MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“the EEOC”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 22] and PlaintiffIntervenor Grant Habighorst’s (“Habighorst”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 26] (collectively, “Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings” or “Motions”). The Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings relate only to Defendant Cummins Power Generation Ine.’s (“Cummins”) defense that the EEOC and Habighorst failed to join indispensable parties. All parties submitted briefing on the Motions. A hearing on the Motions was held on July 30, 2015.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are granted.
A. Factual Background
Habighorst began working for Cummins in August 2012. (Complaint at ¶ 14 (“Compl.”) [Doc. No. 1]; Defendant’s First Amended Answer at ¶ 14 (“Amend.Ans.”) [Doc. No. 15].) Shortly thereafter, in October 2012, Cummins required Habighorst to undergo a fitness-for-duty assessment (“Assessment”). (Compl. at ¶ 15; Amend. Ans. at ¶ 15.) There is no dispute that Cummins was entitled to require Habighorst to undergo the Assessment. (EEOC’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4 n.l (“Pl.’s Memo.”) [Doc. No. 23]; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to EEOC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2 (“Def.’s Resp. Memo.”) [Doc. No. 33].)
Cummins contracts with a vendor, Cigna, to conduct fitness-for-duty assessments of its employees. (Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 3; Pl.’s Memo, at 2-3; see Amend. Ans. at ¶¶24-25.)
Habighorst objected to the Cigna Authorization because he believed it required him to disclose personal medical information not related to his work at Cummins and did not identify to whom this information would be released. (Amend. Ans. at ¶ 25; Compl. at ¶¶ 23-25; see Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 3; Pl.’s Memo, at 3.) Cummins and Habighorst discussed his objections to the Cigna Authorization in an attempt to resolve them.
According to Cummins, at Habighorst’s request that his Assessment be administered by an alternative provider, it approached Dr. Charles Pearson (“Pearson”) about conducting Habighorst’s Assessment. (Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 4; see Pl.’s Memo, at 3 (describing Pearson’s contact with Habighorst).) Precisely what, if any, relationship was formed between Pearson and Cummins is unclear. (See Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 4 (describing “discussions” between Cummins and Pearson related to Habighorst’s Assessment).)
B. Procedural Background
Based on the aforementioned facts, Habighorst filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008 (“ADA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). (Compl. at ¶10.) The EEOC determined there was reasonable cause to believe Cummins discriminated and retaliated against Habighorst and invited Cummins to engage in conciliation efforts. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) These conciliation efforts were unsuccessful. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
The EEOC then initiated suit against Cummins bringing claims under the ADA and GINA
Cummins subsequently filed an Amended Answer. It asserts numerous defenses, the relevant ones to the Motions being: (1) that the EEOC failed to join indispensable parties, specifically the authors of the Cigna Authorization and Pearson Form (Amend. Ans. at ¶ 67); and (2) that “the forms to which Plaintiff objects are not attributable to Cummins,” (collectively, “the Indispensable Parties Defense”).
The EEOC and Habighorst subsequently filed the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Cummins opposes the EEOC’s motion with two primary challenges. First, Cummins alleges a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not the appropriate means to challenge its Indispensable Parties Defense. (See Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 5-8.) Second, Cummins contends the EEOC’s motion must fail because Cigna and Pearson are indispensable parties under Rule 19, (see id. at 8-9), the EEOC fails to meet the requirements for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, (see id. at 9-10), and the case law on which the EEOC relies is inapplicable to the matter at bar, (see id. at 10-11).
For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Cummins’ Indispensable Parties Defense.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard for Rule 12(c) and Rule 19
The EEOC and Habighorst have moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), for judgment on the pleadings as to the Indispensable Parties Defense. “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if there is no material issue of fact to be resolved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Buddy Bean Lumber Co. v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co.,
Determining whether a non-party is “indispensable” pursuant to Rule 19 is a two-step process. Rochester Methodist Hosp. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
B. A Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings May Be Used to Challenge a Defense of Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
Cummins argues the EEOC “has attempted to bypass the proper standard of review and time limit” by bringing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(e). (Def.’s Resp. Memo, at 5.) The “proper” standard for review, according to Cummins, is that of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike a pleading. (See id. at 5-6.)
