Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. Dave Hall, Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. Fluor Federal Global Projects, Inc.; Fluor Corporation; Fluor Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.
Case No. 6:22-cv-01960-JDA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION
April 14, 2025
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC“) and Defendants Fluor Federal Global Projects, Inc. (“FFGP“); Fluor Corporation; and Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants“). [Docs. 154; 156.] The EEOC filed this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“) on September 30, 2021, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. [Doc. 1.] Subsequently, the EEOC filed an Amended Complaint, and Dave Hall was granted the right to intervene. [Docs. 5; 16.] On June 22, 2022, the case was transferred to this Court. [Doc. 22.] In accordance with
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See
BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); see also Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir. 2013). Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the summary judgment record reveals the following facts.
The Military‘s Fitness-For-Duty Standards
FFGP hired Hall in June 2010 as a food services worker for a project in Afghanistan, and Hall was elevated to a Senior MWR Technician prior to his termination on August 29, 2019. [Docs. 156-3 at 9 (95:5-8); 156-4; 156-11; 156-24 at 5.] FFGP employed Hall in connection with the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (“LOGCAP“) IV contract with the U.S. Military, which explicitly required FFGP‘s compliance with Department of Defense (“DoD“) and U.S. Central Command (“CENTCOM“) “fitness for duty” standards. [Doc. 156-6 ¶¶ 3-4; 156-7 at 10-11; 156-8 ¶¶ 5-6.] Specifically, FFGP was required to “ensure the individuals they deploy are in compliance with the current USCENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual/Unit Deployment Policy, including TAB A, Amplification of the Minimal Standards of Fitness for Deployment to the CENTCOM [Area of Responsibility], unless a waiver is obtained in accordance with TAB C, CENTCOM Waiver Request.” [Doc. 156-7 at 10.] At the time Hall was terminated, the “Modification Thirteen” or “MOD 13” was the Individual Protection and Individual/Unit Deployment Policy in effect. [Docs. 156-6 ¶ 4; 156-8 ¶ 7.]
E. Cancer:
1. Cancer for which the individual is receiving continuing treatment or which requires frequent subspecialist examination and/or laboratory testing during the anticipated duration of the deployment. . . .
. . . .
3. All cancers should be in complete remission for at least a year before a waiver is submitted.
[Doc. 156-9 at 27, 31.]
Occucare‘s Application of MOD 13
Fluor International Inc. contracted with Occucare International (“Occucare“) to conduct employee fitness-for-duty examinations for FFGP employees. [Docs. 156-6 ¶ 5; 156-39 ¶¶ 1-2.] At the time in question, the parties’ contract provided that Occucare was solely responsible for making fitness-for-duty determinations, applying the Minimum Standards set forth in MOD 13, and deciding whether a waiver request could or would be submitted to the Military. [Docs. 156-6 ¶ 5; 156-39 ¶ 3.] Its decisions were based on directives gained by a review of MOD 13 and PPG-Tab-A to MOD 13 as well as through experience and interaction with the Command Surgeon General and/or their designees. [Doc. 156-39 ¶ 3.]
Hall is Diagnosed with Prostate Cancer, Undergoes a Prostatectomy, and is Medically Disqualified from Continuing to Work
In the summer of 2019, Hall received a diagnosis of prostate cancer, decided to have surgery to remove his prostate, and informed FFGP of the upcoming procedure. [Doc. 156-3 at 11 (101:13-103:8).] On August 9, 2019, Hall emailed FFGP a note from his physician, Dr. Scott Miller, stating that his surgery was scheduled for August 12, 2019, and that he would have a “2-3 week post-op recovery.” [Doc. 156-12 at 2-3.] FFGP subsequently placed Hall on medical leave. [Doc. 156-13 at 2-3.]
On August 27, 2019, Hall submitted his return-to-work paperwork, completed by Dr. Miller, which stated that Hall was “[c]leared to work.” [Doc. 156-15; see Doc. 156-3 at 12 (119:23-120:10).] An Operative Note attached to the paperwork stated that Dr. Miller found “[n]o evidence of disease outside of the prostate.” [Doc. 156-15 at 4.] FFGP forwarded Hall‘s return-to-work paperwork to Occucare that same day. [Doc. 156-16.]
Hoping to continue working for FFGP, Hall spoke with April Rabb around August 29, 2019, and told her that even if he was not fit to continue in Afghanistan, he was otherwise fit to work and asked if there were positions for him in the United States. [Doc. 156-3 at 6 (66:3-67:10).] She told him that they had “to follow protocol” and they would do “whatever Occu[c]are said.” [Id. (67:3-13).]
