ERIC MONTREAL ANDERSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 06-24-00005-CR
In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
September 6, 2024
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
On Appeal from the 8th District Court, Hopkins County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2329683. Date Submitted: July 30, 2024. Do Not Publish.
A Hopkins County jury found Eric Montreal Anderson guilty of possessing four grams or more but less than 200 grams of fentanyl. See
On appeal, Anderson argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that he possessed the fentanyl.1 He also argues that the trial court erred by imposing the fine without determining his ability to pay it, by ordering payment of restitution and reimbursement, and by including the time payment fee in the bill of costs. We find that sufficient evidence supported the jury‘s verdict of guilt. Pursuant to our opinion in Anderson‘s appeal in cause number 06-24-00002-CR, we also find that the fine was properly assessed and that Anderson failed to preserve his complaint about restitution. While we determine that $80.00 for a reimbursement fee was proper, we sustain Anderson‘s complaint about the time payment fee and delete that fee from the bill of costs. Because we have deleted the court costs improperly assessed in Anderson‘s companion cause number 06-24-00004-CR, we assess those fees in this case and modify the bill of costs and the judgment to include them. As modified, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
A. Standard of Review
“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref‘d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref‘d)). “Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.‘” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)))).
In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State‘s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State‘s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.‘” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). Here, the State had to prove that Anderson knowingly possessed four grams or more but less than 200 grams of fentanyl.
B. The Evidence at Trial
Josh Davis, an officer with the Hopkins County Sheriff‘s Office (HCSO), saw Anderson driving a silver Infiniti on Interstate 30 at 1:15 a.m. on August 19, 2022. After noticing that the Infiniti‘s license plate light was not working and that Anderson was driving in the left lane without passing, Davis decided to run the license plate and discovered from dispatchers that the plate belonged to a maroon passenger car. Davis testified that he attempted to conduct a traffic stop, but Anderson fled and led him on a chase with speeds exceeding 130 miles per hour.
Davis approached the car and immediately noticed a strong odor of marihuana. After arresting Anderson for evading arrest, Davis and other officers searched the car and found a large quantity of marihuana in an open backpack on the front passenger seat. Davis testified, “Located under the driver seat of the vehicle, which is where Mr. Anderson was sitting, were three tied-up sandwich baggies. Those contained the small round blue pills” that later proved to be fentanyl.2 Davis said that “[a] fourth baggie of those was located under the front passenger seat.” Davis also located (1) a stolen, “loaded Glock 19 9 millimeter handgun, . . . [with] a round chambered to fire,” “under the driver‘s seat where Mr. Anderson was seated,” (2) two loaded handgun magazines, (3) debit cards and an “ID not belonging to anybody in the vehicle,” (4) two digital scales, and (5) bags used to distribute drugs. Davis said that Anderson and his passengers denied possession of the items found but were arrested because “they were all in accessibility of the reach of the narcotics.”
Anderson testified in his defense. He admitted that he and his passengers had been smoking marihuana and that he knew the marihuana and magazine clips were in the car. Even so, Anderson testified that he was shocked when officers discovered the pills.
After hearing that evidence, the jury found Anderson guilty of possessing the fentanyl pills.
C. Analysis
“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”
“[E]vidence which affirmatively links [the accused] to [the drugs] suffices for proof that he possessed it knowingly,” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747, because it tends to show “that the accused‘s connection with the contraband was more than just ‘fortuitous,‘” Gill v. State, 57 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (quoting Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref‘d)). Even so, the State must demonstrate that “the accused was aware of the object, knew what it was, and recognized his or her connection to it.” Smith,
“When the contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the defendant, a fact[-]finder may nonetheless infer that the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference.” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413–14. Under the links test, if combined with other evidence, the accused‘s presence or proximity may be sufficient to establish knowing possession. Id. at 415. Some factors that may be legally sufficient, either alone or in combination, to circumstantially establish an accused‘s “knowing possession of contraband” include:
- (1) the defendant‘s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant‘s proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12); see Smith, 118 S.W.3d at 842; Nguyen v. State, 54 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref‘d), overruled on other grounds by Fagan v. State, 362 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref‘d).