Notably, the standards of review for Rule 12(c) and 12(f) are similar. “A [R]ule 12(f) motion to strike will be granted only where the Court is convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the defenses succeed.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. R-C Mktg. & Leasing, Inc.,
The EEOC repeatedly asserts that although any and all facts could be assumed and construed in favor of Cummins, the Indispensable Parties Defense fails as a matter of law. (See PL’s Memo, at 7 (“even if the EEOC assumes all facts that Cummins has raised or could raise, Cummins cannot establish that Cigna or any other author of the releases are indispensable parties”); Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at 5 (“PL’s Reply”) [Doc. No. 35] (“The facts are irrelevant. Cummins cannot prevail on its defense as a matter of law.”).) Pursuant to the Rule 12(c) standard of review, and the EEOC’s urging, this Court has construed all facts and inferences in favor of Cummins. However, as described below, the Indispensable Party Defense fails as a matter of law. Thus, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is an appropriate means to challenge the Indispensable Parties Defense.
C. The Indispensable Party Defense Fails As A Matter of Law
Under no set of factual circumstances can Cigna, Pearson, or any other author of the Cigna Authorization or Pearson Form be considered indispensable under Rule 19. Since joinder of Cigna, Pearson, or any other author of the forms is not necessary under Rule 19(a)(1), the inquiry ends without consideration of Rule 19(b).
1. Complete relief is possible amongst the present parties without joining Cigna or Pearson
Cummins is liable for the Cigna Authorization and Pearson Form to the extent either violates the ADA or GINA
In Norris, the state of Arizona (“the State”) offered its employees the opportunity to enroll in various retirement benefit plans.
The Supreme Court concluded that the State would have violated Title VII had it run the retirement plans itself. Id. at 1086,
To support this conclusion, the Court noted that Title VII made compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment the ultimate responsibility of an employer. Id. Thus, an employer who adopted a benefit plan that discriminated on an impermissible basis “violates Title VII regardless of whether third parties are also involved in the discrimination.’’ Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that it was “well established” that any party to a discriminatory contract was liable for discrimination which occurred under that contract. Id. at 1090,
Norris is analogous to the present matter. Like Title VII, both the ADA and GINA make it an employer’s responsibility to ensure fitness-for-duty exams are conducted in a nondiscriminatory way. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (prohibiting an employer from requiring a medical exam or inquiring “of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l(b) (making it unlawful for an employer “to request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a family member of the employee” except under certain circumstances). As Habighorst’s employer,
Also like Title VII, the ADA has a broad remedial purpose in preventing and remedying discriminatory employment practices.
Cummins is liable for any violation of the ADA or GINA arising from Habighorst’s Assessment. Any damages would be collectible from Cummins and any injunctive relief would be binding on Cummins and its agents. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2) (making injunctive relief binding on parties, employees and agents of parties, and those in “active concert or participation” with the same). Thus, complete relief is possible without joining Cigna or Pearson.
2. Neither Cigna nor Pearson has an interest relating to the claims against Cummins such that their absence would impair or impede that interest
The EEOC presented argument regarding whether an employer has a statutory or common law claim to contribution or indemnification related to liability incurred under antidiscrimination laws. (See Pl.’s Memo, at 14-15; Pl.’s Reply at 6.) According to the EEOC, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO,
When considering whether a non-party is necessary under Rule 19(a)(1), “ ’[t]he focus is on relief between the parties and not on the speculative possibility of further litigation between a party and an absent person.’ ” Gwartz v. Jefferson Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n,
Cigna, Pearson, or any other author of the Cigna Authorization or Pearson Form does not have an interest which the resolution of this matter would impair. The fact that Cummins might later seek indemnification or contribution from Cigna or Pearson does not create an interest that makes them necessary parties here. See Rochester Methodist Hosp.,
3. Cummins does not face a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations because of an interest held by Cigna or Pearson
Rule 19(a)(l)(B)(ii) makes a third-party whose interest would subject an existing party to a “substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations,” a necessary party.
Inconsistent obligations, however, are distinct from inconsistent adjudications or results. Obligations are inconsistent if a party is unable to comply with one court’s order without breaching another court’s order concerning the same incident. Inconsistent adjudications or results, by contrast, occur when a defendant successfully defends a claim in one forum, yet loses on another claim arising from the same incident in another forum. Rule 19(a)(l)(B)(ii)*103 is not concerned with inconsistent adjudications.
