¶1 Mаrtha Equihua, personal representative for the estate of Julio Preciado, appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Carondelet St. Mary’s Hospital (“St. Mary’s”) on Equihua’s claim for abuse under the Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”) and wrongful death. On appeal, Equihua argues the trial court erred in finding that her claim did not fall under the APSA and that her wrongftd death claim therefore also failed. Because we find Equi-hua properly alleged actionable abuse under the APSA, we reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ 2 On appeal from summary judgment, we view the facts and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
¶ 3 In Februаry 2010, Preciado was taken back to the emergency room at St. Mary’s and admitted for an abnormal heart rate and head and neck pain following a fall at the residential care facility. After he was admitted, St. Mary’s administered tube feeding to Preciado for apрroximately 6.5 hours. After his feeding was complete, Preeiado’s nurses noticed his respiratory rate had risen, his abdomen was distended, the feeding tube had a large amount of “residual volume,” and there was a “crackling” sound coming from Preciado’s lungs. Later that day, Preciadо went into respiratory distress and subsequently died from a pulmonary hemorrhage secondary to coagulopathy.
¶4 Following Preciado’s death, Equihua filed an APSA and wrongful death claim against St. Mary’s, Preciado’s residential care facility, and the nurse and physician assigned to сare for Preciado at that facility. The trial court granted summary judgment to St. Mary’s, concluding the APSA did not apply to Equihua’s allegations that St. Mary’s was negligent during Preciado’s tube feeding. The court additionally ruled that because the wrongful death claim was predicated on the APSA сlaim, it necessarily faded as well. The trial court entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. We have jurisdiction over Equihua’s appeal pursuant to AR.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Adult Protective Services Act
¶ 5 Equihua argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to St. Mary’s because her claim falls under the APSA based on the factors enumerated in Estate of McGill ex rel. McGill v. Albrecht,
¶ 6 The APSA “provides a statutory cause of action for incapacitated or vulnerable adults who are the victims of neglect, abuse or exploitation.” In re Estate of Wyttenbach,
¶ 7 As relevant here, the APSA provides that “[a] vulnerable adult whose life or health is being or has been endangered or injured by neglect, abuse or exploitation may file an action ... against any person or enterprise that has been employed to provide care, [or] that has assumed a legal duty to provide care.” § 46-455(33). Abuse includes “injury caused by negligent acts or omissions.” AR.S. § 46-451(A)(l)(b). A vulnerable adult is defined as “an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who is unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of a physical or mental impairment.” § 46-451(A)(9). The parties do not dispute that Preciado was a vulnerable adult under the APSA See § 46-455(B). Additionally, the term “care”
¶ 8 To establish a claim for actionable abuse under the APSA, the negligent act or acts alleged “(1) must arise from the relationship of caregiver and recipient, (2) must be closely connected to that relationship, (3) must be linked to the service the caregiver undertook because of the recipient’s incapacity, and (4) must be related to the problem or problems that caused the incapacity.” Estate of McGill,
¶ 9 Here, St. Mary’s was providing care pursuant to § 46-455(B) while Preciado was its patient by undertaking various services, including feeding Preciado via his PEG tube. See Estate of Wyatt, 232 Ariz. at ¶ 8,
¶ 10 St. Mary’s, howevеr, argues that courts should look only to the primary reason the vulnerable adult was admitted when determining whether a claim properly falls under the APSA. St. Mary’s contends it only undertook acute care services to treat the conditions that Preciado was admitted for— head and neck pain and an irregular heartbeat. Thus, it argues, the act of feeding Preciado via his PEG tube was only an “incidental accommodation[ ]” that does not trigger an APSA claim.
¶ 11 This court recently addressed whether acute care hospitals, like St. Mary’s, are exempt from liability under the APSA In Estate of Wyatt,
¶ 12 Similarly, under the plain meaning of the statute, St. Mary’s is an enterрrise that has been employed to provide care and did provide care to Preciado. See § 46-455; Estate of Wyatt,
¶ 13 St. Mary’s additionally argues that finding Equihua’s claim falls under the
¶ 14 Finally, St. Mary’s argues that, under Wyatt, any alleged negligence related to Preciado’s tube feeding is not actionable under the APSA because it was only a single act of negligence. See Estate of Wyatt,
¶ 15 Equihua additionally argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of St. Mary’s on her wrongful death claim. In the triаl court’s ruling, it simply stated “[t]he Plaintiffs wrongful death claim is predicated on the APSA claim. If the underlying tort claim fails as a matter of law, so, too, does the wrongful death claim.” Because the trial court erred in finding that Equihua’s claim did not fall under the APSA, it also erred in granting summary judgment on the wrongful deаth claim because that ruling was predicated on its APSA ruling. St. Mary’s argues alternatively that we can affirm the trial court’s ruling because a wrongful death claim cannot be predicated on an APSA claim. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is legally correct for any reason. Forszt v. Rodriguez,
¶ 16 St. Mary’s contends that under In re Estate of Winn,
¶ 17 St. Mary’s also argues that Equihua’s wrongful death claim cannot stand because she “positively disavowed” any claim under the Medical Malрractice Act (“MMA”). It reasons that any claim for wrongful death stemming from a health care provider’s negligence must be predicated upon an MMA claim. St. Mary’s cites only AR.S. § 12-561(2),
¶ 18 Equihua, however, responds that amendment of her complaint is unnecessary based on Cornerstone Hosp. of Se. Ariz., L.L.C. v. Marner,
¶ 19 In Cornerstone, this court found, as a matter of first impression, that statutes governing expert witness qualifications in MMA actions apply equally to APSA claims based on medical negligenсe. See id. ¶¶ 7, 14. The court concluded the plaintiff in Cornerstone had alleged medical malpractice in his complaint under § 12-561(2), even though the complaint purported to bring an action solely under the APSA Id. ¶¶2, 21. The fact that claims of medical negligence and malpractice “involve a vulnerable adult and may be brought under APSA dоes not change their nature.” Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 20 The trial court' in this case correctly recognized that Equihua’s “allegation against [St. Mary’s] clearly sets out a claim for medical malpractice.” Thus, amendment of the complaint is not the issue. Cornerstone was not decided until several months after the trial court’s decision in this case. And the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on any issues that may arise based on Cornerstone. We will not rule on an issue not properly presented to the trial court. Airfreight Exp. Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc.,
Disposition
¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order granting summary judgment in favor of St. Mary’s on Equihua’s APSA and wrongful death claims and remand for further proceedings.