1 Johns. Cas. 319 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1800
With regard to the two first objections, it is sufficient to observe, that it does not appear from the de
Covenants may be taken distributively, according to the subject matter, although there be no express words of severalty. The evident intent of this covenant was, that each congregation should be separately liable for what they stipulated to pay ; and that intent should be carried into effect, as far as the terms will admit. No more is claimed in this action than what may be severally demanded. The breach is not alleged as to any thing that may be deemed a joint undertaking.
It was not necessary to state a request in order to show a breach of the covenant. It is enough that it is alleged to be broken. The request is not a condition precedent. It is not a case in which a request is essential to the right of action. The bringing of the action is, of itself, the legal demand, and it was a duty which the defendants were bound to dis charge without a demand.
The request mentioned in the covenant relates merely to the election which the plaintiff had to demand payment
Judgment for the plaintiff.'
Benigna facienda sunt interpretations propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et verba intewtioni, non, e contra, decent inservire. Co Litt. 36, (a). A liberal construction shall be given to written instruments so as to uphold them if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. Bro. Max. 237-249, supra, 70, 71, n. (a). In Ludlow v. M’Crea, 1 Wend. 228, 231, Sutherland, J. says, “ covenants are to he construed according to their spirit and intent, and where from the subject matter of the covenant, it is the evident intent of the parties that they should be taken distributively, they may be so taken, though there be no express words of severalty.” See also to the same point, Walker v. Webber, 3 Fairf. 65, 67. Comyn. on Contracts, Huntington’s ed. 23. Evans’ Pothier on Obi. P. 1,-c. 1, s. 1, art. 7.
1 Chit. PI. Dunlap’s ed. 287, 288.