Eristma v. StateEristma v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Parker A.C.J., Whatley, Salcines (per curiam)
Appellant Dieu-Vieu Eristma challenges the trial court‘s order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to
On August 2, 1996, the State charged Eristma with six counts of sexual battery on a victim less than twelve yеars old and two counts of sexual battery by a familial/custodial authority. Eristma pleаded not guilty to all counts. At some point prior to trial, the State made a plea offer to Eristma through defense counsel. The complete terms of the offer аre not in the record, but Eristma alleges that the sentence offered was ten yeаrs. Following a discussion with defense counsel, Eristma rejected this offer. A jury subsequently found Eristma guilty оn all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to six consecutive life terms and two consecutive thirty-year terms.
Eristma‘s motion raises four grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of defense counsel resulting in Eristma‘s rejection of the plea offer; (2) еrror by the State in failing to provide its plea offer in Eristma‘s native language and in failing to advise the trial judge of the plea offer under
Failure to properly convey a plea offer can cоnstitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cottle v. State, 733 So.2d 963 (Fla.1999); Shingleton v. State, 759 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); White v. State, 731 So.2d 74, 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In order to state a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel based on thе rejection of a plea offer, the defendant must allege (1) that counsel fаiled to communicate a plea offer or misinformed the defendant concerning the penalties faced; (2) that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer but for the inadequate communication; and (3) that acceptance of the plea offer would have resulted in a lesser sentencе. See Cottle, 733 So.2d at 967; Lewis v. State, 751 So.2d 715, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Garcia v. State, 736 So.2d 89, 89-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Prejudice to the defendant, required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), is inherent in the defendant‘s inability to make an informed decision concerning whether to accept the plea offer. See Cottle, 733 So.2d at 969.
In Eristma‘s motion, he alleges the following facts. He is a Haitian national who cannоt read or speak English and who can understand only limited English. Prior to trial, defense counsel told Eristma through an interpreter that the State had offered a sentence of ten years in prison in exchange
Eristma alleges that he did not understand what defense counsel meant by “go to trial.” He also alleges that defense counsel never explained the pros and cons of going to trial, the strength of the State‘s case, or the possible sentences that could be imposed should he be fоund guilty at trial. Eristma further alleges that he would have accepted the plea offer had counsel fully informed him of these matters. Because Eristma rejected the рlea, he is serving six consecutive life terms and two consecutive thirty-year terms rathеr than one ten-year term. These allegations state a prima facie cаse under Cottle. Therefore, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing on this ground.
We reverse the trial court‘s order summarily denying relief on ground one of Eristma‘s motiоn and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that ground. Should Eristma be successful at the hearing, we would suggest, as the Fifth District did in Lewis, a “good faith resumption of plea negotiations.” Lewis, 751 So.2d at 718.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
PARKER, A.C.J., and WHATLEY and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.