*1 tending to show that the work-related contributed,
activity aas matter of Ralph medi- L. ERICKSON fact, cal or physical production pain-related disability. It can serve no STATE of Maine.
role “legal determination of cause” as that relates to possible evaluation of Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. expansion of the risk disability by activity work-related or conditions of the Argued Jan. employment. April Decided n
Bryant, id. presence Neither the nor ab change sence of a in the pathology of the
underlying dispositive condition is
determination as to whether the element of
“legal present cause” is in a “combined ef
fects” case. Id. giving The harm in it such
effect inquiry cuts off the into
“legal prematurely cause” thereby pre a comprehensive
vents analysis ques
tion of employee’s whether the work activi
ty any other condition of employment his
resulted, case, particular facts of the
in the expansion of his risk of disability
over present non-employ usual
ment life workman or other
person. Bryant, 444 A.2d at Sellens Co., Inc.,
v. Allen Products 206 Neb. (1980). 293 N.W.2d 1B See
Larson, Compensa The Law of Workman’s
tion, 38.83, (1980). analysis at 7-235 Such
being required in order to reach a valid case, causality
determination of in this having
it not occurred at the Commission
level, we must remand this case to the causality
Commissioner for consideration of
in accordance with our opinion recent
Bryant. entry will be:
Judgment vacated and case remanded to
the Commissioner proceedings for further
in conformity opinion with the herein and Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.
Further ordered employer that the pay
the employee an allowance for counsel fees $550.00, together amount of with his
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for this
appeal.
All concurring.
CARTER, Justice. Erickson, appeals plaintiff, Ralph L. The Supe- complaint of his the dismissal County. trial Court, The rior Cumberland action court dismissed on that Erick- ground State comply with 14 M.R.S.A. son failed Maine (MTCA). We Act affirm Tort Claims Superior judgment of the Court. refrigerator self-employed is a Erickson 30, 1978, May he or about mechanic. On perform mainte- was hired the State at equipment on located Crescent nance While he climbed down Beach State Park. plain- working equipment, from on floor fell. slipped on a wet and allegedly tiff fall, this Erickson sustained As a result of damages his sought he injuries for which complaint May on filed of this com- sought dismissal State ground plaintiff plaint on the can which relief failed state a claim plaintiff had failed granted and notify within 180 after the State in contraven- accrual of the cause of action 8107(1). mo- In this tion tion, the a memoran- defendant submitted affi- and two affidavits. Both dum law notice the davits state that first State Erickson’s claim received with plain- from the was in form of letter 19, 1979, and tiff’s dated December counsel letter, 20, 1979. This received on December affidavits, accompanied which one of beyond the 180- admitted notice was but noted day period prescribed by statute only recently received had counsel linking the fall with physician’s report preju- was not injury and that State plain- delay reporting. diced Nisbet, Francis M. Ludwig, MacNichol & of law but tiff a memorandum submitted Portland, Jackson, (orally), III South any affidavits. did not submit plaintiff. motion, the Following hearing (orally), Michael S. Glea- Richards John complaint dismissed Court son, Gen., Attys. Augusta, Asst. for defend- July an order docketed ant. appeal from filed a notice of docketed in the Su- order. This notice was GODFREY, NICHOLS, August perior ROB- Court on Before appropriately marked ERTS, CARTER, WATH- sheet VIOLETTE and docket EN, “LAW”. The JJ. I. docket entries were filed with the 26,1981 August
Law Court on
and docketed
matter, we
preliminary
As a
must con-
28, 1981,
on August
August
1981. On
generated
sider what evidence
Erickson
filed
document
“With-
entitled
ceedings below and what actions of
Appeal”
drawal of
and a Motion for Recon- Superior
Law
properly
Court are
before the
sideration. These were docketed in the Su-
*3
a
appeal.
Court on this
Erickson filed
no-
perior
31,
on August
Court
the dismissal order that
appeal
tice
from
Superior Court on Au-
was docketed in the
The motion for reconsideration was ac-
26,1981,
companied
gust
Supe-
and that resulted in the
by
plaintiff
by
affidavits
being
sheet
marked
rior Court docket
and his counsel. Counsel’s affidavit
indi-
appeal
“LAW”. This notice of
and the
cated that he was first
Su-
by
contacted
14,
plaintiff
1979,
on May
perior
he
Court
entries were filed with
immedi-
docket
ately
day
treating physician,
contacted the
the Law
on the same
and entered
but
Court
11,
that not
August
until
Law
on
December
1979 did coun-
Court docket
28. On
sel
report
28,
receive a
physician.
