The allegations of the cross-action were to the effect that the agent of the plaintiff in the main action was driving in the left lane of the traffic lanes on the right side of the road and that the plaintiff’s agent made a right turn from such lane and drove the plaintiff’s automobile into and against the automоbile being driven by the defendant, damaging it in the amount sued for in the cross-action. Specific acts of negligence were charged to the plaintiff’s agent, and it was further alleged that the defendant’s mother owned the automobile being driven by the defendant at the time of the collision and that she' had assigned her cause of action for such damages to the defendant. Attached as an exhibit to thе cross-action and made a part of the defendant’s pleadings was an assignment of the claim by the defendant’s mother to the defendant.
A cause of action for a tort to property is assignable. Code § 85-1805;
Sullivan
v.
Curling,
149
Ga.
96 (
The one special ground оf the amended motion for new trial is based on the contention that the trial court erred in failing to сharge Section 58 (b) of the “Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways” (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 556, 583; Code, Ann. Supp., § 68-1636 (b)). The plaintiff in the present case argues that it orally requested the court to charge the prоvisions of the 1953 act, supra, after the court had concluded its charge, but before the jury retired. Hоwever, the assignment of error is not that the trial court refused to charge as requested by the plаintiff, but that it was reversible error not to so charge even without a request. The complete chаrge was not made a part of the record.
Code § 70-304 concerning “Exceptions to omissions tо charge jury,” provides in part: “If no approved charge has been filed, a general approval by the judge of the motion for new trial shall be taken as a complete verificatiоn of such ground of the motion.”
*180
This Code section does not mean that approval by the trial judge shаll be conclusive that the trial court erred as alleged in the special ground of the motion for new trial, because, as stated in
Trammell
v.
Shirley,
38
Ga. App.
710, 712 (
Therefore, in the present case, the approval of the special ground оf the motion for new trial does not mean that the provisions of subsection (b) of the Act of 1953, supra, applicable to the case, were not covered by the general charge to the jury, but оnly means that the trial court did not charge this subsection at the conclusion of its charge, before the jury retired, in accordance with the oral request of the plaintiff.
The complete charge is not in the record, and it must be presumed that the court charged correctly the general rules of law applicable to the issues, since the contrary is not manifestly shown.
Woolfolk
v.
Macon & Augusta R. Co.,
56
Ga.
458;
Hunt
v.
Pond,
67
Ga.
578;
Russell
v.
State,
83
Ga. App.
841, 846 (
In support of its general grounds of the motion for new trial the plaintiff contends that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it. There was evidence *181 that the plaintiff’s automobile was approximately nine feet from the right curb, and when the defendant, who was driving in the lane next to the right curb, attеmpted to pass the plaintiff’s automobile, the driver of the plaintiff’s automobile made a right turn and rаn into and damaged the automobile being driven by the defendant. There was also evidence that the defendant’s mother had assigned the right of action to the defendant, as well as evidence as to the amount of damage done to the automobile being driven by the defendant. Therefore, the vеrdict was supported by some evidence, and where there is any evidence to support the verdict of a jury this court will not disturb it.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for new trial as amended.
Judgment affirmed.