Lead Opinion
Opinion
In this case, a local church has disaffiliated itself from a larger, general church with which it had been affiliated. Both the local church and the general church claim ownership of the local church building and the property on which the building stands. The parties have asked the courts of this state to resolve this dispute. When secular courts are asked to resolve an internal church dispute over property ownership, obvious dangers exist that
State courts must not decide questions of religious doctrine; those are for the church to resolve. Accordingly, if resolution of the property dispute involves a doctrinal dispute, the court must defer to the position of the highest ecclesiastical authority that has decided the doctrinal point. But to the extent the court can resolve the property dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should use what the United States Supreme Court has called the “ ‘neutral principles of law’ ” approach. (Jones v. Wolf (1979)
Applying the neutral principles of law approach, we conclude, on this record, that the general church, not the local church, owns the property in question. Although the deeds to the property have long been in the name of the local church, that church agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater church and to be bound by its governing documents. These governing documents make clear that church property is held in trust for the general church and may be controlled by the local church only so long as that local church remains a part of the general church. When it disaffiliated from the general church, the local church did not have the right to take the church property with it.
We must also resolve the preliminary procedural question of whether this action is subject to a special motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—generally called an “anti-SLAPP motion.”
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusions, although not always for the same reasons.
“The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America . . . , organized in 1789, was the product of secession of the Anglican church in the colonies from the Church of England, the latter church itself being the product of secession from the Church of Rome in 1534.” (Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker (1981)
St. James Parish began as a mission of the Episcopal Church in 1946. In 1947, members of the mission sought permission from the Los Angeles Diocese to organize as a parish. The members’ handwritten application “promise[d] and declare[d] that the said Parish shall be forever held under, and conform to and be bound by, the Ecclesiastical authority of the Bishop of Los Angeles, and of his successor in office, the Constitution and Canons of the [Episcopal Church], and the Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Los Angeles.” Articles of Incorporation of St. James Parish, filed with the California Secretary of State on March 1, 1949, stated that the corporation was formed “[t]o establish and maintain a Parish which shall form a constituent part of the Diocese of Los Angeles in [the Episcopal Church]; and so that the Constitution and Canons, Rules, Regulations and Discipline of said Church . . . and the Constitution and Canons in the Diocese of Los Angeles, for the time being shall, unless they be contrary to the laws of this State, always form a part of the By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation of the corporation hereby formed and shall prevail against and govern anything herein contained that may appear repugnant to such Constitutions, Canons, Rules, Regulations and Discipline . . . .” In 1991, St. James Parish amended its articles of incorporation, but it did not modify these provisions.
In 1950, the “Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Los Angeles” deeded the property on which the church building stands to St. James Parish for consideration of “less than $100.00.” The deeds to the property have been in the name of the local church ever since.
Canon II.6 of the canons of the general convention of the Episcopal Church provides: “Sec. 1. No Church or Chapel shall be consecrated until the
“Sec. 2. It shall not be lawful for any Vestry, Trustees, or other body authorized by laws of any State or Territory to hold property for any Diocese, Parish or Congregation, to encumber or alienate any dedicated and consecrated Church or Chapel, or any Church or Chapel which has been used solely for Divine Service, belonging to the Parish or Congregation which they represent, without the previous consent of the Bishop, acting with the advice and consent of the Standing Committee of the Diocese.
“Sec. 3. No dedicated and consecrated Church or Chapel shall be removed, taken down, or otherwise disposed of for any worldly or common use, without the previous consent of the Standing Committee of the Diocese.
“Sec. 4. Any dedicated and consecrated Church or Chapel shall be subject to the trust declared with respect to real and personal property held by any Parish, Mission, or Congregation as set forth in Canon 1.7.4.”
The record shows, and no one disputes, that the Episcopal Church first adopted the original versions of sections 2 and 3 of Canon II.6 in 1868. It added section 1 of that Canon in 1871 and section 4 in 1979 when it amended Canon 1.7.
In 1979, in apparent response to that year’s United States Supreme Court opinion in Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Recently, as a result of a doctrinal dispute, St. James Parish disaffiliated itself from the Episcopal Church. It appears that the dispute leading to the decision to disaffiliate arose after the national church ordained an openly gay man as a bishop in New Hampshire in 2003. Some members of the Episcopal Church, including members of St. James Parish, disagreed with this ordination. In July 2004, the board of St. James Parish voted to end its affiliation with the Episcopal Church and to affiliate with the Anglican Church of
To resolve this dispute, the Los Angeles Diocese and various individuals, including a dissenter from the decision by St. James Parish to disaffiliate (hereafter collectively Los Angeles Diocese), sued various individuals connected with St. James Parish (defendants) alleging eight property-recovery-related causes of action. Later, the national Episcopal Church successfully sought to intervene on the side of the Los Angeles Diocese and filed its own complaint in intervention against defendants. In essence, both sides in this litigation, i.e., defendants on one side, and the Los Angeles Diocese and Episcopal Church allied on the other side, claim ownership of the local church building and property on which it stands.