Am. Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.,
Cummins presents no argument that it would face inconsistent obligations because of an interest held by Cigna, Pearson, or any other author of the Cigna Authorization or Pearson Form. (See generally Def.’s Resp. Memo.) The EEOC could not envision how such inconsistent obligations would arise here. (Pl.’s Memo, at 16.) Nor can the Court deduce such a scenario.
The Court finds that Cigna, Pearson, and any other author of the Cigna Authorization or Pearson Form are not necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(1). Thus, they cannot be considered “indispensable” under Rule 19. See Rochester Methodist Hosp.,
III. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 22] is GRANTED;
2. Defendant Cummins’ indispensable party defense (consisting of the Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Defenses in Defendant’s First Amended Answer [Doc. No. 15]) is STRICKEN/DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3. Plaintiff-Intervenor Habighorst’s Motion for Judgment on Pleadings [Doc. No. 26] is GRANTED; and
4. Defendant Cummins’ indispensable party defense (consisting of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Defenses in Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff-Intervenor [Doc. No. 17]) is STRICKEN/DISMISSED WITH PREJTJDICE.
Notes
. Cummins, through its counsel, confirmed this contractual relationship with Cigna during the hearing on the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
. It appears that in this process Cummins asked Cigna if the Cigna Authorization could be modified to address some of Habighorst's concerns, but was informed that such modification was not possible. (See Ex. D to the Declaration of Laurie A. Vasichek at Response to Interrogatory No. 4 [Doc. No. 24-4].)
. During the hearing on the Motions, Cummins, through counsel, denied any agency relationship was formed between it and Pearson, or that Pearson was ever formally engaged to conduct Habighorst’s Assessment.
. It is unclear from the record whether Habighorst objected to the Pearson Form before it
. The EEOC states Habighorst's termination occurred in January 2012. (Compl. at ¶27; PI. Memo, at 3.) However, considering Habighorst was not hired by Cummins until August 2012 and the Assessment was not sought until October 2012, the Court assumes this is an inadvertent error and the EEOC agrees Habighorst was terminated in January 2013.
. Habighorst was allowed to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). (Order dated February 19, 2015 [Doc. No. 10].)
. Habighorst filed a complaint which in all relevant ways mirrors the EEOC’s complaint. (See Plaintiff-Intervenor Complaint [Doc. No. 11].) Cummins answered this complaint in nearly identical terms as its amended answer to the EEOC's complaint, (see Answer to Plaintiff-Intervenor [Doc. No. 17]), including the same Indispensable Parties Defense. (See id. at ¶¶ 69-70.)
. Habighorst's motion and related memorandum merely adopt the reasoning and arguments of the EEOC. (See Doc. Nos. 28, 36.) Similarly, Cummins' response to Habighorst’s motion simply reasserts its arguments against the EEOC's motion. (See Doc. No. 34.) Thus, the analysis addressing the arguments regarding the EEOC's motion will apply equally to Habighorst’s motion.
. Cummins also raises issues related to the EEOC’s characterization of the Indisputable Parties Defense as an affirmative defense, (see Def.'s Resp. Memo at 11-13), the EEOC’s alleged failure to provide a basis for considering documents outside the pleadings, (see id. at 13-14), and an argument that the EEOC’s motion is an unnecessary drain on judicial resources. (See id. at 14-15.) However, because the Court’s decision to grant the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings does not depend on any of these issues, it is unnecessary to address Cummins' related arguments.
. To be clear, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court makes no determination whether either form in fact violates the ADA or GINA. Such a determination is not necessary to resolve the issue presently before the Court.
. The Court notes that the Eighth Circuit has yet to address whether GINA carries a similar broad remedial purpose. However, given that GINA’s title expressly mentions nondiscrimination, and the marked similarities between its language and the ADA, compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-l with 42 U.S.C. § 12112, it is reasonable to assume GINA carries a similar broad remedial purpose.
. Notably, Rule 19(a)(1)(B) speaks to situations where the non-party claims an interest in the subject of the action. Neither Cigna nor Pearson has claimed any interest in the EEOC's suit against Cummins. See Insignia Sys., Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., No. 04-cv-4213 (JRT/AJB),