554 P.2d 1336 | Mont. | 1976
No. 13263
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 DALLAS D. ERICKSON, P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t , -vs - J O H N D. FISHER, Respondent and Respondent. A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g Counsel o f Record : F o r A p p e l l a n t : H. James Oleson a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana F o r Respondent: l J i l l i a m A. Douglas a r g u e d , L i b b y , Montana S u b m i t t e d : August 30, 1976 Decided : o o R 4 1976 F i l e d : fJC-1 5 1976 Mr.Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by p e t i t i o n e r D a l l a s D . E r i c k s o n , from a n a d v e r s e judgment e n t e r e d f o l l o w i n g a t r i a l b e f o r e t h e c o u r t w i t h o u t a j u r y i n L i n c o l n County, Montana.
From t h e r e c o r d it a p p e a r s t h a t on March 1 4 , 1975, a p p e l l a n t , t h e n employed a s a d e p u t y s h e r i f f of L i n c o l n County, was g i v e n a w r i t t e n o r d e r from t h e r e s p o n d e n t , t h e n s h e r i f f o f L i n c o l n County. The o r d e r was concerned w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a c e n t r a l i z e d f i l i n g system, and d i r e c t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t :
"Any c r i m i n a l f i l e s o r c a s e s t h a t you a r e p r e s e n t l y working, o r i n v o l v e d w i t h , s h a l l be immediately t u r n e d o v e r t o O f f i c e r Michael McMeekin of t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n D i v i s i o n . "
A p p e l l a n t d i d n o t t u r n i n c e r t a i n f i l e s c o n t a i n i n g u n s o l v e d c a s e s and c a s e s s c h e d u l e d f o r t r i a l . On A p r i l 21, 1975, r e s p o n d e n t gave w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o a p p e l l a n t of h i s t e r m i n a t i o n s p e c i f y i n g " t h a t under s e c t i o n 16-3705, R.C.M. 1947, you have w i l f u l l y d i s - obeyed a n o r d e r g i v e n by m e t o you", a l l e g i n g t h e above s t a t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A p p e l l a n t f i l e d a t i m e l y p e t i t i o n f o r r e i n s t a t e - ment, which was d e n i e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s a p p e a l : (1) Did a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e l e g a l c a u s e f o r
h i s t e r m i n a t i o n ? ( 2 ) A r e t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t i n c o m p l e t e b e c a u s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e , a s a f i n d i n g of f a c t , t h a t a p p e l l a n t r e l i e d on U n d e r s h e r i f f Shawls i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e w r i t t e n o r d e r ?
F i r s t , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s s e t f o r t h t h e r e a s o n s f o r , and t h e p r o c e d u r e i n v o l v e d i n , t e r m i n a t i o n of a d e p u t y by a s h e r i f f . S e c t i o n 16-3705, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s :
" ( 5 ) Any d e p u t y s h e r i f f now employed o r t h a t may h e r e a f t e r be employed s h a l l c o n t i n u e i n s e r v i c e u n t i l r e l i e v e d o f h i s employment i n t h e manner h e r e i n a f t e r p r o v i d e d and o n l y f o r one o r more of t h e f o l l o w i n g c a u s e s : "(b) willful disobedience of an order or orders given by the sheriff * * *". (Emphasis added.) Appellant cites a number of cases for the proposition
the sheriff must show more than a willful disobedience of an order to suffice as "cause". However, the statutes construed by the cases cited merely state that an officer may be removed "for cause". Such a vague phrase would require a specific show- ing of an adverse effect on the administration of the office and the rights and interests of the public. Montana's legislature has gone one step further using the phrase " * * * only for one or more of the following causes * * *", followed by an enumera- tion of specific causes. Thus, the legislature has specified what is required to be proven for termination. Using these spec- ific causes does not conflict with the general requirement for terminating a public officer, since these enumerated causes would necessarily hinder the administration of the office and impair the rights and interests of the public. As in the instant case, a sheriff could not run an efficient office and adequately en- force the laws of this state, if deputy sheriffs did not adhere to his orders. All that need be shown for the termination of a deputy sheriff is one of the causes enumerated by section 16-
3705 (5), R.C.M. 1947.
Appellant next alleges that his action was not "willful". We do not agree with the definition proposed by appellant, which he insists requires a malicious intent. Section 19-103(15), R.C.M. 1947, states:
"The word 'willfully' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire an advantage."
Appellant did have a willingness to retain those files not turned over to Officer McMeekin, even though no malicious motive may have been behind such action. As such, his action was willful.
Appellant's last attack on the cause of his termination is that the order given was ambiguous and his reliance upon Undersheriff Shawls interpretation constituted a justifiable excuse. We do not agree for a number of reasons. The order directed appellant to turn over all files he was "presently working on or involved with". Some of the files not turned in were cases scheduled for trial. Certainly appellant was "involved" with these cases, since they would require his testimony. Fur- thermore, appellant was aware that the purpose behind the order was to create a central filing system, which purpose would be defeated if each deputy retained files in his possession. Another interesting point is that all deputies, with the exception of appellant, had turned in all files in their possession to Officer McMeekin as ordered. We cannot ignore the fact this was a small office in terms of personnel and not a gigantic corporate enter- prise. Appellant had daily access to respondent and could have easily cleared up any doubts he had concerning the order by direct- ing them to respondent. In light of these factors we agree with the district court that the order was wilfully disobeyed without justifiable excuse.
Appellant's second issue questions the sufficiency of the findings of fact rendered by the district court. Certain rules of construction regarding findings of fact are set forth in Ballenger v. Tillman, 133 Mont. 369, 378, 379, 324 P.2d 1045:
"'Ultimate facts as distinguished from eviden- tiary ones, are the findings a trial court should make.' "'It is an established rule of law that the findings of fact are to receive such a con- struction as will uphold rather than defeat the judgment t h e r e o n . ' " I f t h e f i n d i n g s a r e i n e x a c t a c c o r d w i t h i s s u e s framed by t h e p l e a d i n g s and e v e r y u l t i m a t e f a c t i s c o v e r e d t h a t i s a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d . "
I n f i n d i n g of f a c t No. 5 t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t a t e s a n u l t i m a t e f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t " f a i l e d t o t u r n i n t h e f i l e s a s o r d e r e d . " The proposed f i n d i n g of f a c t o f f e r e d by a p p e l l a n t , namely t h a t he r e l i e d on U n d e r s h e r i f f Shaw's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s m e r e l y a n e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t r e l a t e d t o whether o r n o t h e obeyed t h e o r d e r . A s s u c h , t h e proposed f i n d i n g o f f a c t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o be i n c l u d e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s .
A s t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Montana Mobile Home T o u r i s t C o u r t , I n c . v . F i n l e y , 163 Mont. 7 , 514 P.2d 762, t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n t o t o , and viewed i n t h a t l i g h t t h e y s u p p o r t t h e judgment o f t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t . The judgment i
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