Hall filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC (the “EEOC Charge“) on or around September 10, 2019, alleging he was discharged because of his disability in violation of the ADA. [Doc. 156-30.] On May 12, 2021, the EEOC issued a letter of determination, concluding there was reason to believe violations of the ADA had occurred and inviting the parties to join in conciliation efforts. [Doc. 156-36.] On June 7, 2021, the EEOC issued a notice of failure of conciliation, advising Defendants that it had been unable to secure from Defendants a conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC. [Docs. 5 ¶ 12; 74 ¶ 12.]
The EEOC subsequently filed this action. [Doc. 1.] Its Amended Complaint asserts a single claim alleging that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Hall on the basis of his disability in violation of the ADA because they “could have provided Hall with a waiver that would have allowed him to return to work, in accordance with the DoD MOD 13 Fitness for Duty standards but failed to do so.” [Doc. 5 ¶ 24.] The EEOC seeks injunctive relief, back and front pay, actual and punitive damages, and court costs. [Id. at 6-7.] Hall‘s Intervenor Complaint alleges that he was terminated as a result of intentional disability discrimination and that Defendants denied him a reasonable accommodation in violation of
Summary Judgment Standard
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant‘s position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
As a threshold matter, in support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants Fluor Corporation and Fluor Enterprises, Inc. argued that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis that Hall failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to them because he did not name either of them in the EEOC Charge and instead identified his employer as “Fluor Federal Global.” [Doc. 156-1 at 31-32.] The Magistrate Judge concluded that the EEOC Charge was sufficient to exhaust Hall‘s administrative remedies against all Defendants, applying the “substantial identity exception.” [Doc. 192 at 11-14.] Defendants object to the conclusion that they are not entitled to summary judgment on the exhaustion issue and alternatively object to the conclusion that exhaustion does not
Before filing suit under the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC.
“Generally, failure to name a party in the EEOC charge means the plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies against that party, and a district court must dismiss the case.” Waters v. Univar Sols. USA, Inc., No. 2:22-02071-DCN-MGB, 2023 WL 1479095, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2023). Though the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue,
The EEOC Charge in this case was filed on September 10, 2019, at a time when Hall was not represented, even though he subsequently retained counsel. [Docs. 156-30; 156-34; 163-15.] Defendants contend that because Hall could have amended the EEOC Charge once he obtained counsel, the Waters exception to the “substantial identity” exception does not apply. [See Docs. 195 at 28; 156-1 at 31-32 (citing
Both Waters and the case on which it relies, Olvera-Morales, specifically state that they decline to apply the substantial identity exception “when an attorney prepares the EEOC charge on behalf of its client.” Waters, 2023 WL 1479095, at *4; see also Olvera-Morales, 2008 WL 939180, at *2 (declining to apply the substantial identi[t]y exception because the plaintiff “was represented by counsel at the time she filed her initial EEOC complaint“). Hall was not represented by counsel at the time he filed his charge with the EEOC and, thus, the liberality afford[ed] lay pleadings is applicable to his charge. See Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that because lawyers do not typically complete EEOC charges, district courts must construe them liberally).
[Doc. 192 at 13.] The Magistrate Judge also noted several courts have held that the substantial identity test applies regardless of whether the plaintiff is represented by counsel when the charge is filed. [Id. n.4 (citing EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2014); Turk v. Salisbury Behavioral Health, Inc., No. 09-CV-6181, 2010 WL 1718268, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2010); Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)).]. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge‘s reasoning and his conclusion that Hall exhausted his administrative remedies as against all Defendants. Defendants’ objection is therefore overruled.
The ADA Claims
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
As noted, both the EEOC, in its Amended Complaint, and Hall, in his Intervenor Complaint, assert disparate-treatment claims under the ADA alleging that Hall‘s employment was terminated because of his disability. In their objections, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending that Defendants’ summary judgment motion be denied as to these claims. [Doc. 195 at 20-23.] The Court agrees.
Where an employee presents no direct evidence of discrimination, the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to a plaintiff‘s wrongful termination claim under the ADA. See Neal v. E. Carolina Univ., 53 F.4th 130, 135 (4th Cir. 2022). Therefore, absent evidence of discrimination and where the relevant prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged wrongful termination, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that reason is a pretext for disability discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. To establish a prima facie claim for ADA wrongful termination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) []he was a ‘qualified individual with a disability‘; (2) []he was discharged; (3) []he was fulfilling h[is] employer‘s legitimate expectations at the time of discharge; and (4) the circumstances of h[is] discharge raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 272 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004).
