117 Ga. 263 | Ga. | 1903
Constitutions are the result of popular will, and their words are to be understood ordinarily as used in the sense that such words ■convey to the popular mind. 6 Am. & Eng. Ene. L. (2d ed.) 924-5. There is nothing in the paragraph under consideration which indicates that the term “ debt ” was used in any other way than in its lordinary and popular sense. If a person unversed in the technical niceties of the law is asked what is the amount of his debts, his answer to the question in every instance would be :an amount which would represent the present liability that he is under at the moment the question is answered. A farmer who had been so unfortunate as to be compelled to place a long loan upon his farm, if asked what was the amount of the debt upon his farm,' would unhesitatingly answer by giving an amount which would represent the principal of the debt and any interest that was past due and payable at the time the inquiry was made. One who, in making a return of his property for taxation, is required to state to the tax-receiver the amount of solvent debts due him would not, in the case of a perfectly solvent debt, consider that he was under a moral obligation to return for taxation the value of the debt at any higher amount than one which would represent the principal and any interest that was past due at the time the return was made. It is useless to multiply illustrations. The debt of an individual, or a corporation, or the public, in its usual and popular .sense, means the amount for which the individual or corporation or the public would be presently liable if called upon to discharge
This view is strengthened when we consider the paragraph of the constitution above referred to in the light of that paragraph which provides that “ the bonded debt of the State shall never be increased, except to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the State in time of war.” Civil Code, § 5899. According to a well-settled rule of construction, when a word or phrase is used in-one part of the constitution in a plain and manifest sense, it is to receive the same construction when used in another part, unless it manifestly appears from the clause in which it is used, or other-' wise, that a different meaning should be applied to it. It is manifest that the framers of the constitution did not intend that the word “ debt ” in the paragraph just quoted should include interest on the bonded debt which was not due at the time the constitution
In only three instances is the word “interest” used in connection with the subject of the public debt. It is provided that when any county or municipality shall incur any “ bonded indebtedness” it shall, at or before the time of so doing, provide for the assessment and collection of an annual tax sufficient in amount to pay the ■“ principal and interest ” of such debt within thirty years from the date of the in curbing of the indebtedness. Civil Code, § 5894. This paragraph deals with the matter of the payment of the debt at the time of its maturity. It is not referring to the matter of interest to be earned in the future, but it is a provision that when the debt matures, when the principal is due and the interest is earned, there shall be provision made for the payment of the matured principal and earned interest. The word “ of,” preceding the
While the proceedings and debates of a constitutional convention can not be resorted to to alter or modify any constitutional provision, the meaning of which is perfectly clear, they may bfe looked to as valuable aids in determining the purpose and meaning of a term used in the constitution which is equivocal or ambiguous. Where the term used is one that has a well-defined popular meaning, the fact that the proceedings and debates of the convention indicate that it was the intention of the members of the convention that this term was to be taken in this sense, or the fact that nothing appears in the debates of the convention which would indicate that it was to be taken in any other sense, may well be considered by the courts as confirming an interpretation which gives to such word its usual and popular meaning. There is nothing in the journal or debates of the convention which indicates that the question as to whether the word “ debt,” in the paragraph of the constitution now under consideration, should include unearned interest was ever raised or discussed. While there was a discussion in reference to this paragraph, nothing at all appears in reference.
Similar questions have arisen in other States, under constitutions and legislative enactments, and the courts in construing such provisions have reached conclusions similar to the one we have reached. See Durant v. Iowa Co., 1 Woolw. 69, Fed. Cas. No. 4,189; Finnlayson v. Vaughn, 54 Minn. 331, 56 N. W. 49 ; Gibbons v. R. Co., 36 Ala. 410; Jones v. Hurlburt, 13 Neb. 125; Kelly v. Cole, 63 Kan. 385, 65 Pac. 672; Ashland v. Culberson, 103 Ky. 161, 44 S. W. 441; Herman v. Oconto, 110 Wis. 660.