Defendants moved to strike the Los Angeles Diocese’s lawsuit as a SLAPP suit under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action without leave to amend, finding both that the action was a SLAPP suit and that plaintiffs had not established a probability that they would prevail. The court later sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to the Episcopal Church’s complaint in intervention and dismissed that action. The Los Angeles Diocese and the Episcopal Church appealed the dismissals. The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals and reversed the judgments. That court ruled that the action was not a SLAPP suit subject to the special motion to strike, and that the higher church authorities, not defendants, own the disputed property.
We granted review to decide whether this action is subject to the special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and to address the merits of the church property dispute.
II. Discussion
A. Special Motion to Strike Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16
Before considering the merits of the property dispute, we must decide a preliminary procedural question. Subdivision (b)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
“[S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a two-step process when determining whether a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)
The Los Angeles Diocese’s complaint did allege facts concerning the reasons defendants decided to disaffiliate from the greater church. Nevertheless, we conclude the action did not arise from protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. As the Court of Appeal aptly stated, “The flaw in this thinking is that it confuses the motivation for the disaffiliation with the claims made by the general church about the use of church property. [][]... [I]t makes no difference why defendants are disaffiliating; the point is they are being sued for asserting control over the local parish property to the exclusion of a right to control asserted by plaintiffs.”
“[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
B. Resolving the Dispute over the Church Property
Both lower courts also addressed the merits of the dispute over ownership of the local church—the trial court found in favor of the local church and the Court of Appeal found clear and convincing evidence in favor of the general church. We will also address this question, which the parties as well as various amici curiae have fully briefed. We will first consider what method the secular courts of this state should use to resolve disputes over church property. We will then apply that method to analyze the dispute of this case.
1. How California Courts Should Resolve Disputes over Church Property
Decisions from both this court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear that, when asked to do so, secular courts may, indeed must, resolve internal church disputes over ownership of church property. As the high court put it in the seminal 19th-century case involving a church property dispute, “an appeal is made to the secular authority; the courts when so called on must perform their functions as in other cases. [f] Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.” (Watson v. Jones (1871)
But when called on to resolve church property disputes, secular courts must not entangle themselves in disputes over church doctrine or infringe on the right to free exercise of religion. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has made two points clear: (1) how state courts resolve church property disputes is a matter of state law; but (2) the method a state chooses must not
The high court found invalid, for example, a method used in Georgia whereby “the right to the property previously used by the local churches was made to turn on a civil court jury decision as to whether the general church abandoned or departed from the tenets of faith and practice it held at the time the local churches affiliated with it.” (Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra,
The court adopted this test for a hierarchical church: “[Wjhenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.” (Watson v. Jones, supra,
The second approach the high court has approved is what it called the “ ‘neutral principles of law’ ” approach. (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
The high court definitively approved the neutral principles approach in Jones v. Wolf, supra,
The high court reviewed three Georgia Supreme Court opinions that postdated the remand in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra,
The Jones v. Wolf court upheld Georgia’s neutral principles approach, although it remanded the particular case to the Georgia Supreme Court for further proceedings on a narrow point irrelevant to the issue of this case.