Here, there was no evidence of several of the links test factors, including factors two, six, eight, eleven, and thirteen. Even so, most other factors supported the jury‘s verdict. The jury heard that the defendant was present when the enclosed space of the car was searched. Davis testified that Anderson was in close proximity to the fentanyl found under his seat and could access the fentanyl found in the passenger seat. Anderson admitted to smoking marihuana in the car, indicating that he was under the influence of the drug during his arrest, and the odor of marihuana was present throughout the car. Officers found other drug paraphernalia, like the digital scales and baggies. Anderson also admitted to possessing the marihuana and the magazine clips, and to leading Davis on a high-speed chase, indicating a consciousness of guilt. In sum, factors one, three, four, five, seven, nine, ten, twelve, and fourteen linked Anderson to the fentanyl.
“[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury‘s guilty verdict.” Id. at 417. Considering the cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in
II. The Fine Is Proper and the Complaint About Restitution is Unpreserved
In his second point of error, Anderson argues that the $7,500.00 fine was improperly assessed because the trial court did not determine his ability to pay it pursuant to Article 42.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See
In his third point of error, Anderson argues that the trial court erred by ordering restitution payable to the Texas Crime Lab. As in our opinion in cause number 06-24-00002-CR, we find that Anderson failed to preserve this complaint for our review. See Garcia v. State, 663 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Assessed Reimbursement
Next, Anderson argues that the $80.00 reimbursement fee assessed by the trial court is unsupported by the record.
Initially, we note that Anderson was charged reimbursement fees in his companion cases, which we deleted. This is because, “[i]n a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses . . ., the court may assess each court cost or fee only once
Looking at the bills of costs in this case and in Anderson‘s companion cases, we find the following reimbursement fees: (1) a $10.00 “SHERIFF TAKE & APPROVE BOND” fee, (2) a $10.00 “SHERIFF COMMIT OR RELASE FEE,” (3) a $50.00 “SHERIFF EXECUTE WARRANT FEE,” (4) a $5.00 “NOTICE TO APPEAR” fee, and (5) a $10.00 “SUBPOENA/WITNESS FEE.”3 While Anderson notes that all of those fees are allowed by Article 102.011 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he argues that the record fails to support those fees.4
As for the first three fees, the record in 06-24-00002-CR shows that Anderson was given a surety bond on September 3, 2022, which supports the $10.00 fee for taking and approving the
As for the $5.00 notice to appear fee, the record in cause number 06-24-00006-CR shows that a notice to appear for trial was hand-delivered to Anderson while in custody. Thus, the record is sufficient to support this fee.
Next, although there is a $10.00 fee assessed for issuing a subpoena, the appellate record confirms that no subpoenas were issued. As a result, we sustain Anderson‘s complaint about that fee and will delete it from the bill of costs.
In sum, the record supports the trial court‘s assessment of the $10.00 taking and approving bond, a $10.00 fee for commitment or release, a $50.00 fee for issuing capias, a $5.00 notice to appear fee, and a $5.00 fee for summoning a jury, which totals $80.00 in reimbursement fees.
IV. The Time Payment Fee Must Be Deleted
Last, Anderson argues that the $15.00 time payment fee in the bill of costs is improper. For the reasons stated by our opinion in cause number 06-24-00002-CR, we sustain Anderson‘s complaint about the time payment fee.6
V. Court Costs Must Be Added
Because Anderson‘s companion cases were consolidated with this case for trial, Anderson could only be charged once for court costs. See
VI. Disposition
We delete the time payment fee and the $10.00 fee for issuing subpoenas from the bill of costs but add a $5.00 fee for summoning a jury. We also modify the bill of costs and the trial court‘s judgment to include $290.00 in court costs and affirm the trial court‘s judgment, as modified.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: July 30, 2024
Date Decided: September 6, 2024
Do Not Publish
Notes
(a) A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following reimbursement fees to defray the cost of the services provided in the case by a peace officer:
- (1) $5 for issuing a written notice to appear in court . . . ;
- (2) $50 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine . . . ;
- (3) $5 for summoning a witness; . . .
- (5) $10 for taking and approving a bond and, if necessary, returning the bond to the courthouse; . . .
- (6) $5 for commitment or release[.]