There is another consideration which throws light upon the construction to be given to the word “debt” in the paragraph of the constitution involved in the present case. At the time the question was first raised as to the meaning of the word “ debt ” in this paragraph, the constitution had been in force for more than a quarter of a century. During all that time the word had been construed to mean principal, and at most principal and accrued interest, by every public officer of the State, whether of the legislative or the executive department, or one of the subordinate public corporations of the State; and we think it can be safely asserted that this word in this connection was so construed by nearly all of the people of the State. This would seem to be indicated by long acquiescence in the construction given by the other departments of the government and by the officers of the various cities and counties of the State. Laws have been passed by the General Assembly from time to time during this entire period, authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds in such amounts as that the issue would be unlawful if unearned interest upon the then-existing indebtedness of the city or county was to be counted as a part of the debt. If the meaning of the word is doubtful or ambiguous, this long-continued and unquestioned construction placed upon the word by the legislative and executive departments of the government is a weighty argument in favor of giving to the word the meaning thus given it. There are decisions of many courts holding that the plain import of a constitutional provision may be disregarded in order to avoid the injurious consequences of overturning long-established, though erroneous, practical construction. See cases cited in 6 Am. & Eng. Ene. L. (2d ed.) 932-3. But we do not at this time propose to commit ourselves to the soundness of this proposition.
It may be said that it is practically impossible for a city to become indebted in any amount, without incurring at least a contingent liability for interest on the principal sum borrowed. The constitution recognizes the right of a city to incur a principal'debt, and under this authority it has necessarily a right to incur a contingent liability resulting from the accumulation of interest upon the principal. But a contingent liability for interest will not make the amount of interest which may be due upon the happening of the contingency a part of the debt of the city, within the meaning of the constitution. Principal, whether due or to become due in the future, is a part of the debt of a municipality, within the
The constitution declares that municipal corporations shall not incur any debt until provision therefor shall have been made by the municipality; and that no municipal corporation shall incur any bonded indebtedness, unless, at or before the time of so doing, it provides for the assessment and collection of an annual tax sufficient in amount to pay the principal and interest of the debt within thirty years from the date of the incurring of the debt. Civil Code, §§ 5897, 5894. The constitution thus requires a municipal corporation to make provision for the payment of any debt it may incur by providing for the assessment and collection of an annual tax sufficient in amount to discharge the principal and interest of the debt. This does not, however, mean that the municipal authorities are compelled to collect this tax, if when the time arrives for payment of any part of the debt, either principal or interest, there are funds in the treasury derived from other sources which may be lawfully applied to the payment of the debt. The municipal authorities must make provision for the levy and collection of an annual tax, in the event the collection of the tax is necessary for the purpose of paying the debt; but we do not think it was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the municipal authorities should be compelled to collect the tax, although levied, when there were funds in the treasury derived from other sources which could be lawfully appropriated to the payment of the municipal indebtedness. The ordinances and notice of the election, properly construed, simply mean that a tax shall be levied each year sufficient in alnount to pay the interest due during the year, and the part of the principal maturing during the year, and that the tax so levied shall be collected and appropriated for this purpose ; provided that if there are other funds in the treasury derived from the income of the waterworks, which of course can, in the discretion of the municipal authorities, be applied in payment of the public debt of the city, the principal and interest may be discharged by the use of this fund, instead of requiring the taxpayers to pay the amount of the tax levied for this purpose. It is manifest, both from the ordinance and the notice of the election, that it is the purpose of the municipal authorities to comply with the-
The question as to whether provision has been made is not necessarily involved when the application is made to validate the bonds under the act of 1897. From the language of that act it-will appear that it is not incumbent upon the court to inquire into the question as to whether the provision has been made in conformity with the requirements of the constitution. The bonds are not to be issued until after they are validated. The provision is not required to be made until at or before the issuance of the-bonds; and therefore, in the proceeding to validate the bonds, if nothing appears as to what provision is to be made with reference to payment of the bonds, it will be presumed that if provision has-not already been made it will be made in accordance with the-constitution and laws. See, in this connection, Wimberly v.
The constitution does not contemplate for one moment that a debt incurred by a municipality or county since the adoption of
Judgment in each case affirmed.