Despite these potential difficulties, the high court concluded that “the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in application. These problems, in addition, should be gradually eliminated as recognition is given to the obligation of ‘States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.’ [Citation.] We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Early cases from this court resolving church property disputes generally cited Watson v. Jones, supra,
The Court of Appeal in this case criticized these Court of Appeal decisions for, in its view, violating principles of stare decisis. The Court of Appeal believed that early cases of this court specifically adopted the principle of government approach, thus precluding the more recent Courts of Appeal from adopting the neutral principles approach. We disagree. As explained in the Court of Appeal opinion containing the most thorough examination of this question (Presbytery of Riverside, supra,
Watson v. Jones, supra,
The Presbytery of Riverside court also discussed early decisions of this court and concluded that, although they cited and applied the rule of Watson v. Jones, supra,
Accordingly, we conclude that secular courts called on to resolve church property disputes should proceed as follows: State courts must not decide questions of religious doctrine; those are for the church to resolve. Accordingly, if resolution of a property dispute involves a point of doctrine, the court must defer to the position of the highest ecclesiastical authority that has decided the point. But to the extent the court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law. The court should consider sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s articles of incorporation, the general church’s constitution, canons, and rules, and relevant statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property, such as Corporations Code section 9142. (See Jones v. Wolf, supra,
2. Resolving the Dispute of This Case
St. James Parish holds record title to the property in question. That is the fact that defendants rely on most heavily in claiming ownership. On the other hand, from the beginning of its existence, St. James Parish promised to be bound by the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church. Such commitment is found in the original application to the higher church authorities to
The question before us is, which prevails—the fact that St. James Parish holds record title to the property, or the facts that it is bound by the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church and the canons impress a trust in favor of the general church? In deciding this question, we are not entirely free from constitutional constraints. Once again, Jones v. Wolf, supra,
The dissent argued that “in each case involving an intrachurch dispute— including disputes over church property—-the civil court must focus directly on ascertaining, and then following, the decision made within the structure of church governance. . . . [B]y recognizing the authoritative resolution reached within the religious association, the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with the religious governance of those who have formed the association and submitted themselves to its authority.” (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Shortly after this decision, and in apparent reaction to it, the Episcopal Church added Canon 1.7.4, which recites an express trust in favor of the denominational church. This occurred some 25 years before the instant dispute erupted. Defendants focus on the high court’s reference to what the “parties” can do, and argue that Canon 1.7.4, to be effective, had to have been enacted by the parties—in other words, that some kind of agreement must have been reached between the general church and St. James Parish (and presumably every other parish in the country) ratifying Canon 1.7.4. We do not so read the high court’s words. Use of the passive voice in describing the possible “alternative^” of making the general church’s constitution recite the trust suggests the high court intended that this could be done by whatever method the church structure contemplated. Requiring a particular method to change a church’s constitution—such as requiring every parish in the country to ratify the change—would infringe on the free exercise rights of religious associations to govern themselves as they see fit. It would impose a major, not a “minimal,” burden on the church governance. (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Thus, the high court’s discussion in Jones v. Wolf, supra,
A California statutory provision that was enacted shortly after Jones v. Wolf, supra,
“(c) No assets of a religious corporation are or shall be deemed to be impressed with any trust, express or implied, statutory or at common law unless one of the following applies: [f] . . . [f]
“(2) Unless, and only to the extent that, the articles or bylaws of the corporation, or the governing instruments of a superior religious body or general church of which the corporation is a member, so expressly provide. m... m
“(d) Trusts created by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) may be amended or dissolved by amendment from time to time to the articles, bylaws, or governing instruments creating the trusts. . . .” (Italics added.)
This statute appears to be the type of statute the United States Supreme Court had in mind when it approved reliance on “provisions of state statutory law governing the holding of property by religious corporations . . . .” (Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., supra,
Defendants argue that section 9142 states only a negative conditional, not a positive imperative. In other words, in their view, the statutory provisions are minimum requirements for impression of a trust on local religious property, and do not necessarily exclude other requirements therefor. Defendants focus on the grammatical construction of subdivision (c), and its repeated use of the word “unless.” As defendants would have it, there is never a trust “unless” one of the statutory provisions is present, but this does not mean there is always a trust when one or more of the provisions is present. But this interpretation overlooks subdivision (d) of section 9142. That subdivision provides that “[tjrusts created by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) may be amended or dissolved by amendment from time to time to the articles, bylaws, or governing instruments creating the trusts. . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, subdivision (d) appears clearly to indicate that, under California law, a trust is created by compliance with any one of the alternatives set forth in subdivision (c)(2), and it can only be altered or dissolved by amending the creating instrument.
In short, St. James Parish agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of a greater denominational church and to be bound by that greater church’s governing instruments. Those instruments make clear that a local parish owns local church property in trust for the greater church and may use that property only so long as the local church remains part of the greater church. Respect for the First Amendment free exercise rights of persons to enter into a religious association of their choice, as delineated in Jones v. Wolf, supra,
This conclusion is bolstered by a review of out-of-state cases that involved similar church property disputes within the Episcopal Church and that, with near unanimity, awarded the disputed property to the general church when a
Other Episcopal Church cases reaching similar conclusions include Bishop and Diocese of Colorado v. Mote (Colo. 1986)
Defendants rely in part on Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, supra,
Defendants also cite California-Nevada Annual Conf of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke’s United Methodist Church, supra,
The St. Luke’s court also stated that “subdivision (c)(2) of Corporations Code section 9142 does not authorize a general church to create a trust interest for itself in property owned by a local church simply by issuing a rule declaring that such a trust exists . . . .” (St. Luke’s, supra,
Defendants argue that such a reading of section 9142 “would unconstitutionally promote and establish denominational religion.” We need not, indeed cannot, consider all possible applications of section 9142, but as applied here, the section is fully consistent with Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Defendants also rely on Evidence Code section 662, which provides, “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” We need not decide how or whether this statute interacts with the more specific section 9142 (or the 1st Amendment constraints that exist in this case), because, as the Court of Appeal noted, “particularly when read in conjunction with section 9142, canon 1.7.4 is clear and convincing evidence rebutting any presumption that the beneficial interest in the local church property is solely controlled by the local parish corporation.”
