24 Ind. App. 335 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1900
Action by appellee against appellant to recover damages for an injury received by appellee while in appellant’s employ. The complaint is in one paragraph. The facts stated therein upon which appellee relies, are, in substance, as follows: Appellant was the owner and engaged in the operation of a planing-mill; appellee was employed in said mill to operate the machinery therein, and to work upon the articles therein manufactured, and for no other purpose. That on the 17th day of September, 1897, a certain part of the machinery in said mill, being an iron shaft thirty-two inches long, and upon which three iron wheels or pulleys carrying rubber belts were fixed, which shaft was held in hangers pendant from the ceiling of the room, became so out of level that it would not properly do the work for which it was intended, and it became necessary, for the proper operation of the machinery, that the said iron shaft and pulleys attached thereto should be taken from the hangers, and one of said wheels or pulleys be removed, and the remaining two pulleys adjusted, and placed farther apart, and the shaft replaced in the hangers at a height of about eight feet from the floor of the room in which the same was located; that by reason of the weight of said shaft and pulleys, which weight appellee alleges was about 150 pounds, and by reason of the overhead position of said shaft, it was liable to fall and injure the person so attempting to adjust the pulleys and replace the said shaft in the hangers, unless aided by an assistant, all of which appellant well knew at said time. That upon the 17th day of September, 1897, appellant ordered and directed appellee to tear down said shaft and pulleys, and remove one of said pulleys, and adjust the two remaining pulleys, and replace said shaft upon the hangers; that appellee thereupon requested appellant to furnish some one to assist in doing said work, but appellant failed and refused to furnish an assistant, but directed and commanded appellee to do said work without any assistance; that appellee, believing, and
The theory of appellee’s complaint is that the injury was the result of appellant’s negligence in ordering appellee to do work out of the line of, and away from the place of, the work he was hired to perform. Under the decisions of this and the Supreme Court, the complaint states a cause of action. Clark County, etc., Co. v. Wright, 16 Ind. App. 630; Stuart v. New Albany Mfg. Co., 15 Ind. App. 184; Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Hoodlet, 129 Ind. 327; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hanning, 131 Ind. 528; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Madden, 134 Ind. 462; Lynch v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 8 Ind. App. 516; Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Holcomb, 9 Ind. App. 198; Kentucky, etc., Co. v. Eastman, 7 Ind. App. 514; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Woodward, 9 Ind. App. 169. The complaint was insufficient upon any other theory.
The jury returned a general verdict in appellee’s favor,
By the genex*al vex’dict, all the material allegations of appellee’s complaint were determined in his favox*, and the general verdict must stand, unless the findings of fact are in irreconcilable conflict therewith. It is only necessary for the overthrow of the general verdict that the special findings be in irreconcilable conflict with any one of the propositions necessary for the support of the general verdict. In every case, in order to maintain a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, he must establish every fact material to his cause of action. If the jury, by their answers to interrogatories, clearly find that any material fact has not been established, the verdict and judgment will be of no effect. Counsel for appellee in their brief say: “We only care to emphasize the fact that the complaint declares oxi an injury occasioned the appellee while engaged in a work, at the command of his master, without the line of his employment.” As has been said in the first part of this opinion, the theory of the complaint, as stated by appellee’s counsel, is correct. Such being the theory of the complaint, it became necessary that appellee establish the fact that when the injury was received, he, by the master’s order, was not working within the line of his employment. This the general verdict necessarily establishes. On the contrary, the special findings of fact show that appellee was injured while engaged in doing the work his employment contemplated, and which he himself undex*stood to be within the line of his employxnent. This finding is in irrecoxxcilable conflict with the general verdict. In this case, the facts established by the answers to interrogatories returned with
The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the lower court to sustain appellant’s motion for judgment upon the answers to interrogatories.