August
sought
from the
Er-
withdrawal
ickson’s
orally
affidavit stated that he had
appeal
by
of this
and reconsideration
park supervisor
informed the
Superior
about the ac-
M.R.
Court
its dismissal order.
however,
cident within 180
of its
permit
occurrence. Civ.P.
does not
73(g),
Also submitted was a
August
letter dated
appeal,1
unilateral withdrawal of an
and
12,1981 from the Attorney
73(f)
General’s Office
power
M.R.Civ.P.
limits the
of the
plaintiff’s
to
counsel.
correspondence
Superior
to act in a case after
its
Court
park manager
Thus,
indicated that
and his
unless
docket
marked “LAW”.2
supervisor
vague
had a
recollection of re-
the Superior
Court’s action with
to
ceiving a letter regarding an accident
in-
the Motion for Reconsideration is authoriz-
volving
prior
Erickson
by
to the letter
73(f),
sent
ed
Rule
its denial of the motion
19,
nullity
counsel on
presented
sup-
December
and the evidence
Erickson’s Motion for Reconsideration was
port
beyond appel-
this motion is therefore
denied
Superior
Court
an order
4
cognizance.
See M.R.S.A.
M.R.
August 31,
entered on
Martin,
1981. A second No-
73(f);
&
v.
Civ.P.
Bancroft
Inc.
Appeal
tice of
Drivers,
by plain-
340,
therefrom was filed
Local No.
Truck
Warehouse-
tiff.
Union, Me.,
Helpers
man &
Me., 156, (1979) (Superior general- specified exceptions certain A.2d ap- prosecution of the jurisdiction relating Court to the ly Court the Law had prior over asserted error since occurred peal. of docket marking
transmittal of record and
au-
continuing
Superior
has
Court
“LAW”,
jur
Court
prerequisites
Law
any postjudgment
thority
dispose
Isely v.
74(p));
Rule
isdiction under former
trial)
(such motions for new
motions
Wilkins,
(1969);
Me.,
253 A.2d
52-53
73(a)
Rule
terminate
that would under
85-86,
Schofield,
v.
White
153 Me.
appeal
time
running
—even
(1957) (marking
A.2d
of “LAW” on
previously
appeal
if a notice of
been
Superior
effectively
docket
termi
authori-
Court has no
filed.
Court);
Powers
authority
nates
60(b)
after
act
Rule
motion
ty
Rosenbloom,
143 Me.
Court,
in the Law
is docketed
in Law
(1948) (after
case entered
*4
set of circumstances
but
the rare
Court, Superior
amend bill of
Court cannot
a
appropriate
it
for such
where would
evi
exceptions
incorporate pleadings and
to
the Superior
Court
motion
be heard
dence); Page Bourgon,
138 Me.
the
Court
of
Law
before conclusion
115-16,
Field,
(1941);
McKusick
may
ceedings,
Law
on motion
the
Court
Wroth,
73.11a
&
Maine Civil Practice §
73(f), see
of
suspend
operation
the
Rule
(Supp.1981).
76A(c),
order the Law Court
Rule
and
Superior
pending
stayed
proceedings
the Motion for Reconsider
Although
60(b)
the
motion.
disposition of
Court
au
procedural
ation does
indicate the
not
based,
plain
thority upon which it was
the
Field,
&
added.)
(Emphasis
McKusick
tiff
that
motion
appeal
contends on
the
was Wroth,
Practice,
(1981
Maine Civil
60(b)(6).3
brought pursuant
to M.R.Civ.P.
Thus,
Superior
is clear that
the
Supp.).
rule, however,
This
is not
those enu
among
the
power
act on
was without the
Court
Indeed,
73(f).4
merated in
the Su
Rule
60(b)
Rule
pursuant
brought
motion
preme
September
of
Judicial Court’s Note
filing
the
while the
commenced
appeal
provides:
Rule
pending
appeal
was
of the first notice
we review
Accordingly,
this
73(f) directly paral-
Rule
before
Court.