Defendants state that, over the years, St. James Parish “purchased additional parcels of property in its own name, with funds donated exclusively by its members.” They contend that it would be unjust and contrary to the intent of the members who, they argue, “acquired, built, improved, maintained, repaired, cared for and used the real and personal property at issue for over fifty years,” to cause the local parish to “los[e] its property simply because it has changed its spiritual affiliation.” But the matter is not so clear. We may assume that St. James Parish’s members did what defendants say they did for
For these reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion (although not with all of its reasoning) that, on this record, when defendants disaffiliated from the Episcopal Church, the local church property reverted to the general church. As stated in one of the out-of-state cases involving the same Episcopal Church, “[t]he individual defendants are free to disassociate themselves from [the parish and the Episcopal Church] and to affiliate themselves with another religious denomination. No court can interfere with or control such an exercise of conscience. The problem lies in defendants’ efforts to take the church property with them. This they may not do.” (Protestant Episc. Church Diocese of N. J. v. Graves, supra,
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
Notes
The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002)
As relevant here, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (First Amendment) provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...” (See Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952)
As the high court later explained, Watson v. Jones, supra,
Although the high court originally referred to “neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes” (Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra,
A statute governing specifically church property obviously is not developed for use in all property disputes, but, as the high court has made clear, it may still be considered in applying neutral principles of law as that court defines the term. Such a statute is—or must be—neutral in the sense that it does not require state courts to resolve questions of religious doctrine.
The Georgia Supreme Court had also resolved a dispute over which of two local factions properly represented the local church. The high court was concerned that the Georgia Supreme Court had not adequately explained its reasoning. Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court did not explain whether it simply applied majority rule—which the high court indicated would be permissible—or whether the decision “involve[d] considerations of religious doctrine and polity”—which the high court indicated would not be permissible. (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
In a case not involving a church property dispute, we described “the rule that the state must accept the decision of appropriate church authorities on . . . matters [of religious doctrine and internal church governance]” as “the rule of the so-called church property cases.” (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004)
The opinion of Presbytery of Riverside, supra,
See Bishop and Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, supra, 716 P.2d at pages 108-109; id., footnote 17 (“[W]e find the holding in Barker inapplicable and decline to follow it.”); Trinity-St. Michael’s Parish, Inc. v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of CT, supra,
Concurrence Opinion
I agree with the majority that the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (Episcopal Church) owns the property to which St. James Parish in Newport Beach (St. James Parish) has held title since 1950. This conclusion is compelled by Corporations Code section 9142, subdivision (c)(2). But I disagree with the majority that this provision, which applies only to religious corporations, reflects a “neutral principles of law” approach.
I
St. James Parish began in 1946 as a mission of the Episcopal Church. In 1949, it incorporated and became a parish of the Episcopal Church. Since 1950, the parish has held the deed to the property on which the parish’s church building stands. Ownership of the property is at issue here.
Thereafter, the Episcopal Church, its Los Angeles Diocese, and a congregation member who voted against the decision of the parish to disaffiliate brought these actions, asserting that the property at issue was being held in trust for the Episcopal Church. The trial court ruled for St. James Parish; the Court of Appeal reversed. This court granted review.
II
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)
One is the “principle of government” approach: When the dispute involves a hierarchical church, as here the Episcopal Church, civil courts must accept decisions made at the highest level of the church hierarchy. (Watson v. Jones (1871)
The other is the “neutral principles of law” approach. That concept, as used in the context of a civil court’s resolution of church property disputes, simply permits application of “objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.” (Jones v. Wolf (1919)
The United States Supreme Court has left it to the states to decide which approach to adopt. (Jones v. Wolf supra,
Applying California’s statute in resolving church property disputes, the majority concludes that the Episcopal Church now is the owner of the St. James Parish property in question. I agree.
But that conclusion is not based on neutral principles of law.
But under the principle of government approach, the Episcopal Church wins because that method makes the decision of the highest authority of a hierarchical church, here the Episcopal Church, binding on a civil court. This result is constitutional, but only because the dispute involves religious bodies and then only because the principle of government approach, permissible under the First Amendment, allows a state to give unbridled deference to the superior religious body or general church.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied February 25, 2009, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
In footnote 4, page 481, the majority asserts that neutral principles of law “include application of statutes specifically governing religious property.” I disagree. In the United States Supreme Court’s usage, neutral principles of law refer to laws that apply in the same way regardless of whether property is church property. (Jones v. Wolf, supra,
“The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title.” (Evid. Code, § 662.)