109 Ga. 302 | Ga. | 1899
This action of ejectment was brought by J. W. Epps, as executor of C. W. Epps, against Ada F. Story and Joseph Story. Joseph Story disclaimed title to the land sued for; and Ada F. Story filed an answer, denying the allegations in plaintiff’s petition, and claiming title to the property by virtue of a parol contract. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff excepts to the judgment of the court overruling his motion for a new trial.
This is not a case, then, where the defendant insists upon her right of possession and her title to the premises in dispute by a mere voluntary agreement or gratuitous promise on the part of her father. It is well recognized that a specific performance of such an agreement could not be decreed. Yet it is equally well established that if possession be delivered in pursuance of such agreement, upon a meritorious consideration, and valuable iixxprovements made on the land by reason of faith in that promise or agreement, the father, at his option, can not rescind his agreement or revoke the gift. Hughes v. Hughes, 72 Ga. 174. Title by prescription growing out of adverse possession by a child of laxxds of the parent for seven years is based upon the conclusive presumptiorx of a gift. That provision of law has xxo applicatioxx to this case, for the principle above cited applies although the doxxee has xxot held severx years. See 72 Ga. 178, where a charge of the court below exiunciatixig that principle was affirmed. The facts in Denson v. Denson, 94 Ga. 525-6, are very similar to those developed by the record iix the present case. It appeared there that the parents, husband and wife, divided their land among their children and a daughter-in-law, allowing each his axxd her poi’tion; caused the land to be divided into separate parcels, and placed the daughter-in-law ixx possession of one of them, she agreeixxgto pay the owners annually a fixed sum for their support, axxd she occupied the land for several years, complying with the terms of her agreement. The original ownex’s evicted her from the premises. It was held that although the actual value of the premises for rent greatly exceeded the annuity she was to pay, she could maintaixx an action for the recovery back
The contention in this case, that the evidence tended to show the parent did not intend for the gift of this land to go into effect until his death, and that therefore the scheme of the agreement was testamentary in its character and could not be enforced, we do not think is at all sustained by the record. There is some testimony to the effect that the father intended to treat the land as a home for himself during his life, but the agreement actually made clearly explains what he meant by such a home; each child being obligated to furnish him for a specified time annually a support, and a place of abode on the premises. Besides, a reservation by a grantor of a certain limited interest in property for his life does not prevent thconveyance of property from taking effect in presenti. For example, one person can deed land to another and reserve in himself a life-estate, yet the deed would convey an immediate interest and title to the fee in remainder.
Judgment affirmed.