This new
order
37(d)
initial
providing
only
lels
that
the trial court’s
dismissal
M.R.Crim.P.
presented to the
light
im-
appeal is
in the Law Court
the evidence
docketed
the first
filing
no-
mediately following
Superior
Court before
express
opinion on
We
appeal.
tice of
and that the
Court
operation
judgment.
shall
60(b)
motion
provides:
3. M.R.Civ.P.
time,
for
and
Inadvertence,
be made within a reasonable
(b) Mistakes,
Ne-
Excusable
(3)
Evidence,
(1), (2),
one
Fraud,
than
glect;
not more
Newly
reasons
Discovered
order,
judgment,
proceeding
year after
or
as
Etc. On motion and
such terms
are
legal
just,
may
party
A
under this
relieve
or his
taken.
motion
court
a
was entered or
order,
representative
judgment,
finality
(b)
from a final
not affect the
subdivision
does
(1)
following
proceeding
operation.
or
for the
reasons:
judgment
suspend
its
or
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
power
a court
rule does
limit the
not
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
independent
to relieve
entertain an
action
diligence
due
could not
been discov-
have
order,
judgment,
proceeding.
or
from a
for
ered
time to move
a new trial under
nobis,
vobis, audita
coram
Writs
coram
59(b); (3)
(whether
Rule
de-
fraud
heretofore
querela,
and bills
and bills of review
extrinsic), misrepre-
or
nominated intrinsic
sentation,
review
abolished
nature of bills of
are
an
or other misconduct of
adverse
judgments
reopening
under
entered
means
void;
(4)
(5)
judg-
party;
judgment is
obtaining
rules,
procedure
these
satisfied, released,
dis-
ment
charged,
been
or
judgment
mo-
relief from a
shall
judgment
prior
upon which it
or a
is
prescribed
or
an
in these rules
tion
based
reversed
vacat-
has been
or otherwise
independent action.
ed,
equitable
judg-
longer
or it is no
that the
prospective application;
ment
or
should have
supra.
note
4. See
(6) any
justifying relief from
other reason
either
60(b)
merits of the
foregoing
less
are sub-
motion or the court’s
dismissal
that mo-
complied
stantially
(Emphasis
with.”
add-
tion.5
ed.)
Court
implicitly noted
did not file
within
II.
days
and dismissed the case
With respect
to the
appeal,
merits of the
ground
compliance
the substantial
ex-
two issues are raised regarding the court’s
ception did not
apply when notice
not
disposition
case on summary judg-
period.
filed within this time
ment.6 These are:
(1)
Superi-
whether
plaintiff urges
ruling
this
correctly
interpreted
meaning
inis
error because he
the sub
asserts
good
cause and the substantial com-
compliance exception
stantial
so
available
pliance
exceptions
81077 and
§
long
year
as notice is within the two
statute
whether
the existence of material
issues
prescribed by
of limitations
8110 and the
fact relating
operation
ex-
of these
prejudiced by
State
We
delay.
ceptions precluded the disposition of the
disagree.
light
In
of the distinct nature of
case
judgment.
summary
compliance
and substantial
8107(1),
Under
a party
must file with
exceptions, we conclude that the substantial
the State a notice containing specified in-
exception
applicable
formation regarding
the claim
8107(1)
when
180-day requirement
of §
State
within 180
after
cause of ac-
is satisfied.
tion accrues unless “a
*5
good
claimant shows
why
cause
notice could not
reasonably
general purposes
have
of a notice re
been filed within
day
(Em-
quirement
the 180
expense
limit.”
are to save needless
phasis added.)
litigation
providing
Subsection 4 of
8107
by
opportunity
an
§
for
vides that “no claim ...
shall be
disputes,
com-
amicable
of
resolution
and to al
against
menced
a governmental
entity un-
low the
fully investigate
defendant
5. Had the motion of the
6. We treat the state’s motion to dismiss as a
the
motion for
presentation
side the
the motion for reconsideration was made more
must be made within ten
than 10
cannot be
Amend
Maineland, Inc., Me.,
er to
pursuant
Town of South Berwick
Title 14
and the name and
other
claim,
not have
time within the limits of section
claimant shows
resentative shall
ing:
governmental
Notice
180
180-daylimit,
A. The name and address of the
B. A concise statement of
1. Notice
act
a
representative,
days
pleadings.”
