910, to the federal employers act, a right created in an employe by congressional act was made enforceable in any district where the employer might be doing business at the time of commencing the action, and the jurisdiction of the federal courts was made concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under that act, brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction, may be removed to the federal court. Such being the declaration of congress, and no express legislative act of the state having withheld jurisdiction of actions by nonresident employes upon causes of action arising outside the state, we recognized the right of the employe to enforce his claim where jurisdiction of the cause and the parties had been obtained. If it be said that entertaining such suits unduly burdens interstate commerce, the answer is that congress may, if it chooses, so burden interstate commerce, while the states may not. It was therefore said in the Schendel case that there was a right in the suitor and a corresponding duty in the court.
In the case at bar, there is no such right in the suitor and consequently no corresponding duty in the court. The whole question rests solely upon the commerce clause of the federal constitution. *98 It does not involve the question of citizenship, except as to the non-residence of the plaintiff, and the fact that he may have orderly and efficient administration of justice in the state of his residence and in the state where the cause of action arose is incidental to the matter of the reasonableness of entertaining his suit here. Whether the same limitation should apply to resident citizens of our own state, where their causes of action arise at points remote from the state, out of transaction not had within the state, and whether such limitation shall apply to any action under the federal employers liability act are matters for the consideration of the state legislature. In the instant case, the defendant is subject to service in the county in Illinois where the accident occurred and where plaintiff resides.