This writ of error was taken to a judgment awarding damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff below alleged to have been caused by negligent operation of a motor vehicle of the defendant below. It appears that an employee of the defendant had on Saturday been authorized by the defendant to operate the motor vehicle on the public highways for a specifiеd purpose of the defendant; that on the next day, Sunday, apparently without the lmowledge or the express or implied authority of the defendant, the same еmployee was operating the motor vehicle on the public highway for his оwn purposes when the injury occured by the alleged negligence of the employee in operating the motor vehicle. Damages were *146 awarded tо the plaintiff upon the theory that the defendant is liable for the injury shown if the defendant had, the day before the injury, authorized the operation of its motor vehiclе for its purpose on the public highways by its employee, whether the employee was engaged in employer’s or the employee’s business the next day at thе time of the injury.
The court gave the following charge: “The important question is whethеr the defendant gave its employee, one Sweat, either express or imрlied permission to use the auto truck, to take it into his custody or control and operate it on the public highways, and it is immaterial whether the employee was using it in the defendant’s business or the course of his employment as a servant of defendant or in the personal business or personal pleasure of the employee. The kind of use of which the employee was using the auto truck, that is whether for defendant or himself, is not material. ’ ’
The court also charged the jury: “If you find from the evidence that on a Saturday, preceding the day of the alleged injury to the plaintiff, an agent of the defendant, in charge of the defendant’s motor truck, entrustеd that motor truck to one Sweat to tune up same, or otherwise -work on samе, and did not expressly or impliedly authorize the said Sweat to operate the same on the public highways, and that on the day of the injury to the plaintiff the said Sweat had the said motor truck, and operated the same for his private business, and fоr a pleasure trip, without the knowledge, consent or acquiescencе of the defendant and that such operation was not within the scope of thе said Sweat’s employment, or about the business of the defendant, and that while said Swеat was so using said motor truck, the plaintiff was by the said Sweat’s operation, thereby injured and damaged, you should find the defendant not guilty.”
*147
Tlie charge fix-st above quoted does ixot comport with the law of this State. In Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.,
Revex-sed.