including
Judgment,
in
to Rule
M.R.S.A. 8107
enlarged.
summary judgment
governmental entity
after a cause of action
reasonably
the instant case. Such a motion
Court would
by
after the
requirements
a claimant or his
both
entity
good
file written notice contain-
59(e),
as the defendant
address of his
§
M.R.Civ.P.
claims See ment, failure viero, 487, (notice no in the court’s Me., (1981) we find error 489 had Erickson Act); expressly consider whether provision Security of Maine Health giving not notice within Me., good cause for Co., Paper Dunton 423 v. Eastern Fine moving 180-day period. While 512, (1980) (notice provision A.2d 518 may carry the bur summary judgment for Act); Compensation Marcotte v. Workers’ issue demonstrating that no material 137, den of Lewiston, 233, 235, City A. 94 Me. 47 not exists, party may of fact “an adverse (1900) (notice provision of 138 23 M.R.S.A. allegations mere or denials rest against municipalities in suits for § [by but must set forth pleadings, his ... juries defects); Farber highway caused specific facts show affidavit or 685, State, 398,-, otherwise] v. P.2d 102 Idaho trial,” M.R. ing genuine there is a issue (Idaho Act); Tort Leon- Claims Here, 56(e). only evidence before Civ.P. State, Or.App. ard 630 P.2d compliance with the Court on issue Act); (1981) (Oregon Tort Claims sub 180-day period affidavits Charlotte, City Miller v. 288 N.C. made Erickson mitted the defendant. (1975) (Municipality S.E.2d filing until after attempt, tort requirement). Given this under- position by submit appeal, his lying purpose, we view substan- cannot ting counteraffidavits. compliance exception applicable tial if 8107(1) the 180-day the defend- The affidavits submitted proposition has not been satisfied. be- ant that notice was received stated protection view afford- compelling in period. day the 180 expiration fore the filing good ed claimant letter, by plaintiff’s counsel to sent 8107(1). exception embodied affida- with one Stale and submitted exception substantial vits, satisfy admitted failure notice, al- properly invoked when the indicated time The letter also limitation. though timely timely filed or excused from injury suffered severe that Erickson cause, because of defective in of time from causing pain and loss great *6 some other such as the failure to compensation sought work that he satisfy requirements the form of $100,000. It also at the extent of least 8107(1)(A-E). Telephone Cf. Pacific § & only plaintiff’s counsel had notes that Riverside, v. of Telegraph County Co. 106 report linking recently a medical received Cal.App.3d 183, 187, Cal.Rptr. 165 31 problems. with his medical Erickson’s fall (1981); Wilmington, v. 45 City Jenkins of gen evidence is insufficient 528, 529, N.C.App. 263 344 S.E.2d of question erate an issue of fact (1980); Stromberg, Angeles Inc. v. Los judg preclude summary as to good cause so District, County 270 Cal. Flood Control concern allegation ment. in the letter 759, 762, App.2d Cal.Rptr. 76 186-87 primarily relates ing disability medical (1969). corre noted in the damages the claim for
We no error of law the trial detect cannot, any taken way, It in spondence. compli- court ruling in that the substantial physically was that Erickson to intimate inapplicable ance case. was instant required written notice unable to file the infra, will explained, filing As the record delayed he 8107(1). The fact that support finding vides the 180- physician’s report the notice to await the day fact relat question limitation satisfied. to raise a insufficient notice, Upham v. Van alleged arguably while a form ing good oral cause. See Me., 1229, 1232 of writ- 420 A.2d bearing requirement Corp., defect Baalen provi mistake fact (interpreting ten is of no to Erickson because avail Act, M.R. Compensation allegation presented this was not until after sion Workers 95). first notice of was filed.8 S.A. § opinion. 8. See Part I of this notice,
“Summary judgment may be result of a ordered late in the absence of ‘only prejudice when the conclusively State, facts so pre serves none of these clude ... party’s] recovery judg me, purposes. purpose To the clear of the [a ment in favor of the other provision “good cause” of subsection possible City result.” v. Beaulieu of Lewi section 8107 is to relieve a claimant from ston, Me., (1982); 440 A.2d see consequences of lateness even in those Frenchville, Me., v. Sirois Town of 441 A.2d governmental entity instances where the 291, 296, J., (1982) (Carter, 300-301 dissent actually why I prejudiced. see no reason bar, ing). In the case at has would, Legislature effect, presume in raised, any form, in manner or an issue necessarily must frustrate of material fact on question the purposes of the notice requirement. cause. None