21 N.J. Eq. 283 | New York Court of Chancery | 1871
The argument in this case occupied a week, but learned as it was, it has failed to satisfy me that there is any difficulty, either in ascertaining the legal principles pertinent to the controversy, or in making the proper application of those principles. The facts of the case, so far as relates to 'the present motion, are briefly these:
The complainants are the Erie Bailway Company. The bill sets forth the title of this corporation to a railroad from the city of Paterson to the city of Hoboken, in this state, and that it has been for'some time past in the peaceable occupation and use of such road. I shall assume for present purposes, that- this title is properly pleaded, and that the
It further appears, that the road in question runs through a tunnel which has been cut through Bergen Hill, in Hudson county, near Hoboken. In this tunnel two railway tracks are laid, each adapted to cars of a wide or narrow gauge. The complaint is, that the Morris and Essex Railroad Company, or their lessees, the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, have built, without authority of law, a branch railroad, which is called in the pleadings the Boonton branch, and which, running through Paterson to Hoboken, forms a competing line between those cities with the road of the complainants. The bill also complains that this branch road has been laid over a certain tract of land, the property of a certain corporation styled tlio Long Dock Company, of which the complainants are the lessees, without the defendants having acquired any title to,, or interest in such land. The complainants further show,, that the defendants have recently constructed wide gauge-tracks over this Boonton branch, and that they attempted, to connect, by force, these tracks with the broad gauge tracks of the complainants at the Bergen tunnel.
Upon the filing of this bill, a temporary injunction was granted, restraining the defendants from making this connection, and upon the present occasion the endeavor- is to-continue that injunction.
To this bill the defendants have put in an answer of great length, setting up their right to build this Boonton branch, by force of several successive legislative acts. They likewise show that tlxe Bergen tunnel was built by and upon the land of the Long Dock Company, with the consent of the-New York and Erie Railroad Company, who were the predecessors of the complainants, and that said Long Dock. Company granted to the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, and their assigns, the right to the use of the tunnel, without paying toll for such privilege, for a certain period of time not- yet elapsed. That this, Long Dock Com
This is the general scope of the allegations of the parties, and the foregoing statement will, I think, be sufficient, in connection with such other facts as may be incidentally noticed, to make intelligible the views which I am about to express upon the case in its present aspects.
It thus appears that the first wrong of which complaint is made is, that the exclusive franchise of the complainants of possessing a railroad and carrying goods and passengers thereon from Paterson to Hoboken, has been infringed by the defendants. The claim is, that the complainants have a grant from the legislature to construct and run a railroad between these termini, and that the defendants have no such authority, but have established a road between these cities, by a perversion and in fraud of the statutable powers conferred upon them. If affairs were purely in this condition the position would be well taken. In the case of the Raritan and Delaware. Bay Railroad Co. and others v. The Delaware and Raritan Canal, &c., 3 C. E. Green 546, it was decided by the Court of Errors in this state, that the right to build and use a railroad for the public use is a franchise, the right to which can be derived from the state only, and that such franchise is exclusive except against the government, and that a competing road made without legislative authority will be enjoined. I have assumed that the complainants are the lawful possessors of such a franchise, and,
My reason for thus postponing all ultimate consideration of the legal status of this branch road of the defendants, is because, on the concession even of its unlawfulness, I do not think the complainants are in a position to challenge such status before this court. In my opinion, the complainants have lost this right by their own acquiescence and laches. Indeed, when the pleadings were first read, I thought I perceived that the locus standi of the complainants on this point was missing, and I listened with attention for some suggestion or explanation of counsel, but no circumstance was pointed out supplying this insufficiency in the case made
I have already said that the complainants encouraged the building of the road in question, both actively and passively, and the consequence is, that the rule above cited applies to
From the application of this equitable rule to the case before me, the result is, that I must hold that the branch road of the defendants, called the Boonton branch, is, as it respects the complainants, a legal structure, and this without any reference to the question whether or not it conforms to the power conferred upon the defendants or their assignors, by the legislature.
The claim for an injunction, therefore, cannot rest on this ground.
But, on the argument, a second ground for an injunction was pressed, which was that certain land of the complainants had been unlawfully taken by the defendants, and was being used for the purposes of this branch, road.
The land referred to is a small strip, about twenty or thirty feet wide, lying along the main track of the defendants at the point at which the Boonton branch seeks its junction with such main track. The defendants have laid both their broad and narrow gauge tracks over this strip of land, and have thus connected their branch road with their main track at a point about thirteen hundred feet west of the Bergen tunnel.
It appears from the undisputed testimony in the case, that the defendants have had for some time past, this piece of land in their possession, and have been and now are running their cars over it, on the track with the narrow gauge. It was not pretended on the argument, nor is there the faintest color for such a pretence, that in taking possession -of this land the defendants were aware that they were in-ringing the rights of the complainants. They supposed
But waiving this question, and assuming the English rule to subsist here in full force, I have yet failed to see the propriety of extending to the complainants, on this ground, the relief which is asked. The case does not show that the land which has been taken is of any peculiar value, and from its location it seems unfit for convenient use except by the defendants.
I have already concluded that the right of the defendants to this Boonton branch is not to be controverted; and the consequence is, they have the capacity, if they have at present no title to these premises, to proceed and acquire such title under the provisions in their charter. Under these circumstances, I should regard it as a most arbitrary and improvident exercise of the prerogative of this court, to interpose and stop the running of the cars on this great thoroughfare, until the statutory method of acquiring title to this land could be executed. From such a step the advantage to the complainants would be slight, but the injury to the defendants incalculably great.
If the defendants have no title, all that the complainants
But there is also a third objection to the complainants’ application, founded upon the supposed ownership of this property, which, I think, is equally fatal to it. There are certain circumstances connected with the defendants’ possession of the premises in question, which must operate in the nature of an equitable estoppel to prevent the complainants from treating them as trespassers. The circumstances referred to are the following :
It is admitted in the case, that the defendants have a conveyance for the land contiguous to the small, tract in dispute. In this deed the Long.Dock.Company are the grantors, but the real and beneficial actors in the transaction were the complainants. When the defendants took that conveyance, they did so under the belief that it conveyed to them the land up to the line of the strip of land they were theretofore in possession of and were using for their main tracks. The purpose for which this conveyance was obtained, and the circumstances attending the transaction, are thus stated in the affidavit of Mr. Brisbin, a witness on the part of the defendants: “ That he had the entire charge and control of purchasing the right of way for the Boonton branch of the Morris and Essex Railroad; that he applied to Jay Gould, president of the Erie Railway Company, who was also
Upon these various grounds my conclusion is, that the application foryan injunction in this bill must be denied, and the order heretofore made must be dissolved.