131 Ga. 64 | Ga. | 1908
In a suit for injunction material allegations upon which, the plaintiffs had based their claim for equitable relief were denied. On the trial it was admitted that the only question at issue was which of the parties should pay the costs of court. When that announcement was made, the judge did not suspend the trial of the main ease and in the exercise of a sound discretion proceed to tax the costs, as he is permitted to do in equity cases (see Civil Code, §4850; Pearce v. Chastain, 3 Ga. 226 (46 Am. D. 423) ; Davidson v. Story, 106 Ga. 799 (32 S. E. 867) ; Guernsey v. Phinizy, 113 Ga. 898 (39 S. E. 402, 84 Am. St. R. 270); Goodwin v. Mayor, 53 Ga. 410; Hearn v. Laird, 103 Ga. 271 (29 S. E. 973); Hamilton v. DuPre, 103 Ga. 795 (30 S. E. 248) ; Torras v. Raeburn, 108 Ga. 345 (33 S. E. 989) ; Strickland v. Hutchinson, 123 Ga. 396 (51 S. E. 348) ; Sparks v. Ga. Ry. Co., 113 Ga. 1111 (39 S. E. 470)), but proceeded with the trial of the main ease, and, upon evidence admitted and the pleadings before the' court, directed the jury to find a general verdict against the defendant. Upon that verdict the judge not only taxed the costs but decreed equitable relief in accordance with the prayers of the petition. When taken in connection with the pleadings, the evidence introduced upon the trial was not of such character as to authorize the direction of a verdict; and upon exception properly made a reversal of the ruling must result.
Judgment reversed.