of the documents submitted presumption unjust Such is particularly if State, even when read in governmental cannot entity preju- show position, Erickson’s suggest the existence of dice knowledge because it has actual of the good cause. Given the absence of even a claim. issue, scintilla of evidence on this Supe Nevertheless, majority says rior Court properly dismissed the action. exception ap- substantial is not Frenchville, See Sirois v. Town of 441 A.2d plicable 180-day provision if the Ouellette, Me., at Bozzutto v. They not been claim that satisfied. (1979). protection late-filing afforded a claimant entry is: the good exception embodied in the Judgment affirmed. compels first paragraph of section 8107 this my analysis result. In view careful of the GODFREY, NICHOLS, VIOLETTE and statutory gen- overall scheme of the Act WATHEN, JJ., concurring. particular negates eral and section 8107 ROBERTS, J., dissenting. compulsion. such I do not disagree with Part I Tort The enactment of Maine Claims opinion Court’s herein. I cannot accept, abrogation Act followed Court’s however, the majority’s interpretation of 14 of governmental common law doctrine im- Me., M.R.S.A. the notice Bath, City munity Davies Maine My interpretation Tort Claim Act. (1976). pointed we out Although A.2d 1269 compel that section would us to vacate Legislature Davies that retained judgment and remand prerogative reinstating the absolute bar this case for a determination of whether the immunity, Legislature recognized *7 was, fact, prejudiced by State Maine in of our of that outmoded validity criticism required by of written notice Leg- doctrine. It cannot be denied that the section 8107. enacting acknowledged by the Act islature requires by that claimants harmed fairness The majority opinion that *8 noncompliance. all of the above For I respectfully
reasons must dissent. III, Atty., Dist. Peter G. Berry, N.
Henry Port- (orally), Deputy Atty., Dist. Ballou Intern, land, Casey, Law Student Martha for plaintiff. exposure. operate
Act as an additional limitation notes “[t]he scope liability activities within the under general purposes requirement of a notice opportunity realistic to seek are to the Act have a expense litigation save needless reject outright by providing compensation. I the State’s opportunity an for amicable disputes, proposition Legislature resolution of included and to allow the de- that fully fendant investigate trap claims and de- for the requirement the notice as Maj. fenses.” at op. 349-50. The erection im- unwary in order reduce the merely a barrier to this suit as a public pact on funds.1 explicitly defining 1. The which liabil- State asserts in its brief it is clear the activities for [Legislature attaches, by ity “that intended to limit the includ- 14 M.R.S.A. limitation, exposure liability ing two-year period State’s requiring under the Act 14 M.R.S.A. however, exists, the claim within 180 for the 8110. No injury, delay Legislature proposition non- unless cause for was intended exposure by provisions Legislature compliance shown.” did limit with the notice With in policy the overall of fairness acknowledged accepting pur- mind and STATE Maine poses requirement, of the notice I examine First, the fabric of section 8107. I would RIGGS. Kenneth out point 1 of that subsection section provide any noncompli- fails to sanction for Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. ance with the notice requirements. The Argued Jan. 1982. only proscription against commencement of April Decided entity an action a governmental prior without notice is in found subsection Second, I note that subsection is enti- compliance tled “Substantial notice re- quired.” very sentence containing proscription provides that no claim shall be foregoing “unless commenced notice substantially complied are with.” (Emphasis added.) Although majority would require- not eliminate the content ments from the ex- substantial ception, would eliminate the timeliness they requirement. appears No reason rational why provisions,” “foregoing term used in all encompass subsection does not than requirements rather “form requirements” paragraphs A-E of suggested majority. subsection 1 Furthermore, view, my application compliance exception substantial should be 4’s guided subsection that a held or claim “shall not be invalid inaccuracy reason an insufficient time, stating place, or nature otherwise, claim, unless is shown entity fact governmental added.) prejudiced thereby.” (Emphasis Legislature subsec- established which tion the criterion “substantial compliance” be measured. An un- should timely two-year period within substantially complies limitation with the statutory govern- unless the requirement mental show as a result entity prejudice can