Plаintiff appeals from several adverse district court rulings made in this civil action, commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging defendant wrongfully terminated plaintiff’s employment on the basis of his race, whitе. In appeal No. 89-6297, plaintiff asserts ten grounds of error in the trial court proceedings, which ultimately resulted in verdicts in favor of defendant on both claims. In appeal No. 89-6350, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s award of costs to defendant. 1
Plaintiff commenced this action in November 1987, seeking reinstatement, back pay, and actual and punitive damages. Following a trial on the merits, the jury, on June 2, 1988, returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the section 1981 claim. Also on June 2, the trial court, addressing the Title VII claim, made an initial determination in favor of defendant.
On June 10, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, challenging the jury verdict on the section 1981 claim. The district court denied that motion on September 1. Also on September 1, the district court, ruling it was bound by the jury’s determination on the issue of discrimination, reversed its initial determination on the Title VII claim, held in favor of plaintiff and set a hearing on the issue of Title VII relief. The district court held that hearing on September 9, but did not rule on the issue of Title VII relief.
Defendant filed а notice of appeal on September 27,1988, challenging the district court’s September 1 determinations. On December 7, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for new trial, asserting for the first time that the jury verdict on the section 1981 claim was the result of a jury compromise. The district court denied the motion to reconsider, but sua sponte ordered a new trial, determining the jury verdict was the result of a compromise.
The district court conducted a second jury trial, which resulted in a verdict in favor of defendant on the section 1981 claim. The trial court then held in defendant’s favor on the Title VII claim and awarded defendant costs.
The issue presented by plaintiff’s first ground for error in appeal No. 89-6297 is whether the district court’s referral of this action to mandatory, nonbinding arbitration, pursuant to Western District of Oklahomа Local Rule 43, violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial on his section 1981 claim.
See generally Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc.,
Local Rule 43(P)(1) provides, at the request of a party, for a trial de novo before the district court following arbitration. Further, Rule 43(P)(2) provides that “unless the parties have otherwise stipulated, nо evidence of or concerning the arbitration may be received into evidence” during the trial de novo.
The record indicates that, following the arbitration proceedings, the district court conducted a de novo jury trial on plaintiffs section 1981 claim. Referral of this action to arbitration, therefore, did not deny plaintiff his right to a jury trial.
See New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Hughes,
In his second ground for error, рlaintiff asserts the district court erred in considering defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for a new trial because defendant filed the motion to reconsider beyond the ten-day рeriod provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b). 2 Similarly, in his third ground for reversal, plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in sua sponte granting a new trial beyond the ten-day time frame provided by Rule 59(d).
The ten-day period provided by Rule 59 begins to run only from the entry of a final judgment.
Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852
F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.1988);
see generally Coopers & Lyhrand v. Livesay,
Because a final judgment had not yet been entered in this action to commence Rule 59’s ten-day limitations period, the district court’s consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the district court’s order sua sponte granting a new trial did not violate Rule 59. Further, because a court possesses the discretion to revise its interlocutory orders prior to the entry of a final judgment,
Anderson,
The issue presented by plaintiff’s sixth argument on appeal is whether, because defendant had filed a notice of appeal prior to its motion for reconsideration, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial. While the filing of a timely notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction,
e.g., Garcia v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.,
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Plaintiff’s fifth argument on appeal challenges the district court’s imposition of sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney. Plaintiff’s attorney, rather than plaintiff, was the party aggrieved by the district cоurt’s imposition of sanctions and, therefore, was the proper party to appeal from this decision.
Federal Trade Comm’n v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc.,
Plaintiff asserts four arguments on appeal challenging the second jury trial. Plaintiff first asserts that, because the issue of defendant’s liability on the section 1981 claim had been conclusively resolved by the first jury trial, the only appropriate issue to be addressed during the second trial was the issue of damages. The district court granted a new trial aftеr determining that the verdict in the first trial was the result of a jury compromise.
3
“A compromise judgment is one reached when the jury, unable to agree on
liability,
compromises that disagreement and enters a low award оf damages.”
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc.,
Plaintiff next asserts both that the district court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and that the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant was not supported by sufficient evidence. This court reviews the deniаl of a motion for a directed verdict de novo.
Guilfoyle ex rel. Wild v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R. Co.,
Lastly, plaintiff asserts the trial judge erred in making statements prejudicial to plaintiff in the presenсe of the jury. Review of the record fails to indicate any remark made by the trial court which might have prejudiced plaintiff’s case before the jury.
In appeal No. 89-6350, plaintiff challenges the district court’s award of costs to defendant. This court reviews an award of costs under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co.,
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Plaintiff challenges the district court’s taxation of a witness fee of thirty-five dollars per day for defendant’s expert witness. The witness fee for an expert witness who is not court-appointed is limited to the thirty dollar per day limit authorized in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b).
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,
To thе extent appeal No. 89-6297 challenges the district court’s imposition of sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney, that appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We remand appeal No. 89-6350 to the district court for the purpose of reducing the total award of costs by ten dollars.
See, e.g., Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton,
Notes
. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
. In his appellate brief, plaintiff also asserts defendant’s motion for reconsideration was frivolous and requests an award of sanctions against defendant. Appellant's Brief (No. 89-6297), 7. This request is denied.
. Plaintiff does not challenge, on appeal, the merits of the district court’s decision to vacate the verdict reached in the first jury trial because the verdict represented a jury compromise.