Erdelyi v. O'brienErdelyi v. O'brien
In July, 1979, plaintiff Cynthia Erdelyi applied to defendant Hugh O‘Brien, the Director of Public Safety (Chief of Police) of the City of Manhattan Beach, California, for a license to carry a concealed weapon. At that time, Erdelyi was an employee of a licensed privatе investigator, though not herself a licensed private investigator. She had not been issued a concealed weapons license in the past.
The governing California statute provides as follows:
(a) The sheriff of a county or the chief ... of ... police ... of any city or city аnd county, upon proof that the person applying is of good moral character, that good cause exists for the issuance, and that the person applying is a resident of the county, may issue to such person a license to carry concealed a ... firearm for any period of time not to exceed one year from the date of the license ....
(b) A license may include any reasonable restrictions or conditions which the issuing authority deems warranted, including restrictions as to the time, place, and circumstances under which the person may carry a concealed firearm.
O‘Brien investigated Erdelyi‘s application and denied it. O‘Brien met with Erdelyi at her request. He told her why he had denied the application, she stated why it should have been granted, and he again deсlined to issue a license.
Erdelyi then brought this suit in federal district court under
1. Property
Prоperty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever а person has only “an abstract need or desire for,” or “unilateral expectation of,” a benefit. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Rather, they arise from “legitimate claim(s) of entitlement ... defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id.; Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1980).
Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. See Dangerous Weapons Control Law,
2. Liberty
Although liberty is a “broad and majestic term,” Roth, 408 U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct. at 2705, it is not all-inclusive. It does, however, include the right to be free from actions which “impose( ) ‘a stigma or other disability that foreclose(s) (one‘s) freedom to take advantage of other employmеnt opportunities.’ ” Soderback v. Siler, 610 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707).
Erdelyi does not, and could not, argue that she has an absolute liberty to carry a concеaled weapon. She claims that O‘Brien‘s action foreclosed her freedom to work as a criminal defеnse investigator because it is dangerous for her to undertake that work without carrying a concealed weаpon.
In Soderback, supra, 610 F.2d 643, a seaman was denied licenses to serve as a merchant marine officer.1 Because he wаs not disqualified from “his basic occupation as a merchant mariner,” and because the denial “was not based on charges of dishonesty, crime, or immorality to which any stigma is attached,” id. at 646, we held that he had not been deprivеd of liberty. The same reasoning applies to this case. First, it is undisputed that many people engage in the oсcupations of private investigator and criminal defense investigator without a concealed weapons license. Although Erdelyi might not be able to pursue her profession in precisely the way she would like, she has not bеen entirely, or even substantially, excluded. Second, no stigma attached to the denial of her application. Therefore, Erdelyi did not have a liberty interest in obtaining a concealed weapons license.2
Conclusion
Since Erdelyi did not have a property or liberty interest in a concealed weapons license, the Due Process Clause did not require defendants to provide her with due process before denying her initial applicatiоn for a license. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 569-71, 92 S.Ct. at 2705. We therefore need not decide whether the meeting with O‘Brien would have satisfied due proсess requirements.
AFFIRMED.