As to the prima facie case, Defendants argued in support of their summary judgment motion that the EEOC and Hall (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) have not forecasted sufficient evidence of the fourth element—that Hall‘s discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination—nor is there
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. [Doc. 192 at 28-29.] He reasoned that “there is direct evidence in the record that Defendants terminated Hall‘s employment because of his cancer” insofar as it is undisputed that the fact that Hall‘s cancer had not been in remission for at least one year was the reason that he could not satisfy the applicable fitness-for-duty standards. [Id.] The Magistrate Judge specifically observed that
In their objections and in supplemental briefing, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not plead discrimination under
As the Supreme Court has observed, “[b]oth disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.” Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (noting that the ADA defines “discriminate” to include “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration . . . that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability” and “using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Court explained, “[l]iability in a disparate-treatment case depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer‘s decision,” while “disparate-impact claims involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Id. at 52 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs concede that only disparate-treatment claims are pled here. [See Docs. 215 at 1, 3; 216 at 2.]
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Raytheon is instructive. In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed facts analogous to those before the Court in the present case
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the Court of Appeals erred by conflating the analytical framework for disparate-impact and disparate treatment claims.” Id. at 51. Regarding the Ninth Circuit‘s conclusion that the employer‘s policy screened out persons with a record of addiction and that the employer had not raised a business necessity defense, the Court explained that those are “factors that pertain to disparate-impact claims but not disparate-treatment claims.” Id. at 54. “Had the Court of Appeals correctly applied the disparate-treatment framework, it would have been obliged to conclude that a neutral no-rehire policy is, by definition, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the ADA,” and thus the only issue that would have remained would be
By improperly focusing on [disparate-impact] factors, the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the [employer‘s] no-hire policy is a quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was terminated for violating workplace conduct rules. If [the employer] did indeed apply a neutral, generally applicable no-rehire policy in rejecting [the employee‘s] application, [the employer‘s] decision not to rehire [the employee] can, in no way, be said to have been motivated by [the employee‘s] disability.
In a footnote, the Supreme Court also rejected a suggestion by the Ninth Circuit that the refusal to rehire the employee violated the ADA because his workplace misconduct was related to his disability. Id. at 54 n.6. The Court noted that it had rejected a similar argument in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993), in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 54 n.6; Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., 117 F.4th 165, 177 (4th Cir. 2024) (“Even when a protected characteristic is ‘correlated’ with the reason given by an employer for the adverse employment decision, such as an employee‘s pension status [would be to his age], that doesn‘t make the reason unlawfully discriminatory.” (citing Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611)).
The same reasoning applies in the present case. As the Ninth Circuit did in Raytheon, the Magistrate Judge erred in this disparate-treatment case by not applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for purposes of analyzing whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment and by, instead, considering whether Defendants relied on a policy that “screen[ed] out” the disabled and whether they
As in Raytheon, because the employer‘s proffered reason for the employment action is legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the only remaining question is whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether the proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination. See id. at 51-53 (holding that in a disparate treatment case, the court must look no further than determining whether the employer‘s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for acting based on the employee‘s disability). There is no such genuine dispute here. Defendants’ evidence was undisputed that under the relevant contract, Occucare was solely responsible for making fitness-for-duty determinations, including whether to apply for waivers; that FFGP employees were not involved in the determination that Hall was not fit for duty or in the decision not to seek a
As noted, although the EEOC‘s Amended Complaint alleges only a disparate-treatment claim,8 Hall‘s Intervenor Complaint also includes a failure-to-accommodate claim. The Court therefore turns to that claim.
Discrimination in the failure-to-accommodate context includes refusing to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.”
The Magistrate Judge concluded that there were at least genuine disputes of material fact concerning several issues related to Hall‘s failure-to-accommodate claim: (1) whether Hall had a record of physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
In their objections, Defendants challenge each of these conclusions. [Doc. 195.] The Court considers the objections seriatim.
Whether Hall Had a Disability Within the Statutory Meaning
The ADA provides that the term “disability” includes “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” or “a record of such an impairment.”9
Determining whether a plaintiff is disabled requires “an individualized inquiry, particular to the facts of each case.” EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001). Congress has enacted several rules of construction regarding the definition of disability: (1) the definition should be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals; (2) “substantially limits” should be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Finally, the Court notes that “whether an employee had an impairment and whether the conduct affected is a major life activity are questions of law for the court, but whether the impairment substantially limits the major life activity is a question of fact.” Donald v. S.C. Dep‘t of Prob. Parole & Pardon Servs., No. 3:19-1045-SAL-SVH, 2020 WL 2735981, at *4 (D.S.C. May 7, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 2732342 (D.S.C. May 26, 2020); see Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 851 F. App‘x 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2021) (concluding that there was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether” the plaintiff‘s impairment interfered with a major life activity to such a degree as to amount to a disability); J.D. by Doherty v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 671 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that “the district court correctly determined that [the plaintiff] has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he is disabled“).
