640 N.E.2d 583 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1994
In 1988, Myron and Katherine Wolff, who are husband and wife and residents of Cincinnati, Ohio, were victims of an automobile accident in North Dakota. As a result of that accident, Mrs. Wolff was rendered quadriplegic. Mr. Wolff suffered no physical injuries. The tortfeasors, two North Dakota drivers, settled their potential liability for $150,000, which was the limit of their respective insurance policies. In addition, in their own policy with Erie Insurance Group ("Erie"), Mr. and Mrs. Wolff had underinsured motorist coverage with per-person limits of $250,000 and per-accident limits of $500,000. Erie paid Mrs. Wolff the *218 per-person limit of its underinsured coverage, less the amount paid by the tortfeasors.1 Subsequently, Mr. Wolff attempted to make a separate claim under the Erie policy for his loss of consortium.
In response, Erie filed a declaratory judgment action in Hamilton County, where the policy was issued, to determine if Mr. Wolff was entitled to a separate claim under the Erie policy for his loss of consortium. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Wolff, holding that his loss of consortium was a separate claim not subject to the per-person limit under the Erie policy. In its judgment entry dated December 21, 1992, the trial court issued a final appealable order, noting that all other matters before the court had been withdrawn.3
In its first assignment of error, Erie argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mr. Wolff. Erie contends that the court erred in determining that Mr. Wolff's loss of consortium was a separate claim not subject to the per-person limit paid to Mrs. Wolff. Erie essentially argues that this case is controlled by Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989),
Mr. Wolff, on the other hand, argues that the trial court correctly held that loss of consortium is a separate claim under the Erie policy.
The trial court used two rationales to decide that Mr. Wolff's claim was separate. First, the court was persuaded by Ohio Supreme Court dicta in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips
(1990),
In fairness to both sides in this case, issues of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage have been much litigated, revised, and revisited by the courts.5 Nonetheless, we decline to enter the fray. We choose to decide this case on traditional grounds of insurance policy interpretation.
Three sections of the Erie policy are pertinent to our analysis.6 Under the section entitled "Our Promise," the policy reads as follows:
"We will pay damages that the law entitles you or your legal representative to recover from the driver or owner of an uninsured motor vehicle [in this case underinsured]. Damages must result from an accident arising out of ownership or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. Damages must involve bodily injury which means physical harm, sickness, disease or resultant death."
Under this clause, Mrs. Wolff clearly is entitled to recover damages. The parties agree that the North Dakota tortfeasors responsible for her injuries were underinsured, and that Mrs. Wolff suffered catastrophic bodily injury as a result of the accident. *220
We note an important definitional distinction at this point. In the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage section of the Erie policy, "bodily injury" is defined as "physical harm, sickness, disease, or resultant death." The definition of bodily injury expressly fails to include loss of consortium. By contrast, in the liability section of the policy, the definition of bodily injury specifically includes care and loss of services. We assume that Erie intended for these definitions to be different.
We look next at another section of the insuring clause captioned "Others We Protect." Paragraph three reads:
"(3) Anyone else who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to any person protected by this coverage."
We read this section as giving Mr. Wolff, who is a named insured, the right to recover damages for his claim for loss of consortium. Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc.
(1970),
The final section is the provision dealing with limitations on the company's liability. Within this section are two pertinent provisions. The introductory paragraph under "Limits of Protection" states that the maximum exposure Erie has under this coverage is the $500,000 per-accident limit on the declarations page, regardless of the number of persons, autos, or claims in one accident.
The other pertinent part of this section reads as follows:
"Split Limits
"(1) `EACH PERSON' This is the most we will pay for bodily injury to one person in any accident."
This per-person limit clearly applies only to Mrs. Wolff's bodily injury claim.
The question is, when all these sections are read together, what limits apply to Mr. Wolff's claim? We agree with the trial court that the Erie policy is at best ambiguous on this point.
It is basic insurance law that when provisions of an insurance contract are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured who is seeking coverage. Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos. (1989),
Under the Erie policy, it is arguable that there is no limiting language on Mr. Wolff's consortium claim at all. Because the maximum Erie must pay under the underinsured coverage is $500,000, and because we agree that Mr. Wolff's claim is separate from Mrs. Wolff's and not subject to the per-person limit of liability covering her claim, we hold that Mr. Wolff can recover up to $250,000 under the Erie policy. Whether this is under a separate per-person limit of liability as the trial court found or under the per-accident limit in the contract makes no difference in this case. Under either method, Mr. Wolff is entitled to recover up to $250,000 on his loss-of-consortium claim.7
In its second assignment of error, Erie argues that the trial court erred when it did not grant Erie summary judgment because Mr. Wolff's consortium claim was derivative of, and merged with, Mrs. Wolff's bodily injury claim, and was thus extinguished when her claim was settled. We reject this argument on the authority of Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992),
Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Wolff is entitled to recover up to $250,000 on his consortium claim under the Erie policy.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
SHANNON, P.J., and DOAN, J., concur.
We have sua sponte removed this cause from the accelerated calendar.
We believe that it indeed can be argued that recent Ohio Supreme Court cases, subsequent to both the Phillips II decision and the trial court's judgment, consign Tomlinson to an even deeper unmarked grave. See, generally, Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc.
(1992),