In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs did not forecast evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether, at the relevant time, Hall had an actual disability or a record of impairment. [Doc. 156-1 at 16-20.] The Magistrate Judge agreed in part with Defendants, concluding that “the evidence in the record fails to show that Hall was actually disabled at the time of his termination,” but the Magistrate Judge also concluded that Hall had “a record of impairment because he has a history of cancer, which substantially limits a major life activity.” [Doc. 192 at 26-27.] The Magistrate Judge concluded that Hall had a record of impairment because it is undisputed that he received a cancer diagnosis in July 2019 and underwent cancer surgery in August 2019. [Id. at 26-27.]
In their objections, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that Hall had a record of impairment. [Doc. 195 at 17-19.] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show that Hall had a record of impairment because they cannot demonstrate that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity. [Id.] Defendants argue that, at the very least, the record-of-impairment issue presents a
“Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive analysis.”
In the Court‘s view, especially given the requirement that the statutory text be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, that Hall underwent surgery to treat his cancer warrants a reasonable inference that it negatively affected his cell growth as compared to most people in the general population. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the forecasted evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the history of Hall‘s cancer and cancer surgery amounted to a record of impairment so as to satisfy the ADA‘s definition of disability. Cf. Watkins v. Shriners Hosps. for Child, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS, 2020 WL 2309468, at *5 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020) (holding that when a plaintiff had been diagnosed with a very aggressive form of nearly stage III invasive breast cancer and had surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, that was “a strong indication of how the invasive nature of the ductal breast cancer modified [the plaintiff‘s] cell-growth normalcy” and thus, “even without medical documentation or expert testimony, a juror could reasonably infer that [her] cancer substantially impaired her body‘s ability to normally grow and produce cells, when compared with the general, non-
Whether Hall Requested an Accommodation
Defendants argued in support of their summary judgment motion that Hall never requested an accommodation and thus never triggered Defendants’ duty to determine whether an accommodation was available. [Doc. 156-1 at 21-22.] The Magistrate Judge
“The duty to engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation is generally triggered when an employee communicates to his employer his disability and his desire for an accommodation for that disability.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2013). “Before [an employer‘s] duty to provide reasonable accommodation—or even to participate in the ‘interactive process‘—is triggered under the ADA, the employee must make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice.” EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011). “It is not difficult to request an accommodation. To trigger an employer‘s duty to accommodate, a disabled employee need only communicate his disability and desire for an accommodation.” Kelly v. Town of Abbington, Va., 90 F.4th 158, 166 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). The employee “need not specify the precise limitations resulting from the disability, or identify a specific reasonable accommodation.” Id. (cleaned up). And the employee “need not formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation.‘” Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hall testified that shortly after he was notified he was being released from the project, he had a phone call with Fluor‘s April Rabb around August 29, 2019, and he asked, “[I]f I‘m not fit to go back to Afghanistan but I‘m fit to work, is there any possibility that I could get something anywhere in the States?” [Docs. 156-3 at 6 (66:3-67:10).]
Whether a Reasonable Accommodation Was Available for Hall‘s Record of Disability
The Magistrate Judge concluded a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether submitting a waiver under MOD 13 or reassigning Hall to a vacant position were available accommodations for his record of disability. [Doc. 192 at 33-35.] In their objections, Defendants argue that “[a]n employer‘s duty to accommodate a ‘record of’ a disability is intended to allow for follow-up appointments or other items related to a past disability in the record,” but that “[t]he accommodations that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly found” as available “in this case did not relate to a past disability, such as follow-up appointments, but [Hall‘s] . . . outright failure to qualify for deployment under the relevant [DoD] standards—an essential job function.” [Doc. 195 at 24.] They also contend that Plaintiffs have not forecasted evidence sufficient to create a fact issue as to
A “reasonable accommodation” is defined to include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” as well as “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”
As for accommodating an employee‘s record of disability, the ADA‘s implementing regulations provide,
An individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment may be entitled, absent undue hardship, to a reasonable accommodation if needed and related to the past disability. For example, an employee with an impairment that
previously limited, but no longer substantially limits, a major life activity may need leave or a schedule change to permit him or her to attend follow-up or “monitoring” appointments with a health care provider.
Additionally, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Hall‘s resume at least creates a fact question as to whether he was qualified to perform the essential functions of a vacant position that did not have the same fitness-for-duty requirements.12 [Doc. 192 at 35.]; see Williams v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. 2:10-1546-RMG, 2012 WL 601867, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2012). Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants’ objection to the Magistrate Judge‘s conclusion that there exists a genuine dispute of material fact
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court accepts in part, modifies in part, and rejects in part the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. 156] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the EEOC‘s motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. 154] is DENIED. Defendants’ summary judgment motion is granted as to the EEOC‘s and Hall‘s disparate-treatment claims and as to their requests for punitive damages and denied as to Hall‘s failure-to-accommodate claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
April 14, 2025